Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-07 Thread Rich Kulawiec
Ah...got it, this was sloppy phrasing on my part. I meant "first" in the sense of "first rule that one should write". Depending on the firewall type/implementation, that might be the rule that's lexically first or last (or maybe somewhere else). ---rsk

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread Scott Weeks
On 07.05.2015 08:30, Scott Weeks wrote: > --- r...@gsp.org wrote: > From: Rich Kulawiec > > The first rule in every firewall is of course > "deny all" and subsequent rulesets permit only > the traffic that is necessary. > > > > I think you got this backward?

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread Scott Weeks
From: Rich Kulawiec On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 03:30:01PM -0700, Scott Weeks wrote: > From: Rich Kulawiec > > The first rule in every firewall is of course > "deny all" and subsequent rulesets permit only > the traffic that is necessary. > > > I think you

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread Andrew Jones
It depends on the software used and implementation. Many rulesets for pf on BSD start with 'block in on interfaceX' for instance, because it uses a "last match wins" system, unless you use the 'quick' keyword to make rule processing stop if that rule matches. Andrew On 07.05.2015 08:30, Scott

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 03:30:01PM -0700, Scott Weeks wrote: > --- r...@gsp.org wrote: > From: Rich Kulawiec > > The first rule in every firewall is of course > "deny all" and subsequent rulesets permit only > the traffic that is necessary. > > > I think

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread Scott Weeks
--- r...@gsp.org wrote: From: Rich Kulawiec The first rule in every firewall is of course "deny all" and subsequent rulesets permit only the traffic that is necessary. I think you got this backward? That way all traffic is blocked, so none is allowed

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread Christopher Morrow
this is really a form of: "A subnet should contain all things of a like purpose/use." that way you don't have to compromise and say: "Well... tcp/443 is OK for ABC units but deadly for XYZ ones! block to the 6 of 12 XYZ and permit to all ABC... wait, can you bounce off an ABC and still kill an XYZ

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-06 Thread charles
Consider setting up a separate zone or zones (via VLAN) for devices with embedded TCP/IP stacks. I have worked in several shops using switched power units from APC, SynAccess, and TrippLite, and find that the TCP/IP stacks in those units are a bit fragile when confronted with a lot of traffic,

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Gene LeDuc
On 5/5/2015 4:34 PM, Mark Andrews wrote: In message <20150505113445.gb24...@gsp.org>, Rich Kulawiec writes: I break them up by function and (when necessary) by the topology enforced by geography. The first rule in every firewall is of course "deny all" and subsequent rulesets permit only the

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Mark Andrews
In message <20150505113445.gb24...@gsp.org>, Rich Kulawiec writes: > On Mon, May 04, 2015 at 07:55:43PM -0700, nan...@roadrunner.com wrote: > > Possibly a bit off-topic, but curious how all of you out there segment > > your networks. [snip] > > I break them up by function and (when necessary) by

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Joel Maslak
I'd certainly forget anything with "service provider" in the name. Different problem, different architecture. Last time I built this, I built a core network (WAN links, routers, etc) that enforced anti-spoofing rules, so I knew if I saw an "internal" IP address (either public assigned to me or RFC

RE: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Keith Medcalf
It is called the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture ... > -Original Message- > From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of > nan...@roadrunner.com > Sent: Monday, 4 May, 2015 20:56 > To: nanog@nanog.org > Subject: Network Segmentation Approaches > > Possibly a bit off-

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Stephen Satchell
On 05/04/2015 07:55 PM, nan...@roadrunner.com wrote: Possibly a bit off-topic, but curious how all of you out there segment your networks. Corporate/business users, dependent services, etc. from critical data and/or processes with remote locations thrown in the mix which could be mini-versions o

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Jimmy Hess
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 9:55 PM, wrote: > There's quite a bit of literature out there on this, so have been > considering an approach with zones based on the types of data or > processes within them. General thoughts: It depends on the users and tasks on the network.. Different segmentation st

Re: Network Segmentation Approaches

2015-05-05 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Mon, May 04, 2015 at 07:55:43PM -0700, nan...@roadrunner.com wrote: > Possibly a bit off-topic, but curious how all of you out there segment > your networks. [snip] I break them up by function and (when necessary) by the topology enforced by geography. The first rule in every firewall is of c