Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-26 Thread Amir Herzberg
I have no idea who was the reviewer (academic or industry or whatever). However, he didn't actually object to the assertion that latency increases with congestion; he only raised the question of the which latency values would be typical/reasonable for a congestion DoS attack. Notice also that the r

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-26 Thread Saku Ytti
On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 at 13:11, Etienne-Victor Depasquale wrote: > " he/she doubts that delays increase significantly under network congestion > since he/she thinks that the additional queuing is something mostly in small > routers such as home routers (and maybe like the routers used in our > e

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-26 Thread Etienne-Victor Depasquale
" he/she doubts that delays increase significantly under network congestion since he/she thinks that the additional queuing is something mostly in small routers such as home routers (and maybe like the routers used in our emulation testbed) " Wow, this is the first time I've found an academic chal

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-25 Thread Amir Herzberg
Hi Damian, thanks, that's right; actually in high-latency and 10% loss, you get _much_ better performance than either TCP or Quic. However, these are not as common scenarios as clogging due to DDoS... So we still want to find relevant data, to know which ranges of latency and loss make sense. Guys

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-25 Thread Damian Menscher via NANOG
Getting (and releasing) numbers from DDoS attacks will be challenging for most, but I think your research could apply to more than just DDoS. There are often cases where one might want to work from an environment which has very poor networking. As an extreme example, in 2007 I got online from an

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-25 Thread Amir Herzberg
On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 2:12 AM Saku Ytti wrote: > On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 05:30, Amir Herzberg wrote: > > DDoS is very very cheap, if there is a single global egress for given > interface then the DDoS traffic can easily be 100 times the egress > capacity (1GE egress, 100GE DDoS). Thanks. Howe

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-24 Thread Saku Ytti
On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 05:30, Amir Herzberg wrote: > That's actually roughly the range of losses we focused on; but it was based > on my rough feeling for reasonable loss rates (as well as on experiments > where we caused losses in emulated environments), and a reviewer - > justifiably - asked

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-24 Thread Amir Herzberg
Damian, thanks! That's actually roughly the range of losses we focused on; but it was based on my rough feeling for reasonable loss rates (as well as on experiments where we caused losses in emulated environments), and a reviewer - justifiably - asked if we can base our values on realistic values.

Re: Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-24 Thread Damian Menscher via NANOG
I suggest testing with a broad variety of values, as losses as low as 5% can be annoying, but losses at 50% or more are not uncommon. Damian On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 4:41 AM Amir Herzberg wrote: > Dear NANOG, > > One of my ongoing research works is about a transport protocol that > ensures (crit

Data on latency and loss-rates during congestion DDoS attacks

2020-01-24 Thread Amir Herzberg
Dear NANOG, One of my ongoing research works is about a transport protocol that ensures (critical) communication in spite of DDoS congestion attack (which cannot be circumvented), by (careful) use of Forward Error Correction. Yes, obviously, this has to be done and used carefully since the FEC cle