Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack

2017-08-31 Thread Andy Litzinger
FYI - I did get a response back from BGPMon- they concur with Job: "Hi Andy, unfortunately we had a peer sending us a polluted BGP views. Most likely using a BGP optimizer that is making up new paths. We've reached out to 131477 and dropped the session with them. This was most likely 131477 maki

Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack

2017-08-31 Thread Andy Litzinger
Hi Steve and Job, Same here- I didn't actually see my prefixes leaked anywhere I could check, but I couldn't check near China where BGPmon's probe was complaining. So I was glad it didn't seem to be spreading, but still concerned that there may have been a large area (China) where my traffic wa

Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack

2017-08-31 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 1:23 PM, Steve Feldman wrote: > Interesting. We also got similar BGPMon alerts about disaggregated > portions of couple of our prefixes. I didn't see any of the bad prefixes in > route-views, though. > > The AS paths in the alerts started with "131477 38478 ..." and looke

Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack

2017-08-31 Thread Steve Feldman
Interesting. We also got similar BGPMon alerts about disaggregated portions of couple of our prefixes. I didn't see any of the bad prefixes in route-views, though. The AS paths in the alerts started with "131477 38478 ..." and looked valid after that. Job's suggestion would explain that.

Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack

2017-08-31 Thread Job Snijders
Hi Andy, It smells like someone in 38478 or 131477 is using Noction or some other BGP "optimizer" that injects hijacks for the purpose of traffic engineering. :-( Kind regards, Job On Thu, 31 Aug 2017 at 19:38, Andy Litzinger wrote: > Hello, > we use BGPMon.net to monitor our BGP announcemen