On 06/03/2015 04:27 AM, Roland Dobbins wrote:
> (not to mention the
> enumeration and enhanced DDoS impact of packeting routers doing crypto
> for their BGP sessions and which aren't protected via iACLs/GTSM).
Could you elaborate on your enumeration and DDoS concerns? If you're
concerned about the
On 06/02/2015 10:04 PM, Ethan Katz-Bassett wrote:
> The same folks also followed up that workshop paper with a longer paper on
> the topic:
> https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/sigRPKI.pdf
And a different set of folks (including me) are working on a different
mechanism to protect against attacks
On 2015-06-05 02:40, Roland Dobbins wrote:
On 5 Jun 2015, at 10:56, David Mandelberg wrote:
Could you elaborate on your enumeration and DDoS concerns?
Crypto = more overhead. Less priority to crypto plus DDoS = routing
update issues.
I don't think there's an update issue here.
On 2015-06-11 07:30, Russ White wrote:
There have been suggestions that a key-per-AS is easier to manage
than a
key-per-router, like in provisioning.
Two points --
First, if a single person with console access leaves the company, I
must
roll the key for all my BGP routes, with the attendant
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