Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

On Fri, 9 Jul 2021, K. Scott Helms wrote: Nothing will change immediately.  Having said that, I do expect that we will see much more effective enforcement.  The investigations will come from the ITG (Industry Traceback Group) with enforcement coming from FCC or FTC depending on the actual offen

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

On 7/9/21 3:44 PM, Keith Medcalf wrote: On Friday, 9 July, 2021 16:32, K. Scott Helms wrote: Robocalls really aren't a product of the legacy PSTN. Today almost none of them originate from anywhere but VOIP. Now, you can certainly say that if SS7 had robust authentication mechanisms that we co

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

On 7/9/21 3:32 PM, K. Scott Helms wrote: On Fri, Jul 9, 2021 at 4:47 PM Michael Thomas > wrote: On 7/9/21 1:36 PM, K. Scott Helms wrote: > Nothing will change immediately.  Having said that, I do expect that > we will see much more effective enforcemen

RE: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

>On Friday, 9 July, 2021 16:32, K. Scott Helms wrote: >Robocalls really aren't a product of the legacy PSTN. Today almost none >of them originate from anywhere but VOIP. Now, you can certainly say >that if SS7 had robust authentication mechanisms that we could then trust >caller ID (more) but

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

On Fri, Jul 9, 2021 at 4:47 PM Michael Thomas wrote: > > On 7/9/21 1:36 PM, K. Scott Helms wrote: > > Nothing will change immediately. Having said that, I do expect that > > we will see much more effective enforcement. The investigations will > > come from the ITG (Industry Traceback Group) with

Re: Do you care about "gray" failures? Can we (network academics) help? A 10-min survey

On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 4:03 PM William Herrin wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 5:31 AM Saku Ytti wrote: > > Network experiences gray failures all the time, and I almost never > > care, unless a customer does. > > I would suggest that your customer does care, but as there is no > simple test to d

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

On 7/9/21 1:36 PM, K. Scott Helms wrote: Nothing will change immediately.  Having said that, I do expect that we will see much more effective enforcement. The investigations will come from the ITG (Industry Traceback Group) with enforcement coming from FCC or FTC depending on the actual offen

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

Nothing will change immediately. Having said that, I do expect that we will see much more effective enforcement. The investigations will come from the ITG (Industry Traceback Group) with enforcement coming from FCC or FTC depending on the actual offense. The problem has been that it's been far t

Weekly Routing Table Report

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-st...@li

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

On Fri, 9 Jul 2021, Michael Thomas wrote: Nothing has changed for me either. Color me surprised. The real proof will be to see if the originating domain can be determined, and whether the receiving domain does anything about it. Why would they do anything? The traffic is revenue. What is the

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

Nothing has changed for me either. Color me surprised. The real proof will be to see if the originating domain can be determined, and whether the receiving domain does anything about it. Mike On 7/9/21 9:42 AM, Brandon Svec via NANOG wrote: I’m getting the same or more, but did anyone really e

Care to get more involved in ARIN? (was: Fwd: [arin-announce] Call for Nominations Extended for Board and Advisory Council)

NANOGers - From time to time discussions break out on the nanog mailing list about various ARIN policies and practices, and I frequently note that ARIN’s governing and policy development bodies are actually made up of members of this very same operator community. If you have views on how ARIN

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

I’m getting the same or more, but did anyone really expect they would stop July 1? It will take time for complaints to be tracked down and operators to take actions, right? Brandon On Fri, Jul 9, 2021 at 6:49 AM Josh Luthman wrote: > Subjectively speaking, I'm still getting the same amount of s

RE: VoP regulatory consultant

Thanks Tim. I have been a member of that listserv for years. It is very US focused. That’s why I thought I would ask the larger NANOG community. Ryan -Original Message- From: Tim Nelson Sent: Friday, July 9, 2021 9:28 AM To: Ryan Finnesey Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: VoP reg

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

Subjectively speaking, I'm still getting the same amount of spam phone calls. I'm certainly getting a lot more spam SMS to my cell. Almost all of them in my entire life starting July 1... Josh Luthman 24/7 Help Desk: 937-552-2340 Direct: 937-552-2343 1100 Wayne St Suite 1337 Troy, OH 45373 On

Re: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

All I know is that I am getting a lot fewer bogus calls on my cell phone than I was this time last month. On Fri, Jul 9, 2021, 06:17 Ryan Finnesey via NANOG wrote: > This should help with Robo calls a lot. > > -Original Message- > From: NANOG On > Behalf Of Sean Donelan > Sent: Wednesda

RE: Email and Web Hosting

There's also Rackspace. They have e-mail and web hosting, etc. -Original Message- From: "Ryan Finnesey via NANOG" Sent: Thursday, July 8, 2021 10:56pm To: "Steve Saner" , "nanog@nanog.org" Subject: RE: Email and Web Hosting If the client base wants to stick with basic IMAP/POP3 em

Networks not reachable from VZ as if there's no route

Hi, Networks are not reachable from VZ FIOS as if there's no route. Upon further checking, issue appears to be widespread. I've checked two major SPs VZ/Sprint and neither has these networks, while ATT/HE.NET/ route-views all have them. root# for i in 8.8.8.8 121.51.175.17 121

RE: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021)

This should help with Robo calls a lot. -Original Message- From: NANOG On Behalf Of Sean Donelan Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2021 2:31 PM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: SITR/SHAKEN implementation in effect today (June 30 2021) STIR/SHAKEN Broadly Implemented Starting Today https://www.fcc

RE: Email and Web Hosting

If the client base wants to stick with basic IMAP/POP3 email Tucows/OpenSRS has a good platform. Also a few years ago my company migrated business email accounts and domains from an ISP and moved them to Office 365 and did a revenue share with the ISP. They where happy still got a bit of reven

RE: Email and Web Hosting

Tucows/OpenSRS works well for “ISP email” From: NANOG On Behalf Of K. Scott Helms Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 11:14 AM To: Steve Saner Cc: NANOG list Subject: Re: Email and Web Hosting Two decent options, one on prem and the other fully hosted. Tucows/OpenSRS has a fully hosted email offerin

VoP regulatory consultant

Would anyone have any recommendations on regulatory consultants for VoIP within North America but markets outside the US? Get Outlook for iOS

Spoofer Report for NANOG for Jun 2021

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address.

Re: Do you care about "gray" failures? Can we (network academics) help? A 10-min survey

On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 5:04 PM William Herrin wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 5:31 AM Saku Ytti wrote: > > Network experiences gray failures all the time, and I almost never > > care, unless a customer does. > > Greetings, > > I would suggest that your customer does care, but as there is no > s

Re: Do you care about "gray" failures? Can we (network academics) help? A 10-min survey

On Thu, 8 Jul 2021 at 22:10, Baldur Norddahl wrote: > We had a line card that would drop any IPv6 packet with bit #65 in the > destination address set to 1. Turns out that only a few hosts have this bit > set to 1 in the address, so nobody noticed until some Debian mirrors started > to become u