Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-25 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 8:50 AM, John Kristoff wrote: > On Wed, 25 Mar 2015 08:27:14 -0400 > Rob Seastrom wrote: > >> John's statement was in the context of general advice to be included >> in a BCOP document and I felt compelled to say "whoa there". ok, that was my reaction as well. > My inten

RE: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-25 Thread Chuck Church
Other phrases can be substituted. "no guts, no glory" "go big or go home" "no pain, no pain" Chuck -Original Message- From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of Scott Weeks Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2015 1:41 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-25 Thread John Kristoff
On Wed, 25 Mar 2015 08:27:14 -0400 Rob Seastrom wrote: > John's statement was in the context of general advice to be included > in a BCOP document and I felt compelled to say "whoa there". My intent was for it to be taken as a DDoS mitigation response option, not as a general practice. John

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-25 Thread Rob Seastrom
Christopher Morrow writes: > On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 5:27 AM, Rob Seastrom wrote: >> >> John Kristoff writes: >> >>> If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that >>> wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address >>> except perhaps for network co

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Scott Weeks
-- > measures". I volunteer to write the article on "YOLO upgrades", > wherein one loads untested software on equipment with no OOB, types > "request system reboot", shouts "YOLO", and hits return. :: YOLO - If a manager forces me to do

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 5:27 AM, Rob Seastrom wrote: > > John Kristoff writes: > >> If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that >> wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address >> except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) o

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Maxwell Cole
On 3/24/15 5:27 AM, Rob Seastrom wrote: John Kristoff writes: If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) or control link local co

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-24 Thread Rob Seastrom
John Kristoff writes: > If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that > wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address > except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) or > control link local control traffic (e.g. local SPF adjace

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-23 Thread John Kristoff
On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 19:00:14 -0400 Yardiel D.Fuentes wrote: > Since there have been good feedback for this BCOP. The committee > decided to extend the "last-call period" for another two weeks to > give ample chance to further feedback. > > So, it is not late for more comments, Hi Yardiel, Nice

Re: Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-03-23 Thread Yardiel D . Fuentes
Thank you all who have contributed your feedback, comments and discussion points towards the DDoS/DoS attack BCOP. I have updated the current version of the BCOP with the agreed upon feedback: http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/BCOP_Drafts Since there have been good feedback for this BCOP. The co

Last-call DoS/DoS Attack BCOP

2015-02-27 Thread Yardiel D . Fuentes
Hello NANOGers, Following up on the below effort from last year, the DDoS/DoS Attack BCOP Draft document is ready for the last call 2-week period. After this period and unless notable objections are raised, the current document will be ratified as such. The current document can be found in th