Hi Stephane, NANOG –
Do the math for all pertained prefixes in the pastes, those 3 prefixes were
just examples I had at hand,
and the event is still of quite some significance. Albeit ROA-validating
routers being an argument that
extenuates probabilities and the ensuing effect, deployment of suc
On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 12:06:51AM +0100,
Florian Brandstetter wrote
a message of 53 lines which said:
> Examples of affected networks are:
>
> 193.30.32.0/23
> 45.129.92.0/23
> 45.129.94.0/24
Note that 193.30.32.0/23 has also a ROA (announces by 42198). So,
announces by AS8100 would be RPKI-
owards
> implementing them..
> From: NANOG on behalf
> of Florian Brandstetter
> Sent: 25 January 2020 00:06
> To: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Rogue objects in routing databases
>
> It appears that there is currently an influx of
> rogue route
> objects cr
ehalf of Florian Brandstetter
Sent: 25 January 2020 00:06
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Rogue objects in routing databases
It appears that there is currently an influx of rogue route
objects created within the NTTCOM and RaDB IRR databases, in
connection to Quadranet (AS8100) and China Mobile
In
Hi!
This came up on our radar somewhere in the last 24 hours too. It indeed
does look very curious. Thank you for your analysis and report.
NTT is taking steps to figure out what is behind this. Our current
working theories are that perhaps the IRR maintainer account was
compromised, or some kind
It appears that there is currently an influx of rogue route
objects created within the NTTCOM and RaDB IRR databases, in
connection to Quadranet (AS8100) and China Mobile
International (CMI).
Examples of affected networks are:
193.30.32.0/23
45.129.92.0/23
45.129.94.0/24
Networks, which have see
6 matches
Mail list logo
