* Laurent Dumont:
> Wouldn't you want BCP38 policies to be as close as possible to the
> traffic sources? Instead of creating more "fake" traffic?
Maybe as close as possible, but still without sacrificing source
network attribution is sufficient.
> And at the same time, partial filtering doesn'
Wouldn't you want BCP38 policies to be as close as possible to the
traffic sources? Instead of creating more "fake" traffic?
And at the same time, partial filtering doesn't seem as a very effective
way to fight spoofed traffic on a large scale.
On 03/24/2017 11:07 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
*
* Jared Mauch:
>> On Nov 19, 2016, at 9:13 PM, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>
>> My google fu is failing me, but I believe there was a NANOG posting a year
>> or two ago that mentioned that if the top x providers would
>> implement BCP 38
>> then y% of the traffic (or Internet) would be de-spoofed. The p
- Original Message -
> From: "Jared Mauch"
> To: "Frank Bulk"
> Cc: nanog@nanog.org
> Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2016 10:44:09 AM
> Subject: Re: BCP 38 coverage if top x providers ...
>> On Nov 19, 2016, at 9:13 PM, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>
> On Nov 19, 2016, at 9:13 PM, Frank Bulk wrote:
>
> My google fu is failing me, but I believe there was a NANOG posting a year
> or two ago that mentioned that if the top x providers would implement BCP 38
> then y% of the traffic (or Internet) would be de-spoofed. The point was
> that we don'
Hi Frank,
Applying BCP38 at those level is more risky because of the sheer
volume of transit & prefixes.
For years, people have been working hard pushing the responsibility
of BCP38 to outside their sandbox.
You may remember one of those instance.
-
Alain Hebert
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