Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-15 Thread Ravi Pina
On Wed, Apr 08, 2009 at 08:32:02AM +1000, Karl Auer wrote: > On Wed, 2009-04-08 at 07:04 +0930, Mark Smith wrote: > > It seems there is a trend towards moving host protection on to the > > hosts themselves, onto or closer to the resource or entity being > > protected. It's basically following the c

RE: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-15 Thread TJ
--- >From: Mark Smith >[mailto:na...@85d5b20a518b8f6864949bd940457dc124746ddc.nosense.org] >Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 5:34 PM >To: Michael Helmeste >Cc: nanog@nanog.org >Subject: Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls > >On Tue, 07 Apr 2009 13:05:31 -0700 >Michael Helmeste wrote: > >> Hi all, >

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread ubaidali_abdul_razack
agents/NAC Agents Regards Ubaidali Abdul Razack +65.65436404 (Office) +65.65436278 (Fax) Roland Dobbins 04/08/2009 08:28 AM To NANOG list cc Subject Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls On Apr 8, 2009, at 4:05 AM, Michael Helmeste wrote: > However, I wanted to get other opinions of w

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Roland Dobbins
On Apr 8, 2009, at 4:05 AM, Michael Helmeste wrote: However, I wanted to get other opinions of what packet filtering solutions people use in the border and in the core, and why. Stateless ACLs in hardware at the edge are important both for infrastructure self-protection (i.e., iACLs) and

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
On Wed, 08 Apr 2009 09:20:34 +1000 Karl Auer wrote: > On Wed, 2009-04-08 at 10:46 +1200, Nathan Ward wrote: > > > I'd be interested to hear why people use firewalls. > > > End hosts are not always trustworthy. > > > > If a host is compromised, should it be able to send anything and > > everyt

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Karl Auer
On Wed, 2009-04-08 at 10:46 +1200, Nathan Ward wrote: > > I'd be interested to hear why people use firewalls. > End hosts are not always trustworthy. > > If a host is compromised, should it be able to send anything and > everything out to the public network? A packet filter looks at the "top s

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Nathan Ward
On 8/04/2009, at 10:32 AM, Karl Auer wrote: I'd be interested to hear why people use firewalls. I've never felt the need, myself - am I living in a fool's paradise? End hosts are not always trustworthy. If a host is compromised, should it be able to send anything and everything out to th

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Karl Auer
On Wed, 2009-04-08 at 07:04 +0930, Mark Smith wrote: > It seems there is a trend towards moving host protection on to the > hosts themselves, onto or closer to the resource or entity being > protected. It's basically following the cliche, "If you want something > to be done properly, you need to do

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Michael Helmeste
While there are no specific audit requirements, overall traffic auditing (not just for dropped packets) is definitely something I'm considering. One way of gathering this data without using a firewall would seem to be netflow; I don't think netflow specifically calls out (or even shows?) traffic bl

RE: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Crooks, Sam
Sam Crooks -Original Message- From: Michael Helmeste [mailto:mhelm...@uvic.ca] Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 3:06 PM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: ACLs vs. full firewalls Hi all, One of the duties of my current place of employ is reorganizing the network. We have a few Catalyst 6500

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Mark Smith
On Tue, 07 Apr 2009 13:05:31 -0700 Michael Helmeste wrote: > Hi all, > One of the duties of my current place of employ is reorganizing the > network. We have a few Catalyst 6500 series L3 switches, but currently > do all packet filtering (and some routing) using a software based > firewall. Don

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Matthew Petach
On 4/7/09, Michael Helmeste wrote: > Hi all, > One of the duties of my current place of employ is reorganizing the > network. We have a few Catalyst 6500 series L3 switches, but currently > do all packet filtering (and some routing) using a software based > firewall. Don't ask me, I didn't de

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Eric Gauthier
Michael, Do you have logging or audit requirements to your filters? We use ACLs almost everywhere for non-stateful filtering, but there are a few locations (e.g. HIPPA) that require an audit trail which is perhaps better accomplished by a firewall. Eric :) On Tue, Apr 07, 2009 at 01:05:31PM -0

Re: ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Justin M. Streiner
On Tue, 7 Apr 2009, Michael Helmeste wrote: Current security requirements are only based on TCP and non-stateful UDP src/dst net/port filtering, and so my suggestion was to use ACLs applied on the routed interface of each VLAN. There was some talk of using another software based firewall or a C

ACLs vs. full firewalls

2009-04-07 Thread Michael Helmeste
Hi all, One of the duties of my current place of employ is reorganizing the network. We have a few Catalyst 6500 series L3 switches, but currently do all packet filtering (and some routing) using a software based firewall. Don't ask me, I didn't design it :) Current security requirements are o