On Fri, 2013-02-22 at 16:57 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> RFC 952 as modified by RFC 1123 describe the legal syntax of a hostname.
> There is no trailing period.
No - but a trailing period is a (common?) way to indicate that the name
as given is complete, so in a lot of contexts a trailing period i
In message <20130221225540.ga99...@numachi.com>, Brian Reichert writes:
> I'm trying to nail down some terminology for doc purposes.
>
> The issue: most resources on the net freely describe a fully-qualified
> domian name ('FQDN') as to exclude the root domain; i.e, they exclude
> the trailing do
On Fri, 22 Feb 2013 06:11:21 +0530, Suresh Ramasubramanian said:
> And so their bush league by itself was responsible for all the penetrations
> that mandiant says they did? Which shows that they don't have to be
> particularly smart, just a bit smarter than their average spear phish or
> other at
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Jack Bates wrote:
> The A-team doesn't get caught and detailed
no, the A-team has BA Baraccus... he pities the fool who gets caught
and detailed... the last thing BA detailed was his black van.
bird supposedly doesn't support rib dumps at this time.
Randy Bush wrote (2013/02/22 7:11):
a friend trying to see if bird will be better than quagga for bgp
recording can not see how to get rib dumps, as opposed to just updates.
what are we missing?
randy
--
#
And so their bush league by itself was responsible for all the penetrations
that mandiant says they did? Which shows that they don't have to be
particularly smart, just a bit smarter than their average spear phish or
other attack's victim.
On Friday, February 22, 2013, Jack Bates wrote:
> On 2/2
I'm trying to nail down some terminology for doc purposes.
The issue: most resources on the net freely describe a fully-qualified
domian name ('FQDN') as to exclude the root domain; i.e, they exclude
the trailing dot as mandated by some RFCs such as RFC 1535:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1535.txt
a friend trying to see if bird will be better than quagga for bgp
recording can not see how to get rib dumps, as opposed to just updates.
what are we missing?
randy
I wanted to bring attention to the following draft proposal from
Mellanox to export traffic information from InfiniBand switches:
http://sflow.org/draft_sflow_infiniband.txt
If you are an InfiniBand user, this is a great opportunity to think
about the types of metrics that you woud want from your
On 2/21/2013 12:17 PM, Scott Weeks wrote:
I'm not upset. I'm pointing out what Steven Bellovin said
in just a few words: "This strongly suggests that it's not
their A-team..."
The A-team doesn't get caught and detailed. The purpose of the other
teams is to detect easy targets, handle easy
On Thu, 14 Feb 2013 13:18:24 -0800, Owen DeLong said:
> On Feb 14, 2013, at 12:58 , Karl Auer wrote:
> > On Thu, 2013-02-14 at 08:08 -0500, Jared Mauch wrote:
> >> I recommend keeping your network as congruent between IPv4 and IPv6 as
> >> possible, with dual-stack.
> > Why?
> For one thing, doin
On Feb 20, 2013, at 9:07 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
>
> On Feb 20, 2013, at 1:33 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 20 Feb 2013 15:39:42 +0900, Randy Bush said:
>>> boys and girls, all the cyber-capable countries are cyber-culpable. you
>>> can bet that they are all snooping and
--- kyle.cre...@gmail.com wrote:
From: Kyle Creyts
The focus on platform here is ridiculous; can someone explain how
platform of attacker or target is extremely relevant? Since when did
--
It implies their skillset. Here's something I just saw that
Scott Weeks wrote:
--- calin.chior...@secdisk.net wrote:
You seem "upset" that they are using M$ only(target and
source).
I'm not upset. I'm pointing out what Steven Bellovin said
in just a few words: "This strongly suggests that it's not
their A-team..."
This is a technical mailing list wh
--- calin.chior...@secdisk.net wrote:
From: "calin.chiorean"
:: This all seems to be noobie stuff. There's nothing technically cool
:: to see here
>> You mean the report or the activity?
The activity.
>> You seem "upset" that they are using M$ only(target and
>> source).
I'm not upset.
> I can't help but wonder what would happen if US Corporations simply
> blocked all inbound Chinese traffic. Sure it would hurt their
> business, but imagine what the Chinese people would do in response
First thing is the Chinese government would rejoice since they don't
want their citizens on o
Not to mention, the KG units are dot government only.. For obvious reasons.
From my Android phone on T-Mobile. The first nationwide 4G network.
Original message
From: Christopher Morrow
Date: 02/21/2013 8:37 AM (GMT-08:00)
To: Jack Bates
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Net
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 11:23 AM, Jack Bates wrote:
> On 2/21/2013 12:03 AM, Scott Weeks wrote:
>>
>> I would sure be interested in hearing about hands-on operational
>> experiences with encryptors. Recent experiences have left me
>> with a sour taste in my mouth. blech!
>>
>> scott
>>
>>
>
> Ag
On 2/21/2013 12:03 AM, Scott Weeks wrote:
I would sure be interested in hearing about hands-on operational
experiences with encryptors. Recent experiences have left me
with a sour taste in my mouth. blech!
scott
Agreed. I've generally skipped the line side and stuck with L3 side
encryptio
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 01:34:13AM +, Warren Bailey wrote:
> I can't help but wonder what would happen if US Corporations simply
> blocked all inbound Chinese traffic. Sure it would hurt their business,
> but imagine what the Chinese people would do in response.
Would it hurt their business?
Scott Weeks wrote:
Be sure to read the source:
intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf
Anybody happen to notice that the report sounds awfully like the
scenario laid out in Tom Clancy's latest book, "Threat Vector?"
--
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practic
On 21-Feb-13 04:25, Kyle Creyts wrote:
> For another example of this, an acquaintance once told me about the process
> of getting internationally standardized technologies approved for deployment
> in China; the process that was described to me involved giving China the
> standards-based spec th
The focus on platform here is ridiculous; can someone explain how
platform of attacker or target is extremely relevant? Since when did
people fail to see that we have plenty of inter-platform tools and
services, and plenty of tools for either platform built with the
express purpose of interaction w
::This all seems to be noobie stuff. There's nothing technically cool
::to see here
You mean the report or the activity?
You seem "upset" that they are using M$ only(target and source). They steal
data!!! From whom to steal? From a guru that spend minimum 8 hours a day in
from of *nix?
Why t
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