Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Jeff Kell
On 2/14/2014 9:07 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote: > Indeed -- I'm not in the business of bit-shipping these days, so I > can't endorse or advocate any particular method of blocking spoofed IP > packets in your gear. If you're dead-end, a basic ACL that permits ONLY your prefixes on egress, and blocks you

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/14/2014 4:09 PM, Joe Provo wrote: > On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 10:42:55AM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: > [snip] >> Taken to the logical extreme, the "right thing" to do is to deny >> any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. NTP

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/14/2014 3:00 PM, Larry Sheldon wrote: > On 2/14/2014 12:42 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote: >> Taken to the logical extreme, the "right thing" to do is to deny >> any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. > > Since the 1990s I have a

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Joe Provo
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 10:42:55AM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: [snip] > Taken to the logical extreme, the "right thing" to do is to deny any > spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. NTP is not the > only one; there is also SNMP, DNS, etc. ...and then we're back to "implement BCP3

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread joel jaeggli
On 2/14/14, 3:00 PM, Hal Murray wrote: > >> I was being a bit extreme, I don't expect UDP to be blocked and there are >> valid uses for NTP and it needs to pass. Can you imagine the trading >> servers not having access to NTP? > > Sure. > > They could setup internal NTP servers listening to GP

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread Hal Murray
> I was being a bit extreme, I don't expect UDP to be blocked and there are > valid uses for NTP and it needs to pass. Can you imagine the trading > servers not having access to NTP? Sure. They could setup internal NTP servers listening to GPS. Would it be as good overall as using external s

Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Larry Sheldon
On 2/14/2014 12:42 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote: Taken to the logical extreme, the "right thing" to do is to deny any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether. Since the 1990s I have argued (ineffectively, it turns out) a case that says that sentence can be edited down to good advanta

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread John
On 02/13/2014 06:01 PM, Jared Mauch wrote: On Feb 13, 2014, at 1:47 PM, John wrote: UDP won't be blocked. There are some vendors that have their own hidden protocol inside UDP packets to control and communicate with their devices. Thinking on it again, maybe blocking UDP isn't all that bad.

Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]

2014-02-14 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/14/2014 10:22 AM, Wayne E Bouchard wrote: > On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 08:01:27PM -0500, Jared Mauch wrote: >> I would actually like to ask for those folks to un-block NTP so >> there is proper data on the number of hosts for those researching >>

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread Wayne E Bouchard
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 08:01:27PM -0500, Jared Mauch wrote: > I would actually like to ask for those folks to un-block NTP so there is > proper data on the number of hosts for those researching this. The right > thing to do is reconfigure them. I've seen a good trend line in NTP servers > bei

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-14 Thread Mark Tinka
On Friday, February 14, 2014 03:01:27 AM Jared Mauch wrote: > I would actually like to ask for those folks to un-block > NTP so there is proper data on the number of hosts for > those researching this. The right thing to do is > reconfigure them. I've seen a good trend line in NTP > servers bein

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-13 Thread Jared Mauch
On Feb 13, 2014, at 1:47 PM, John wrote: > On 02/13/2014 10:06 AM, Cb B wrote: >> Good write up, includes name and shame for AT&T Wireless, IIJ, OVH, >> DTAG and others >> >> http://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-details-behind-a-400gbps-ntp-amplification-ddos-attack >> >> Standard plug for htt

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-13 Thread John
On 02/13/2014 10:06 AM, Cb B wrote: Good write up, includes name and shame for AT&T Wireless, IIJ, OVH, DTAG and others http://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-details-behind-a-400gbps-ntp-amplification-ddos-attack Standard plug for http://openntpproject.org/ and http://openresolverproject.org/ an

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-13 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 2/13/2014 9:06 AM, Cb B wrote: > Good write up, includes name and shame for AT&T Wireless, IIJ, > OVH, DTAG and others > > http://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-details-behind-a-400gbps-ntp-amplification-ddos-attack > > Standard plug for http://

Re: ddos attack blog

2014-02-13 Thread Jared Mauch
On Feb 13, 2014, at 12:06 PM, Cb B wrote: > Good write up, includes name and shame for AT&T Wireless, IIJ, OVH, > DTAG and others > > http://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-details-behind-a-400gbps-ntp-amplification-ddos-attack > > Standard plug for http://openntpproject.org/ and > http://openre

ddos attack blog

2014-02-13 Thread Cb B
Good write up, includes name and shame for AT&T Wireless, IIJ, OVH, DTAG and others http://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-details-behind-a-400gbps-ntp-amplification-ddos-attack Standard plug for http://openntpproject.org/ and http://openresolverproject.org/ and bcp38 , please fix/help. For those