RE: Question about the use of NO_EXPORT in BGP route announcements

much better tool for this problem. Thanks for your work on this RFC. Jeff -- Jeff Bartig Interconnection Architect Internet2 AS11164<https://as11164.peeringdb.com/> / AS11537 +1-608-616-9908 jbar...@internet2.edu<mailto:jbar...@internet2.edu> On 19 Sep 2024, at 12:26, Sriram, Kotikalap

Question about the use of NO_EXPORT in BGP route announcements

For some IETF work in progress related to Source Address Validation (SAV), it is useful to know the purposes for which NO_EXPORT may be attached to routes announced in BGP, especially towards transit providers? I know it makes sense for an AS to announce an aggregate less-specific prefix to tra

Question about mutual transit and complex BGP peering

Requesting responses to the following questions. Would be helpful in some IETF work in progress. Q1: Consider an AS peering relationship that is complex (or hybrid) meaning, for example, provider-to-customer (P2C) for one set of prefixes and lateral peers (i.e., transit-free peer-to-peer (P2P)

Re: AS 3356 (Level 3) -- Community 3356:666

>And it's also nice not to yank the old community in case your customers still >depend on it, even if you do also support the RFC version as an alias of that >one. That seems to be the case. Also, possibly the use of WKC 65535:666 has not picked up much. We observe that out of a total of 264,55

AS 3356 (Level 3) -- Community 3356:666

There is an old NANOG thread from 2005 that said AS 3356 (Level 3) were applying 3356:666 to indicate Peer route: https://archive.nanog.org/mailinglist/mailarchives/old_archive/2005-12/msg00280.html Also, see: https://onestep.net/communities/as3356/ Now network operators commonly use ASN:666 for

NIST RPKI Monitor version 2.0

We (NIST) have released a new version of the NIST RPKI Monitor (v2.0): https://www.nist.gov/services-resources/software/nist-rpki-deployment-monitor We are open to adding more features and analyses based on user feedback. Your comments/suggestions are welcome. Thank you. Sriram

Re: AS hijacking (Philosophy, rants, GeoMind)

Mike, >As our canned Email stated, AS2 (and many low digit AS') get hijacked and >often go on to hijack someone's prefix. AS2 (proper) is rarely changed and >the chances of an actual prefix hijack from it is extremely low. > >So as I've asked our peers, I'll ask here: What is expected of us to be

Re: SP 800-189 (Draft), Resilient Interdomain Traffic Exchange

I think Doug has already pointed to this: Email for comments: sp800-...@nist.gov mentioned in the link: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-189/draft We are thankful that many helpful comments/suggestions were received from ISPs, other organizations and individuals earlier on the

Re: Analysing traffic in context of rejecting RPKI invalids using pmacct

Jay: >When we (as7018) were preparing to begin dropping invalid routes >received from peers earlier this year, that is exactly the kind of >analysis we did. In our case we rolled our own with a two-pass >process: we first found all the traffic to/from invalid routes by a >bgp community we gave th