On 25 Nov 2009, at 04:22, Russell Myba wrote:
Looks like of our customers has decided to turn their /24 into a
nice little
space spewing machine. Doesn't seem like just one compromised host.
Reverse DNS for most of the /24 are suspicious domains. Each
domain used in
the message-id forward
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 09:25:27AM -0800, Michael Peddemors wrote:
> I here people saying that they don't publish whois information because they
> don't want the email's made public. Okay, at least the registered company
> name, or individual who presented the ID should be there.
Without del
> How do you announce an ASN?
Using RSS.
Doesn't ARIN already announce all allocations via RSS?
--Michael Dillon
Hi,
On Nov 25, 2009, at 4:41 PM, Dan White wrote:
> On 25/11/09 14:17 -0800, David Conrad wrote:
>> On Nov 25, 2009, at 1:22 PM, Dan White wrote:
>>> Contact ICANN/IANA and plead with them to stop assigning any more resources
>>> to said ISP.
>>
>> ICANN/IANA doesn't assign resources to ISPs.
>
On Nov 25, 2009, at 8:16 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
> we have to fix DNS so that provider-in-the-middle attacks no longer work.
> (this is why in spite of its technical excellence i am not a DNSCURVE fan,
> and also why in spite of its technical suckitude i'm working on DNSSEC.)
As you know, as long as
ARIN and the RIPE NCC have worked together to research the issues with
the Autonomous System Number (ASN) range AS1707-AS1726. Below is our
analysis of what happened and a plan to resolve these issues.
It appears that prior to 1993, Renater was issued AS1707 with an AS
name of "ASNBLOCKA". This i
> From: David Conrad
> Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2009 07:42:15 -0800
>
> As you know, as long as people rely on their ISPs for resolution
> services, DNSSEC isn't going to help. Where things get really offensive
> if when the ISPs _require_ customers (through port 53 blocking, T-Mobile
> Hotspot, I'm lo
* Jorge Amodio:
> What needs to be done to have ISPs and other service providers stop tampering
> with DNS ?
First, stop calling it "NXDOMAIN rewriting". These guys are rewriting
everything they want, so that they can respond to your search queries,
or serve different ads to you.
Then try to op
On 26/11/09 07:37 -0800, David Conrad wrote:
There are folks on this list who work for ISPs which are doing wildcards/synthesis/etc. They (or, more likely their management) can tell you there are obvious business reasons why they do wildcards/synthesis/etc. Perhaps I'm overly cynical, but I susp
On Thu, 26 Nov 2009 12:25:49 CST, Dan White said:
> That's a disagreement we'll have to have. Anytime this issue has been brought
> up in a public setting (here, slashdot, etc.) has resulted in terrible press
> and even corrective action. In particular, Network Solutions' attempt to
> at this at th
On Nov 27, 2009, at 2:25 AM, Dan White wrote:
> Anytime this issue has been brought up in a public setting (here, slashdot,
> etc.) has resulted in terrible press
> and even corrective action.
Does anyone have any idea of the financial 'rewards' SPs who do this kind of
thing reap from it?
I'
Dan White wrote:
On 26/11/09 07:37 -0800, David Conrad wrote:
There are folks on this list who work for ISPs which are doing
wildcards/synthesis/etc. They (or, more likely their management) can
tell you there are obvious business reasons why they do
wildcards/synthesis/etc. Perhaps I'm overl
On Nov 26, 2009, at 8:37 AM, Paul Vixie wrote:
>> From: David Conrad
>> Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2009 07:42:15 -0800
>>
>> As you know, as long as people rely on their ISPs for resolution
>> services, DNSSEC isn't going to help. Where things get really offensive
>> if when the ISPs _require_ customers
Dan,
On Nov 26, 2009, at 10:25 AM, Dan White wrote:
> On 26/11/09 07:37 -0800, David Conrad wrote:
>> There are folks on this list who work for ISPs which are doing
>> wildcards/synthesis/etc. They (or, more likely their management) can tell
>> you there are obvious business reasons why they do
> From: David Conrad
> Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2009 13:25:39 -0800
>
> At some point, we may as well bite the bullet and redefine http{,s} as IPv7.
since products and services designed to look inside encrypted streams and
inspect, modify, or redirect them are illegal in most parts of the world:
"yes,
Happy Thanksgiving
I was wondering when someone was gonna tell Paul to go have a stiff drink and
relax lol
Sent from my Blackberry. Please execute spelling errors.
- Original Message -
From: Shane Ronan
To: nanog
Sent: Thu Nov 26 13:38:43 2009
Subject: Happy Thanksgiving
Happy Thanksgiving
Paul, have a stiff one .
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile
The reality is, lets see you create something that ends up being used in a
manner wildly different from your intentions, and not be emotional about it.
On Nov 26, 2009, at 5:41 PM, Warren Bailey wrote:
> I was wondering when someone was gonna tell Paul to go have a stiff drink and
> relax lol
>
Not to keep endlessly on this thread, but again with reference to good whois
record keeping and bad..
64.21.87.136: mx2.yvzus.com
64.21.87.141: mx3.xmabs.com
64.21.87.168: mx5.zgows.com
64.21.87.170: mx5.zntas.com
We know the activity is probably limited to:
Found a referral to whois.nac.net:4
Brendan,
Thanks for your reply and link. Do you have any good white paper or scenario
based example to share?
Thanks,
Devang
On Thu, Nov 26, 2009 at 7:45 PM, Brendan Kelly wrote:
> Devang here is our guide.
>
>
> http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/en_US/junos10.0/information-products/topic-collec
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 2:58 PM, Jorge Amodio wrote:
[snip]
> What needs to be done to have ISPs and other service providers stop tampering
> with DNS ?
Well, NXDOMAIN substitution, on ISP provided DNS servers, is not
"tampering with DNS", anymore than spam/virus filtering/attachment
limits, d
I think most fathers who have daughters have that happen when they start going
out with boys ...
Happy Thanksgiving USA people.
MMC
On 27/11/2009, at 10:04 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
> The reality is, lets see you create something that ends up being used in a
> manner wildly different from your i
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