issues. It talks about authentication and transport
> security, but doesn't talk about the potential for government interference.
>
> -mel beckman
>
> On Sep 14, 2016, at 8:22 AM, Doug Montgomery wrote:
>
> Mel,
>
> If you are speaking of RPKI based origin validation,
munity hasn't spent nearly enough time discussing
> the danger aspect. Being engineers, we focus on technical means, ignoring
> the fact that we're designing our own guillotine.
>
> -mel beckman
>
> > On Sep 14, 2016, at 12:10 AM, Scott Weeks
> wrote:
> >
>
If only there were a global system, with consistent and verifiable security
properties, to permit address holders to declare the set of AS's authorized
to announce their prefixes, and routers anywhere on the Internet to
independently verify the corresponding validity of received announcements.
*co
On 6/10/12 5:53 PM, "Paul Vixie" wrote:
>Doug Montgomery writes:
>
>> > ...
>>
>> I think we debate the superficial here, and without sufficient
>>imagination.
>> The enumerations vs query issue is a NOOP as far as I am concerned.
>>With
On 6/5/12 3:40 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
There are number of operational models that provide the needed
routing protection without enumeration.
I can see a use-case for something like:
"Build me a prefix list from the RIR data"
this requires a full data fetch, not doable in dns.
and, at the oth
>I suggested the telephone to another a few weeks ago and that wasn't well
>received. Let me elaborate. Today is Friday. It's July. It's about 2PM.
>Probably lunchtime where NIST is. Calling the IT help desk at NIST is
>likely to get you further faster. NANOG is not really "real time".
Contact m
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