On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 05:01:35PM -0600, Richard Laager wrote:
> On 2024-02-12 15:18, Job Snijders via NANOG wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 04:07:52PM -0500, Geoff Huston wrote:
> > > I was making an observation that the presentation material was
> > > referring to
On Mon, Feb 26, 2024 at 05:41:12PM +, Ray Orsini via NANOG wrote:
> What tools are you using to monitor BGP announcements and route changes?
The wonderful BGP.tools already has been mentioned a few times.
Another excellent option is https://Packetvis.com, I find their RPKI
monitoring approach
Dear Carlos, LACNIC, and wider community,
I very much appreciate how LACNIC worked with various stakeholders
before publicly commiting to the schedule outlined in Carlos' email.
>From what I can see, LACNIC pro-actively and properly tested their
purported post-migration environment with very broa
Dear all,
FYI:
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402579A1.pdf
Kind regards,
Job
On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 02:23:52PM -0400, Nanog News wrote:
> *Jonathan Black has been appointed NANOG Executive Director*
>
> In his new role, Jonathan will be responsible for the organization's
> operational management and will collaborate with the NANOG Board to
> refine, articulate, and implem
On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 04:05:21PM -0400, Josh Luthman wrote:
> Now do you think they're going to properly understand what an SS7 or
> vulnerability is?
The FCC organised several sessions (private and public) where they
invited knowledgeable people from this community to help edifice them on
what
Dear all,
A fact sheet has now been published, with much more detail and
considerations: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402609A1.pdf
This is a VERY interesting read!
Kind regards,
Job
On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 07:17:37PM -0400, Brandon Martin wrote:
> I suspect that's why we've had some success with getting BGP security
> not just addressed in guidance but actually practically improved.
Ben Cartwright-Cox's axiom (paraphrased): "The real reason the Internet
works is that we want
On Fri, 5 Jul 2024 at 06:59, Randy Bush wrote:
> not to distract from everyone diagnosing someone else's problem, but ...
>
> what foss dns monitoring tools do folk use to alert of
> - iminent delegation expiry
> - inconsistent service (lame, soa mismatches, ...)
> - dnssec signing and time
Rubens,
ARIN-NONAUTH was deprecated two years ago:
https://www.arin.net/vault/announcements/20220404-irr/
Aliaksei,
Indeed, it appears both NTT’s and RADB’s mirror instances are
desynchronized in relationship to ARIN’s IRR. Both NTT and RADB should do a
database reload to rectify the issue.
Des
On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 09:37:22PM -0400, Aliaksei Sheshka wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 9:26 PM Job Snijders via NANOG
> wrote:
>
> > Indeed, it appears both NTT’s and RADB’s mirror instances are
> > desynchronized in relationship to ARIN’s IRR. Both NTT and RADB
>
On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 07:10:48PM -0400, Aliaksei Sheshka wrote:
> nothing! I suspect the mirror is out of sync.
>
> Now NTT mirror:
Seems reloading helped:
$ date
Thu Jul 11 03:50:22 UTC 2024
$ whois -h rr.ntt.net 199.52.73.0/24
route: 199.52.73.0/24
origin: AS132055
descr:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 04:32:40AM +, Christopher Hawker wrote:
> When it comes to RPKI, its deployment and usage, there is a fair bit
> of information available on the Internet. Each RIR has their own
> guides for creating ROAs, each router vendor and developer has their
> own guides for deplo
Dear all,
I'd like to share an update on RFC 9234 deployment. RFC 9234 titled
"BGP Open Policy" aka the "Only-To-Customer" (OTC) BGP Path Attribute is
an anti-route-leak mechanism which is *NOT* based on RPKI! (yes ...
routing security is more than just RPKI! :-)
The basic idea of 9234 is that BG
On Tue, Sep 24, 2024 at 02:57:21PM +0200, Ben Cartwright-Cox via NANOG wrote:
> One example is if the customer is doing ROKI ROV validation (and their
> upstream isn't) having a default would defeat ROV validation
Ben, Perhaps I am misunderstanding you ... but I am not sure default
routes 'defeat'
On Wed, Sep 18, 2024 at 07:33:37AM -0400, Steven Wallace wrote:
> Internet2 uses Cloudflare’s https://rpki.cloudflare.com/rpki.json as
> an alternate source for RPKI-ROA information. We recently discovered
> that this file omits IPv4 ROAs longer than /24. It would be helpful if
> it included all RO
On Mon, 18 Nov 2024 at 14:29, Matt Corallo wrote:
> On 11/18/24 5:11 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
> > * na...@as397444.net (Matt Corallo) [Sun 17 Nov 2024, 20:44 CET]:
> >> Apologies if it came across as insulting, indeed I wasn't spending my
> time reading IETF mailing
> >> lists in the early 2010s :
On Fri, Dec 06, 2024 at 10:55:30PM +, Ryan Hamel wrote:
> That means (at least for Noction) the operator has to go out of their
> way to disable safety, so those that claim it has bad defaults, may
> want to RTFM.
While I appreciate various business drivers and motivations exist to
deploy sof
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