Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Rob Seastrom
John Kristoff writes: > If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that > wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address > except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) or > control link local control traffic (e.g. local SPF adjace

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Maxwell Cole
On 3/24/15 5:27 AM, Rob Seastrom wrote: John Kristoff writes: If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) or control link local co

AT&T BGP Operations in Miami, FL

2015-03-24 Thread Patrick Tracanelli
Hello, Is there anyone from ATT BGP operations who can contact-me off list please for Miami location? I have an open ticket since early morning and a BGP session not exporting other transit ASNs, which were just working by the morning. Thank you. -- Patrick Tracanelli

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 5:27 AM, Rob Seastrom wrote: > > John Kristoff writes: > >> If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that >> wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address >> except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) o

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Scott Weeks
-- > measures". I volunteer to write the article on "YOLO upgrades", > wherein one loads untested software on equipment with no OOB, types > "request system reboot", shouts "YOLO", and hits return. :: YOLO - If a manager forces me to do