Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Steven Wallace
pendent on > Validators downloading updated ROAs, which may be longer than the DDoS lasts. > > Lee > > > -Original Message- > From: NANOG On Behalf > Of Steven Wallace > Sent: Friday, October 18, 2024 9:50 AM > To: nanog@nanog.org > Subject: It can be chall

Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Randy Bush
>> what's an as-set? > An IRR object that contains ASNs and other as-sets. Generally used to > represent a network’s customer cone. ahhh. cool. i was worried you meant {1,2,3}, which is pretty much dead. randy

Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Li, Weitong
12:32 PM To: Steven Wallace ; nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs DDoS mitigation providers normally originate a customer’s /24 or /48 with their ASN as the origin. This prefix is the most specific prefix which cover

Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Steven Wallace
On 18 Oct 2024, at 13:17, Randy Bush wrote: >> In some cases, you can identify customers of DDoS mitigation services >> by looking at as-sets published by these providers > > what's an as-set? > > randy An IRR object that contains ASNs and other as-sets. Generally used to represent a network’s cu

Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Randy Bush
> In some cases, you can identify customers of DDoS mitigation services > by looking at as-sets published by these providers what's an as-set? randy

Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Steven Wallace
Steven Wallace Date: Friday, October 18, 2024 at 7:52 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs DDoS mitigation services, particularly those that dynamically announce more specific routes during an attack, add complexity when

Re: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Compton, Rich via NANOG
NEVER advertised by the customer. -Rich From: NANOG on behalf of Steven Wallace Date: Friday, October 18, 2024 at 7:52 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs DDoS mitigation services, particularly those that

RE: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Howard, Lee via NANOG
--- From: NANOG On Behalf Of Steven Wallace Sent: Friday, October 18, 2024 9:50 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs This message is from an EXTERNAL SENDER - be CAUTIOUS, particularly with links and attachment

It can be challenging to advise DDoS mitigation subscribers on their RPKI-ROA needs

2024-10-18 Thread Steven Wallace
DDoS mitigation services, particularly those that dynamically announce more specific routes during an attack, add complexity when advising customers on creating their RPKI-ROAs. Smaller organizations, often served by networks that provide DDoS mitigation on their behalf, might be unaware of thes