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There's no need for Ukraine to engage ICAAN to achieve its goals.
Pretty much every nation has existing telecommunications laws with
power for regulation to require telecommunications providers not to
provide service to particular nation-states. Law w
Hi Matthew
There's a typical 10*SFP tray and less common 20* tray. Flexoptix,
Fiberstore and others retail these (as well as use them to protect
their transceivers in transit) or AliBaba gives lots of hits. Use a
tray per transceiver part number and keep them vertical in an
appropriately-sized bo
Eric Kuhnke wrote:
> Has anyone out there standardized on putting GPS coordinates in this
> field [SNMP sysLocation]
See also: the LOC record type in DNS.
-glen
y
> deny udp any 123 any 123
> permit ip any any
Which just pushes NTP to some other port, making control harder. We’ve already
pushed all ‘interesting' traffic to port 80 on TCP, which has made traffic
control very expensive. Let’s not repeat that history.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
Saku Ytti wrote:
>
> It's essentially abusing (some what well-defined and interoperable abuse) 32b
> tag field for this purpose.
That's pretty much what the OSPF tag and the BGP's synchronisation with OSPF
were originally intended for.
However it's pretty much a design misfeature and you'd be
is no inter-process information leakage this isn't seen as a
problem in the traditional Unix view of security. You may have differing views
if your program is a daemon servicing a multitude of networked users. Thus the
interest in alternative malloc() and free() implementations.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
Fernando,
Perhaps the document should have opened with a disclaimer that it is impossible
to describe the full customer requirements for a firewall and thus a customer
can reasonably add additional requirements. Then everyone knows where they
stand and we avoid stupid (perhaps contractual) argu
partners but are proof against receive-only
optical taps (and in that case I’d encourage the SFF Committee to specify that
implementations print their fingerprint and the fingerprint of the partner
GBIC, so that people can verify after the fact that the partner expected is the
one encountered).
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
On 30 Jun 2014, at 3:47 pm, Saku Ytti wrote:
> On (2014-06-30 13:28 +0930), Glen Turner wrote:
>
>> After the SFF Committee specifies the registers the operating system vendors
>> or vendors of devices would then add commands to support to toggle the I2C
>> needed to
ly bridge each MPLS tunnel into a VLAN to the Linux
computer. Then you can use a stock vendor kernel, with its lack of
maintenance hassles.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
perationally you soon get used
to the hex prefix and only notice when it isn't one of the common ones.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
On 23/06/2013, at 1:21 PM, William Allen Simpson wrote:
> What security protocols are folks using to protect SONET/SDH?
> At what speeds?
"Excuse me NSA, can I have export approval for one KG-530 SDH encryptor?" What
are the odds :-)
And how would we know that the "export model" isn't simply
other than the ISP.
You've seen in the NSA documents how highly they regard this
traffic analysis. I'd fully expect the NSA to collect it by
other means.
-glen
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
Perhaps more interesting than bytes on backbones would be the median distance
to an Internet-connected device.
-glen
ly sucked. As a trivial example of what can
go wrong, if you unknowingly choose an airport where customs works
9am-5pm and your flight arrives at 2am, then you've got a rather
long wait in the walkway between Immigration and Customs. So long
a wait that you're likely to encounter some o
people believe it is normal and acceptable.
Why not contact the FBI. Not because it will help. But because if even 1%
of the libraries in the country do that then the FBI will take the path of
least resistance, which is to hassle ISPs with enough warrants until the
ISPs find it economic to clean up
king in business acumen as to say that their customer was UALIBI.
Amazing. A fine case study of a person in customer contact undoing the
work of millions of dollars in PR. Whatever you say about Steve Ballmer
he's a great sales person at heart. He must despair at
es
performance on high-BDP (Bandwidth Delay Product) networks.
Cheers, Glen
--
Glen Turner
ts incorporation into Linux, the corral
where most TCP algorithm shoot-outs take place.
--
Glen Turner
George Imburgia wrote:
There's a standard;
ANSI/TIA/EIA 606A
http://www.flexcomm.com/library/606aguide.pdf
Here in Australia there's no standard for colours of data communications
patch cables.
But there are some non-data communications standards for fixed
cable colours. In particular, fire sy
e MTU of the network. almost equal number of tiny packets carrying
the ACK's of the mobygrams, and then a small noise level of "everything else".
Our network also shows peaks at the ethernet MTU (our MTU is higher than that)
and the DNS packet size.
--
Glen Turner
<http://ww
m an in-country peer).
DNS is the wrong answer, simply because there's no way for the user to
express *their* policy. But since there no CDN support in HTTP.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
others in this regard). Tracking down all the references to
an address and changing the config merely as the result of a
hardware swap is painful and adds complexity at a time when
it is not desired.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
Network Engineer
Australia's A
7pm appears to be a bad time to tune in if you're in the UK...
The streaming is very appreciated. A clock visible to the camera would
save the hassle of translating local time to agenda time.
--
Glen Turner <http://www.gdt.id.au/~gdt/>
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