Re: BGP FlowSpec

2016-04-30 Thread Pierre Lamy
I was looking into using this mechanism for blocking DDoS on Juniper devices, but at the time, they only supported 8k flowspec entries/routes and this was not sufficient to deal with the problem. My fallback was to poison the routing table with null routes, but the problem with this was that it did

Re: Spitballing IoT Security

2016-10-31 Thread Pierre Lamy
On 30/10/2016 12:43 AM, Eric S. Raymond wrote: > Ronald F. Guilmette : >> Two kids with a modest amount of knowledge >> and a lot of time on their hands can do it from their mom's basement. > > I in turn have to call BS on this. If it were really that easy, we'd > be inund

Re: Ddos mitigation service

2013-02-01 Thread Pierre Lamy
The 3 major scrubbing vendors: Prolexic Verisign Akamai Prolexic has the ability to announce a /24 for you, and scrub the whole thing, then pipe it back to you via a GRE tunnel or dedicated circuit. All of the companies mentioned do this for a living, and are pretty good at what they do. Ther

Re: Ddos mitigation service

2013-02-01 Thread Pierre Lamy
also highly recommended that you have incident handlers who are able to make big decisions. -Pierre On 01/02/2013 10:48 AM, James Thomas wrote: Hi Pierre, Thank you for your interesting note. On 01/02/2013 09:57, Pierre Lamy wrote: The 3 major scrubbing vendors: Prolexic Verisign Akamai I

Re: OpenNTPProject.org

2014-01-16 Thread Pierre Lamy
BCP38 will only ever get implemented if governments and ruling 'net bodies force deployment. There's otherwise very little benefit seen by the access network providers, since the targets are other orgs and the attacks are happening in a different backyard. On 14/01/2014 10:36 AM, Paul Ferguson