On Jun 20, 2013 7:30 PM, "Rubens Kuhl" wrote:
> In this case of registrar compromise, DS record could have been changed
> alongside NS records, so DNSSEC would only have been a early warning,
> because uncoordinated DS change disrupts service. As soon as previous
> timeouts played out, new DS/NS p
On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 8:41 PM, Timothy Morizot wrote:
> On Jun 20, 2013 5:31 PM, "Randy Bush" wrote:
> > and dnssec did not save us. is there anything which could have?
>
> Hmmm. DNSSEC wouldn't have prevented an outage. But from everything I've
> seen reported, had the zones been signed, val
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