A solution I put in place at UUnet circa 1997 was to take a set of /32
routes representing major destination, e.g. ISP web sites, content
sites, universities, about 20 of them, and temporarily place a /32
static route to each participant at the public exchange and traceroute
to the destinatio
If you are unfortunate enough to have to peer at a public exchange
point, put your public ports into a vrf that has your routes. Default
will be suboptimal to debug.
I must say stephen and vixie and (how hard this is to type) even
richard steenbergens methodology makes the most sense going forward
Could be a local trojan inserting bogus entries on the hosts file,
could be DNS poisoning on one particular resolver, or an infection on
the distribution source.
Rubens
On Sun, Apr 19, 2009 at 5:55 PM, Mari Nichols wrote:
> I believe the file is originating directly from Skype. Our writer
>
issue has been resolved.
Thanks to all that responded.
Stephen Stuart wrote:
>> Anyone have any contact information for the google noc or adsense noc?
>> Thanks in advance.
>
> Did you send email ?
http://www.peeringdb.com/view.php?asn=15169
On 20/04/2009, at 7:22 AM, John Martinez wrote:
Anyone have any contact information for the google noc or adsense noc?
Thanks in advance.
--
Matthew Moyle-Croft
Networks, Internode/Agile
Level 5, 162 Grenfell Street, Adelaide, SA 5000 Australia
Em
Anyone have any contact information for the google noc or adsense noc?
Thanks in advance.
I believe the file is originating directly from Skype. Our writer
stated that he had tried download.com's version and it was clean
against VT. I'm on ISC handler duty today, just wondering if anyone
had seen this happening.
Mari Nichols
HoD
From: Paul Ferguso
>>> Iirc it's on the roadmap for thier next generation of switches.
>> bummer, as performance and per-port cost are certainly tasty.
> Afaik low latency is due to the fact that Arista boxes are doing cut
> through.
no shock there
> Pricewise they are very attractive. And Arista EOS actually is mo
Has anyone seen anything like this?
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/f58203f8d5cb98628eaa785e27c9e059
On 19.04.2009 01:38 Randy Bush wrote
>>> just curious. has anyone tried arista for smallish exchanges, before
>>> jumping off the cliff into debugging extreme, foundry, ...
>> last time I look at them their products lacked port security or
>> anything similiar.
>
> whoops!
>
>> Iirc it's on the
On 19.04.2009 19:43 Chris Caputo wrote
> On Sun, 19 Apr 2009, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
>> On Sat, 18 Apr 2009, Nick Hilliard wrote:
>> > - ruthless and utterly fascist enforcement of one mac address per
>> > port, using either L2 ACLs or else mac address counting, with no
>> > exceptions for an
On 19/04/2009 08:31, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
Well, as long as it simply drops packets and doesn't shut the port or
some other "fascist" enforcement. We've had AMSIX complain that our
Cisco 12k with E5 linecard was spitting out a few tens of packets per
day during two months with random source m
On Sat, 18 Apr 2009, Paul Vixie wrote:
"Even"? *Especially* -- or they're not competent at doing security.
wouldn't a security person also know about
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_spoofing
and know that many colo facilities now use one customer per vlan due
to this concern? (i re
On Sun, 19 Apr 2009, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
> On Sat, 18 Apr 2009, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> > - ruthless and utterly fascist enforcement of one mac address per
> > port, using either L2 ACLs or else mac address counting, with no
> > exceptions for any reason, ever. This is probably the single m
Yeah,
You could count packets or you could forward them not both.
ACLs could crash everything. Retrieving the config via SNMP
would crash a router.
I gotta get back into an ISP and get a new set of stories to tell.
jy
On Apr 18, 2009, at 10:29 PM, Deepak Jain wrote:
Remember when you didn't
On Sat, 18 Apr 2009, Nick Hilliard wrote:
- ruthless and utterly fascist enforcement of one mac address per port,
using either L2 ACLs or else mac address counting, with no exceptions
for any reason, ever. This is probably the single more important
stability / security enforcement mechanism f
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