Greg Whynott writes:
> i found it funny how M$ started giving away virus/security software
> for its OS. it can't fix the leaky roof, so it includes a roof patch
> kit. (and puts about 10 companies out of business at the same time)
I actually like the new arrangement better, where Microsoft prov
"George Bonser" writes:
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Bret Clark
>> Sent: Friday, December 10, 2010 7:08 AM
>> To: nanog@nanog.org
>> Subject: Re: BGP multihoming question.
>>
>> On 12/10/2010 10:01 AM, Dylan Ebner wrote:
>> > 3. You cannot trust the second isp to advertise the SWIP b
Interesting analysis of the 3 "LOIC" tool variants used in the "Anonymous"
Operation Payback attacks on Mastercard, Paypal, etc.
http://www.simpleweb.org/reports/loic-report.pdf
LOIC makes no attempt to hide the IP addresses of the attackers, making it easy
to trace them if they are using their
Interesting..
there's an ED about LOIC
http://encyclopediadramatica.com/LOIC
it even gives a instruction on how to deny the use of the tool: (funny)
What if I get caught and V&d?
You probably won't. It's recommended that attack with over 9000 other
anons while attacking alone pretty much means
> -Original Message-
> From: Marshall Eubanks [mailto:t...@multicasttech.com]
> Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2010 10:20 AM
> To: North American Network Operators Group
> Subject: LOIC tool used in the "Anonymous" attacks
>
> Interesting analysis of the 3 "LOIC" tool variants used in the
>
I was reading about this- yeah really "anonymous".
http://praetorianprefect.com/archives/2010/12/anonymous-releases-very-unanonymous-press-release/
Also:
http://www.boingboing.net/2010/12/11/anonymous-isnt-loic.html
Andrew
From: Stefan Fouant
To: 'Marshall Eubanks' ; 'North American Networ
check the agreed maintenance windows as defined in the (SLA)section Maintenance
Plans - etc
- Original Message
From: Joel Jaeggli
To: valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Fri, December 10, 2010 6:48:41 PM
Subject: Re: [Operational] Internet Police
On 12/10/10 9:06
location?
- Original Message
From: Matt Disuko
To: NANOG
Sent: Thu, December 9, 2010 3:02:59 PM
Subject: Global Crossing/GBLX tech needed - AS3549
Can a Global Crossing IP engineer please contact me off-list?
Thanks,
Matt
It's hard to believe that it took eight people to run wireshark and
write this simplistic paper about LOIC. The analysis is weak at best
(it seems they only had a few days to study the problem), and never
analyzes the source code which has been widely available at
https://github.com/NewEraCracker/L
In a message written on Sat, Dec 11, 2010 at 10:19:32AM -0500, Marshall Eubanks
wrote:
> LOIC makes no attempt to hide the IP addresses of the attackers, making it
> easy to trace them if they are using their own computers.
Perhaps the authors of the tool would rather keep the finite law
enforc
On Fri, 10 Dec 2010 15:32:10 -0500
Drew Weaver wrote:
> I should've "qualified" my question by saying "What valid application
> which traverses the Internet and could be seen at the edge of a
> network actually uses UDP 80?"
I'll grant that my response was a bit pedantic: there is no
legitimate
On Dec 11, 2010, at 4:21 PM, Leo Bicknell wrote:
> In a message written on Sat, Dec 11, 2010 at 10:19:32AM -0500, Marshall
> Eubanks wrote:
>> LOIC makes no attempt to hide the IP addresses of the attackers, making it
>> easy to trace them if they are using their own computers.
>
> Perhaps th
Like I said the other day on Cnet comments section, December 10, 2010 3:31 PM
PST.
"It is extremely easy to find out who everyone is, because the
"anonymous" is decentralised and easy to infiltrate and manipulate."
Andrew
From: Leo Bicknell
To: North American Network Operators Group
Cc:
The USSS has jurisdiction over all DDoS (threats to critical infrastructure).
Jeff
On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 3:30 PM, andrew.wallace
wrote:
> I would say the attack falls under the jurisdiction of the US secret service
> since this is an attack on the financial system.
>
> "Today the agency's prim
So then why is there a cyber command and a cyber group part of homeland
security charged with protection of critical infrastructure if critical
infrastructure is the responsibility of USSS? Looks like we have too many
keystone cops (the AF advertises an operational Cyber Command with nothing
r
http://www.secretservice.gov/ectf_newyork.shtml
Each field office has their own page.
Jeff
On Sat, Dec 11, 2010 at 8:42 PM, TR Shaw wrote:
> So then why is there a cyber command and a cyber group part of homeland
> security charged with protection of critical infrastructure if critical
> infr
On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 5:51 PM, Joel Jaeggli wrote:
> On 12/10/10 12:33 PM, Drew Weaver wrote:
>> Nobody has really driven the point home that yes you can purchase a
>> system from Arbor, RioRey, make your own mitigation system; what-have
>> you, but you still have to pay for the transit to diges
I'm certain there are thresholds to that. Carrier grade mitigation
solutions will start low and ramp up to 5, 6, 7, etc. figures
depending on the attack and amount of bandwidth to be filtered among
other variables.
Jeff
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 12:05 AM, Christopher Morrow
wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 1
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 12:20 AM, Jeffrey Lyon
wrote:
> I'm certain there are thresholds to that. Carrier grade mitigation
> solutions will start low and ramp up to 5, 6, 7, etc. figures
> depending on the attack and amount of bandwidth to be filtered among
> other variables.
>
nope, the pricing
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 12:05 AM, Christopher Morrow
wrote:
>
> verizon's ddos service was/is 3250/month flat... not extra if there
> was some sort of incident, and completely self-service for the
> customer(s). Is 3250/month a reasonable insurance against loss?
> (40k/yr or there abouts)
reasona
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 12:42 AM, Aaron Glenn wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 12:05 AM, Christopher Morrow
> wrote:
>>
>> verizon's ddos service was/is 3250/month flat... not extra if there
>> was some sort of incident, and completely self-service for the
>> customer(s). Is 3250/month a reasonab
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