: Tuesday, August 4, 2020 10:24 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Issue with Noction IRP default setting (Was: BGP route hijack by
AS10990)
CSCdj01351. Fixed in 1997.
Regards,
Jakob.
-Original Message-
Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2020 13:29:59 -0700
From: Ryan Hamel
...
Also, wasn't it you
CSCdj01351. Fixed in 1997.
Regards,
Jakob.
-Original Message-
Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2020 13:29:59 -0700
From: Ryan Hamel
...
Also, wasn't it you that said Cisco routers had a bug in ignoring NO_EXPORT?
...
Dear Ryan,
I have come to believe this is a Noction IRP specific issue.
On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 01:29:59PM -0700, Ryan Hamel wrote:
> I disagree on the fact that it is not fair to the BGP implementation
> ecosystem, to enforce a single piece of software to activate the
> no-export community by de
>
> Why are you not on your soap box about BIRD, FRrouting, OpenBGPd, Cisco,
> Juniper, etc... about how they can possibly allow every day screw ups to
> happen, but the same options like the NO_EXPORT community are available for
> the engineer to use? One solution would be to implement "BGP Group/
On 3/Aug/20 00:03, Ross Tajvar wrote:
> I guess I missed your mention of "guidance rather than regulation",
> and am still missing it, unless you're referring to another thread.
>
> If you want to acknowledge a problem with internet governance and
> bring it to this mailing list for discussion,
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Sunday, August 2, 2020 9:42:12 AM
Subject: Re: Issue with Noction IRP default setting (Was: BGP route hijack by
AS10990)
On Sun, Aug 2, 2020 at 4:34 AM Robert Raszuk < rob...@raszuk.net > wrote:
All,
Watching this thread with interest got an idea - let
I guess I missed your mention of "guidance rather than regulation", and am
still missing it, unless you're referring to another thread.
If you want to acknowledge a problem with internet governance and bring it
to this mailing list for discussion, that sounds like a good idea. But the
only "proble
On 2/Aug/20 21:37, Ross Tajvar wrote:
> Mark,
>
> I think trying to implement some kind of license requirement for DFZ
> participants is a step in the wrong direction and a waste of time and
> money. How would you even enforce it? If the goal is just to provide a
> bigger barrier to "kids born a
On Sun, Aug 2, 2020 at 9:36 AM Robert Raszuk wrote:
> Hi Ca,
>
> > Noction is sold to ISPs, aka transit AS, afaik
>
> Interesting.
>
> My impression always was by talking to Noction some time back that mainly
> what they do is a flavor of performance routing. But this is not about
> Noction IMHO
Mark,
I think trying to implement some kind of license requirement for DFZ
participants is a step in the wrong direction and a waste of time and
money. How would you even enforce it? If the goal is just to provide a
bigger barrier to "kids born after 9/11", why not just increase RIR fees,
or add a
And bgp "optimizer" won't do that
At best, they will let you get the less worst
On 8/2/20 6:36 PM, Robert Raszuk wrote:
if I care about my services I want to exit the best
performing way to reach back customers.
On 2/Aug/20 01:44, Ryan Hamel wrote:
> Matt,
>
> Why are you blaming the ease of use on the vendor, for the operators
> lack of knowledge regarding BGP? That is like blaming a vehicle
> manufacturer for a person pressing the gas pedal in a car and not
> giving a toss about the rules of the road.
Hi Ca,
> Noction is sold to ISPs, aka transit AS, afaik
Interesting.
My impression always was by talking to Noction some time back that mainly
what they do is a flavor of performance routing. But this is not about
Noction IMHO.
If I am a non transit ASN with N upstream ISPs I want to exit not
On Sun, Aug 2, 2020 at 4:34 AM Robert Raszuk wrote:
> All,
>
> Watching this thread with interest got an idea - let me run it by this
> list before taking it any further (ie. to IETF).
>
> How about we learn from this and try to make BGP just a little bit safer ?
>
> *Idea: *
>
> In all stub (non
On 1/Aug/20 22:29, Ryan Hamel wrote:
> Job,
>
> I disagree on the fact that it is not fair to the BGP implementation
> ecosystem, to enforce a single piece of software to activate the
> no-export community by default, due to ignorance from the engineer(s)
> implementing the solution. It should b
On 1/Aug/20 18:58, Job Snijders wrote:
> Following a large scale BGP incident in March 2015, noction made it
> possible to optionally set the well-known NO_EXPORT community on route
> advertisements originated by IRP instances.
>
> "In order to further reduce the likelihood of these problem
All,
Watching this thread with interest got an idea - let me run it by this list
before taking it any further (ie. to IETF).
How about we learn from this and try to make BGP just a little bit safer ?
*Idea: *
In all stub (non transit) ASNs we modify BGP spec and disable automatic
iBGP to eBGP a
Ryan,
To continue with your analogy, this would be more similar to someone who
has never driven before walking into a dealership and buying a new car to
drive off the lot. Ultimately the responsibility is on the driver, but the
dealership should have never sold them the car in the first place. Thu
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 4:47 PM Ryan Hamel wrote:
> Matt,
>
> Why are you blaming the ease of use on the vendor, for the operators lack
> of knowledge regarding BGP? That is like blaming a vehicle manufacturer for
> a person pressing the gas pedal in a car and not giving a toss about the
> rules o
Matt,
Why are you blaming the ease of use on the vendor, for the operators lack of
knowledge regarding BGP? That is like blaming a vehicle manufacturer for a
person pressing the gas pedal in a car and not giving a toss about the rules of
the road. The base foundation regarding the rules of the
: Saturday, August 1, 2020 11:58:12 AM
Subject: Issue with Noction IRP default setting (Was: BGP route hijack by
AS10990)
On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 06:50:55AM -0700, Ca By wrote:
> I am not normally supporting a heavy hand in regulation, but i think it is
> fair to say Noction and simila
Ryan,
The reason Noction is being singled out here as opposed to other BGP
speakers is that it inherently breaks several BGP protection mechanisms as
a means to achieve its purpose. BGP was never intended to be "optimized",
it was intended to be stable and scalable. While i'm sure there are
hundre
Job,
I disagree on the fact that it is not fair to the BGP implementation ecosystem,
to enforce a single piece of software to activate the no-export community by
default, due to ignorance from the engineer(s) implementing the solution. It
should be common sense that certain routes that should b
On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 06:50:55AM -0700, Ca By wrote:
> I am not normally supporting a heavy hand in regulation, but i think it is
> fair to say Noction and similar BGP optimizers are unsafe at any speed and
> the FTC or similar should ban them in the USA. They harm consumers and are
> a risk to n
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