We're rate limiting it now, but it's definitely bad behavior. When I open
the flood gates, over a 5-min sample from a single host I received well
over 61,000 queries.
The size of the records being requested cause this to be an (unintended)
amplification attack, as a 30Mbps inbound sum is getting am
In a message written on Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 05:48:18PM +, rar wrote:
> The goal is to keep the single BGP router from being a single point of
> failure.
I don't really understand the failure analysis / uptime calculation.
There is one router on the Comcast side, which is a single point of
f
+1, could not have said it better.
On 10/15/2016 01:47 AM, Leo Bicknell wrote:
In a message written on Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 05:48:18PM +, rar wrote:
The goal is to keep the single BGP router from being a single point of failure.
I don't really understand the failure analysis / uptime calcu
It comes down to sizing your failure domain. Any single upstream Transit
alone means the failure domain is the whole site (making assumptions about
your topology). As mentioned earlier, any single point of failure doesn't
reduce your failure footprint and gives little in terms of redundancy. Now
if
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