ASN 6172 (ATHOME) is still announcing a few routes. Any word
on when @Home will turn off the last router? Or are they being
abandoned in place. In the past, some defunct networks have
been announced for as long as two years after everyone left.
After the SNMP excitement I asked if anyone had suggestions on how
to architect or design a backbone network to be less suspectible to
problems. It turns out the telephone industry has written a set of
best practices for the Internet.
Focus Group 2.A.2: Best Practices on Packet Switching. Kar
My comment was originally prompted by the meeting minutes which
reported on the survey data showing that 100% of carriers are implementing
firewalls in their gateways. The 100% is what caught my eye. As the
topic comes up in various places, large ISPs repeatedly say they are
unable to implemen
> Most ISPs have a comparable set-up wrt modems/terminal servers for
> managing their network elements - same dealy, but ISPs can choose
> between inband & OOB whereas the telcos can't. (Or couldn't, til
> recently, when Net/Bell convergence started urging the market toward
> big damn fiber swit
IV. SS7 SECURITY ISSUES
Dave Henderson (SEVIS Systems) gave a presentation entitled, "Public
Switched Network is Now Really Public (Attachment 4)." Dave noted he has
spent a number of years working in information warfare and protection. He
noted that his work addresses issues on network
On Fri, 8 Mar 2002, Vadim Antonov wrote:
> So, i would say i'm pro-OOB where it concerns clean confinement of control
> traffic into a non-routable, unconditionally-prioritized frames, and
> contra-OOB when it comes to making separate networks for control traffic.
> Your definition of "separate n
On Mon, 11 Mar 2002, Jake Khuon wrote:
> There were workable solutions even back then. I think we all just chose the
> path of least resistance because it was easier and the risk factours were
> perceived to be low. We all know that was a false assumption. I remember
> the first smurf attack
On Mon, 11 Mar 2002, Scott Madley wrote:
> Let's face it as the industry moves towards a more converged state, we
> haven't even really begun to consider the security implications that
> present themselves in this new enviroment.
With convergence, do you think we will get the best security pract
On Wed, 13 Mar 2002, Jake Khuon wrote:
> emloyees access their infrastrcture. Do you seperate and outsource your
> management infrastructure to your corporate IT support? Do you seperate but
> control it within your production network engineering groups? If so, do you
> have a special group w
On Wed, 13 Mar 2002, Rajesh Talpade wrote:
> A network is only as secure as its weakest link
>
> sounds like a cliche, but am afraid this least-common-denominator rule
> will hold as networks converge.
Is there anything we can do to improve this? How can we make sure
the people who "need-t
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/02/175172.html
Leaders of the nation's largest corporations are designing a new
communications network that would alert them immediately to a terrorist
attack and enable them to instantly talk with one another and government
officials about how to respond.
On Wed, 13 Mar 2002, Steve Feldman wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 13, 2002 at 03:55:26PM -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote:
> > Once upon a time, kc had a MOO -- we used to hang out there and discuss
> > things in real time
>
> It's still there, but doesn't see much activity these days.
> Steve
Have you tried contacting AC Neilson? As far as I know, they
are more than happy to sell this data to anyone they can get to
buy it.
On Mon, 18 Mar 2002, Curtis Owings wrote:
> Has anyone published something like "Neilson Ratings" for Internet
> use? Something that would show how much time a
On Thu, 14 Mar 2002, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
> In theory, news would be more rebust than mail, because of its distributed
> nature and it should be possible to make news work without relying on the
> DNS.
USENET/news has a few properties which make it reliable. The most
important is the fl
> "db" == David Barak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
db> Regarding securiy issues, I'd suggest working with
db> UUNet/Worldcom (or whatever AS701 is called lately).
db> I've seen some of their folks work closely with
db> aggrieved victims of DDOS attacks.
Historically, BBN/Genuity/GTE/Verizon/
According to a recent salary survey telephone companies have some
of the lowest paid information security professionals in comparison
with other technology corporations, federal government, or financial
companies. When the US Transportation Security Administration (aka,
the agency in charge of
On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, Chris Flores wrote:
>
> Should be interesting to see how this impacts the ability to reach
> sites hosted at Exodus.
>
>
> nothing complicated. just means you will utilize a transit provider to reach
> Exodus hosted sites instead of direct public peer. unless you privately
On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, Avleen Vig wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, LeBlanc, Jason wrote:
> > On that note, Etrade layed off their entire net sec team a few months back.
> > I don't trade there no more. ;)
>
> Fewer and fewer companies are paying attention to network security with
> the right mindset.
On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, Tony Wasson wrote:
> >> If I was looking for top security talent, what would I ask for whether
> >> I was hiring directly or outsourcing?
>
> I agree with Steve Wilcox, incidents are important. I would ask for a
> description of the 3 most interesting incidents they've ever w
On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, Sean M. Doran wrote:
> Only in the minds of people who are lied to by Exodus's detractors.
>
> I just spoke with the Invisible Hand of the Marketplace, and it
> signed (in BSL, so the translation may be off) the following:
AS3561 (InternetMCI) was once the number 1 ISP, by a
On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, Kelly J. Cooper wrote:
> I also had a short list of other questions that I used to try and get
> a feel for the person's "security minded-ness" (my term, I invented it
> a'ight?). Because when it comes to ISP security, there's a very
> limited pool of talent so candidates ar
On Fri, 29 Mar 2002, Mark E. Mallett wrote:
> BTW as I mentioned when I contacted Genuity, they advised me to contact
> UUnet directly. So by inference at least one large carrier (Genuity)
> seems to feel that contacting them directly is appropriate.
I believe this is the problem. Providers c
On Fri, 29 Mar 2002, Kelly J. Cooper wrote:
> So, just out of curiousity, why are you asking this question?
Because a couple of congressional aides asked me what I would spend
the money on. My first response was my brain didn't know how to
spend that much money. But then you get in the swing
>A basic security mindset is a combination of paranoia, a talent for
>contingency planning, and an understanding of business need.
My suggestion was to include a couple of courses in the curriculum.
1. Engineering Ethics
How to play fair
Right and wrong, dealing with conflicting
On Tue, 2 Apr 2002, Christopher E. Brown wrote:
> I think it comes down to being able to deal creatively with a
> lack of total control, and find ways to limit what you cannot
> eliminate.
Security specialists can't be everywhere, can't do everything, and
can't stop every bad thing. The r
No. but www.news.com seems to be having authorization problems.
HTTP Error 403 - Forbidden
On Wed, 3 Apr 2002, German Martinez wrote:
>
> Is somebody affected with this outage ?
>
> http://west-boot.mfnx.net/traffic/issues.txt
>
>
>
Since root zone changes are handled through different processes,
this doesn't mean an imminent operational change is about to take
place. Why did the PS top level domain expire on March 22 2002,
while most other TLD's have expiration dates decades in the future?
US-DOM in 2087, CU-DOM in 2094.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2002, K. Graham wrote:
> From my understanding there is a 99.97% up time value that most companies try
> and match. Is this a hard and fast rule or is this a value that we all try
> and emulate as best as we can? Do I have the value incorrect? Is it higher
> or lower? I had alw
On Sun, 7 Apr 2002, John Palmer (NANOG Acct) wrote:
> Looks like www.gov.ps is offline. Wasn't someone in Norway operating a
> backup site for this? IP address resoves to 212.14.253.243 which is not
> routed at this time.
Doing a little research, it appears a substantial part of physical
facilit
On Mon, 8 Apr 2002, Paul Vixie wrote:
> > packet reordering at MAE East was extremely common a few years ago. Does
> > anyone have information whether this is still happening?
>
> more to the point, does anybody still care about packet reordering at
> exchange points? we (paix) go through signif
CERT/CC has published a paper on the latest trends in malicious
attacks (not accidents, operator error, etc) on the Internet.
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/attack_trends.pdf
CERT/CC identifies four increasing trends affecting the network
infrastructure:
1. Distributed Denial of Service - F
On Wed, 10 Apr 2002, Christopher K. Neitzert wrote:
> I'm in the process of managing cabling for a large install (500-ish runs)
> and a vendor came to me with a story about the creation of ground loops in
> running sheilded+gounded cat-5e in large installations.
While working at a previous empl
On Thu, 11 Apr 2002, matthew zeier wrote:
> I've gotten attractive pricing from Genuity but I haven't used them in a
> couple years. Is there any reason I wouldn't want to use them as a third
> upstream OC3 provider?
I love Genuity's latest set of commercials. Who doesn't have a "legacy"
in th
On Fri, 12 Apr 2002, Roy wrote:
> Registering is not "bad", its just not beneficial. Given that the routes I want
> to announce are within my assigned range, why is it a good thing to register
> them? If the transit provider always add entries when I ask for them, it seems
> to be very little b
At the Scottsdale NANOG Spring 2001 I asked for volunteers to install
temperature and humidity data loggers in their colocation facilities.
I wanted to determine what are "typical" colocation enviromental
conditions. I was tired of people asserting all sorts of numbers
as the required condition
A few network providers seem to be having trouble with MAE-West
in San Jose (I believe MAE-West ATM). The providers I can see, don't
have problems reach MAE-West. I'm not in San Jose, but CalTrans
indicates there is a large fire near the Capital City Expressway
in San Jose. Does anyone know if
The question was about the fiber routes, not the data centers. Damage
a long distance away can impact providers. For example, when the Bay
Bridge fiber route was damaged, several providers lost connectivity to
MAE-West a few years ago. PSI is still reporting their connectivity to
mae-west is d
That's unusual. A train derailment usually effects more than one
provider, and normally does not cause network-wide BGP resets.
On Thu, 25 Apr 2002, Daniel Kelley wrote:
> UUNET support says that the outage relates to a train derailment in the
> northeast that occured this morning. master ti
According to Worldcom's spokesperson, a train derailment near Toledo
Ohio cut two cables at 8am EDT.
http://www.idg.net/ic_852639_1773_1-3921.html
Matrix.NET measurements indicate significant network problems began
around 10am EDT with a larger blip around noon EDT.
http://average.miq.net/
A
>From the "other" part of North America, and country hosting the
next NANOG meeting.
Fairly major Train Derailment East of Winnipeg. Many Canadian carriers
affected, (This is a major 360 condo build) although most have fiber route
diversity.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2002, Steve Gibbard wrote:
> Are train derailments common events that don't get much press coverage (or
> maybe that don't get much coverage unless it's a passenger train), or was
> this an especially bad week?
According to federal records and news reports, train derailments are
On Wed, 1 May 2002, Pete Kruckenberg wrote:
> We experience a lot of types of attacks ("education/research
> network" = "easy hacker target"). With DDoS incidents, it
> seems we are more often an unknowing/unwilling participant
> than the target, partly due to owning big chunks of IP
> address
Telus has gone first, and announced it is using Arbor's
products across its backbone network.
http://www.eweek.com/article/0,3658,s=720&a=26867,00.asp
People have been trying the products for a while. Does
Arbor Networks really have an answer to DoS, or does it
still need a little longer in th
Ok, extremely dumb question. But I'm sure lots of other people have
already solved this one.
Network operators have been using various PGPs to exchange confidential
information for many years. I have my own personal PGP key for my own
use and a nice Unix box of my own. There are licensed versi
On Fri, 17 May 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> perhaps better late than never... PAIX & LINX both
> have IPv6 capabilities at/on the exchange fabric(s).
> I am not aware that Equinix has taken that step.
Uhm, another dumb question.
Why does the operator of a layer 2 exchange
On Fri, 17 May 2002, Sean Donelan wrote:
> Ok, extremely dumb question. But I'm sure lots of other people have
> already solved this one.
Ask a dumb question, get 37 dumb answers.
Summary
One recommendation for the GnuPG plug-in for Outlook
One inquiry how many licenses I was in
In 1999 the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) published a report which concluded:
"In summary, end-to-end NS/EP services cannot currently be offered via
the public Internet. A number of factors (e.g., lack of NS/EP demand,
market factors, and lack
www.yahoo.com has been akawhoknows. You'll need to specify which
IP address you were really trying to go to.
On Mon, 20 May 2002, Mary Grace wrote:
> IS it just us out hereon the Right Coast in the Washington DC area, but are
> a number of routes to the Bay Area and Southern California down?
Although this thread will immediately go out of control, Vern Paxson et al
once again has come up with some interesting numbers. Something to read
over the US Memorial Day holiday weekend.
http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/cdc-usenix-sec02/index.html
I was lucky enough to see a preview of the p
On Sat, 25 May 2002, Randy Bush wrote:
> but semi-clued governments and semi-clued folk in general seem to
> be attracted to the domain name space. i suspect it is one of
> those areas that appear simpler, more powerful, and more lucrative
> than they actually are. running a cctld well is a maj
A few people asked the interstate-40 bridge collapse in Oklahoma across
the Arkansas river. 11 and possible as many as 20 people are believed
dead.
Although I-40 is a major cross-country interstate, the bridge collapse
had no apparent impact on cross-country telecommunications traffic. I'm
no
On Wed, 29 May 2002, Ian A Finlay wrote:
> I can't read a shared imap folder for Nanog right now, so could someone
> please reply to me off list and let me know if they are seeing problems
> with ATT's network, especially on the east coast?
ATT Worldnet was having e-mail problems earlier today,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-311460,00.html
China's cable firms fight deadly turf war
>From Oliver August in Shanying
May 30, 2002
"CLAD in a blue China Telecom jacket proclaiming We protect the nations
cables, Hao Dawei sets off at sunrise from his parents mudbrick home in
Shanyi
Is the Internet Sevice Providers Security Consortium (ISPSec) still
active? In the past ISPSec developed some best practices for ISPs.
Have ISPs stopped using ISPSec and started using NRIC instead.
http://www.icsalabs.com/html/communities/ispsec/index.shtml
On Mon, 3 Jun 2002, Barbara Fraser wrote:
> I'm wondering just how many ISPs are using HMAC-MD5 to authenticate IS-IS
> route advertisements within their ASs, or MD5 on BGP peering sessions? I
> don't need a real number, just a sense of the community. Is usage
> increasing? is it dead? is it re
le auth by default, since you would have to stick in a key
> somehow, and if that was default then it could be exploited.
>
> rgrds
>
> Faz
>
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of
> batz
> Sent: 04 June 2002 15:20
This is not a political question, only operational process.
Has ICANN and NTIA worked out their operational issues so they can quickly
change the root zone to reflect changes in ccTLD nameservers if people
need to change which name servers are handling the ccTLDs. Last year,
some of the ccTLD
Does anyone have information why ATT's Worldnet portal is being
routed through Splitrock, UIUC and NCSA? It seems to have pretty
much taken the Worldnet site off the net.
> nslookup www.worldnet.att.net
Server: localhost
Address: 127.0.0.1
Non-authoritative answer:
Name:www.worldnet.att
On Sat, 8 Jun 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I did some more looking last night, and it seems it's not down, it's just
> unreachable from my network. Even stranger, it's only unreachable from
> Atlantic.Net's primary ARIN block of 209.208.0.0/17. Traceroutes die at
> so-1-1-0.mpr1.sql1.us.mfn
If these questions are answered incorrectly, it could impact your
operations.
53 Questions for Developing the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/53ques.html
1.2. Assistance: What can be done to make it easier for home users and
small businesses to safe guar
On Fri, 14 Jun 2002, Robert Mathews wrote:
> applications. Sourcefire founder Martin Roesch and other experts say that
> the problem is being investigated by tech firms, private researchers, and
> government agencies. The National Infrastructure Protection Board's
> Debbie Weierman notes that
On Fri, 21 Jun 2002, Pawlukiewicz Jane wrote:
> How important is the phone to you? I mean, given some situation that
> arises, can we solve it without the phones?
The important thing is you have some way to communicate, not what method
is used for the communication.
If the PSTN fails, use the I
Sorry for interrupting our quarterly peering debate, but I'd like to
ask if there are any groups for people who are Postmasters (abuse, spam,
dmca, etc)? I know there are many groups for people who want to complain
about those subjects, but I was wondering if there are groups for people
who hav
On Sat, 29 Jun 2002, Martin Hannigan wrote:
> There's a lot of them. A bunch are "under cover".
I'm aware of most of the public and semi-public spam/abuse lists. But
it is difficult for front-line abuse folks at large ISPs to exchange
tips in a public forum. I was hoping there was something
On 18 Jun 2002, George Jones wrote:
> We (UUNET) have an internal document that we've been using for a few
> years as the basis for tests of security features of equipment to be
> connected to our backbone. We're interested in making it public so
> that it can be improved and so that others can
On 1 Jul 2002, Eric Brandwine wrote:
> The doc currently states "This option MUST be available on a
> per-interface basis." Perhaps going one step further, and requiring
> per-interface application of ACLs that are checked against the
> purported source address would be useful.
We may just be
Has anyone tried to apply/follow the ITU work on network security
for telecommunications carriers? Some folks have suggested using them
for Internet service providers.
[COM17-D19] Lucent Technologies (Q10/17): Towards the model for network
security framework
http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/com
My non-scientific measurements (i.e. pings to well known european
sites) show an increase in packet loss to about 6%, the 10 day
average previously was less than 1%.
Neither ns.ebone.net nor auth1.ebone.net are answering queries.
BGP data still looks normal
KPNQwest data http://bgp.potaroo.net
I don't understand many of the cyber-scare articles. If I was cynical,
and I thought we had a clever government, I would say it was all a
diversionary tactic to distract attackers from the more vulnerable
infrastructures.
Disrupting the Internet is a matter of scale and time. It is fairly
triv
On Sun, 7 Jul 2002, Gerardo A. Gregory wrote:
> Can someone from WorldComm please verify a fiber cut that happened today at
> around 11:30 am (Central). I have bveen informed that a fiber cut in
> Illinois (or Indiana) has been in effect (until just a few minutes) for all
> of the afternoon and
On Sun, 7 Jul 2002, deeann mikula wrote:
> can anyone point me to any current statistics on the amount of email
> traffic carried on the internet that is actually spam?
The Wall Street Journal has an on-going series about UCE/Spam. Today's
article is about Hotmail. According to the article Ho
On Wed, 10 Jul 2002, Aditya wrote:
> Cal-ISO issues a "Stage 2" emergency.
> Next targeted blackout block(s): 1.
The official word from NERC (North American Eletric Reliability Council):
"Generating resources are expected to be adequate to meet projected demand
for electricity in North America
Has anyone written the equivalent of the old Bell Systems Notes on the
Network for the Internet? A couple of books come close, Hueston's ISP
Survival Guide and Cisco's ISP Essentials. But there doesn't seem to
be anything that helps Bell heads understand what switching, routing
or signaling me
On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Scott Call wrote:
> Working for a Telco with an ISP division, I can tell you the best thing to
> to do is wait for the Bell Heads to retire for the third time and keep
> them away from your gear until then :)
Yes, several people mentioned that the two groups should just main
On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Randy Bush wrote:
> > I don't know which is scarier. Lucent/Bell Labs trying to design
> > the next generation Internet architecture, or Cisco trying to
> > design the next generation DCN/SS7 architecture.
>
> the contest is keen. for a nice view of this insanity fueled by
Sprint Labs has some data from the real world.
http://www.sprintlabs.com/Department/IP-Interworking/Monitor/
They are very careful researchers and don't make brash statements,
but my reading of their research is not much support for QOS in a
backbone. However, QOS may have a place on access l
On Thu, 18 Jul 2002, Martin Hepworth wrote:
> Looks theres a fiber cut in NE USA. It's definitly affecting what's left
> of PSI-net's network trans USA.
Most other providers' networks appear unaffected. Other than the Internet
Traffic Report (which is flaky even on good days) there doesn't see
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,387377,00.asp
"All the while maintaining that the government will not set IT security
requirements for the private sector, top federal IT officials today said
they expect such mandates will be imposed on federal agencies and that the
same standards will also
I have never seen the final root cause (actually direct cause, we know
what the root cause was) report from Telehouse. Although I can understand
why Telehouse wouldn't want to say what happened.
Between replacing water pumps, reports of contanimation inside and
outside the cooling system, fue
> Ok, come on... That was 310 or so days ago. Exactly what happened
>shouldn't be a huge concern anymore. They addressed it, fixed it, and are
>making sure it doesn't happen again, thats the part we need to concentrate
>on.
The Morris worm happened over a decade ago. Computers are still b
On Tue, 23 Jul 2002, Daniska Tomas wrote:
> i'm wondering how large isps offering managed cpe services manage their
> password databases.
Slovakia, that's an interesting one for NANOG.
Key management is still a hard problem. It would be nice if the NSA
published how they do it, but I suspect
On Tue, 23 Jul 2002, Shawn Solomon wrote:
> One common solution is a hash based on the cpe site name or some other
> unique key provided by the cpe information (address, ph #, etc).
> Changing the hash occasionally provides new passwords, and it is all
> easily scripted..
Most burglar alarms in
NIST has a new draft publication on Wireless Network Security. It is a
good consolidation of 802.11 and bluetooth wireless security.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/draft-sp800-48.pdf
What I would like to call network operator's attention is the checklist of
recommended wireless netw
A nice academic paper looking at the causes of BGP errors. They found
configuration errors are pervasive, with 200-1200 prefixes experienceing
problems due to misconfigurations every day. But they also found the Net
is relatively robust, with only one in twenty-five misconfigurations
affect con
On Sat, 27 Jul 2002, W.D.McKinney wrote:
> NASA has had this out for over a year.
> http://www.nas.nasa.gov/Groups/Networks/Projects/Wireless/index.html
Yep, its like the early 1980's all over again when the wardialing first
came up. All sorts of security features were built into modems, such a
Mr. Clarke has been floating several trail ballons this week.
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-947409.html
"Software makers and Internet service providers must share the blame for
the nation's vulnerable networks, President Bush's special adviser on
cyberspace security said Wednesday."
http:
I encourage network operators (or IX operators, DNS operators, etc) to let
the government know what you think. Mr. Clarke's crew is writing the
plan, and taking input from many sources. If you think RPF (or some other
source address validation) is a solution let them know. If you think
S-BGP i
Before now, I haven't seen any verifiable statements about how the
networking infrastructure in the Pentagon was affected by the attacks
last year. Not to diminish the loss of life, which was tragic, but
networking people might be interested in this.
Building a surviable network in such a small
I guess the FBI/NIPC can't put out an alert about this one.
Notice the absence of any domain servers
> whois -h whois.nic.gov fbi.gov
% DOTGOV WHOIS Server ready
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI-DOM)
Information Resources Division Washington, DC 20535
Domain Name: FBI.GOV
Status: Active
Do
Is Akamai is trying to fix FBI.GOV or crack DNS.
Aug 12 20:09:28 clifden named[198]: [ID 295310 daemon.info] invalid RR
type 'NS' in additional section (name = 'akamai.net') from
[209.67.231.204].53
Aug 12 20:09:28 clifden last message repeated 129 times
Aug 12 20:09:32 clifden named[198]: [ID
On Mon, 12 Aug 2002, Brad Knowles wrote:
> > Building a surviable network in such a small area, relatively speaking the
> > Pentagon is small, is a much harder problem than diversity on a regional
> > or even national network.
>
> Keep in mind that it was DARPA that funded the original r
What are the best current practices ISPs use to maintain routing protocol
security?
1. None - May be acceptable in some environments
2. I don't tell anyone about my routing protocols
3. Firewalls protect me
4. Don't exchange routing information with external parties
5. Explicit routing neighbor
On Thu, 15 Aug 2002, Brad Knowles wrote:
> One of the lessons we were taught in our security briefings was
> that just because something was publicly discussed somewhere (e.g.,
> on a television show or in the newspaper) does not automatically make
> the information unclassified.
It works
On Fri, 16 Aug 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote:
> Ok here's a question, why are they sueing AT&T, CW, and UU? I see
> Listen4ever behind 4134 (China Telecom), who I only see buying transit
> through InterNAP. Wouldn't it be simpler for them to sue InterNAP? I guess
> it would sure be nice prece
On Sat, 17 Aug 2002, Sean M. Doran wrote:
> Hm, why stop with just backbone networks?
>
> Why shouldn't edge networks, corporate networks, and household
> networks chip in to uphold civil judgements against infringers?
The record labels don't want to give you that choice. If you read the
compla
Although many users have changed their online habits, they haven't
necessarily fixed their machines, even as infected computers slow, often
to a crawl.
Twenty percent of users who had computer problems did not attempt a fix.
Among those who did, 29 percent waited a month or longer.
Two in five
On Thu, 7 Jul 2005, Gadi Evron wrote:
> I wonder, has anyone ever prepared a best practices paper of some sort
> as to what can be expected in cases of big emergencies and mass
> hysteria, for networks?
Yes, there have been several studies and papers about what happens to
networks during public e
On Mon, 11 Jul 2005, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
> > All this while I was trying unsuccessfully to use my
> > mobile to ring the office.
>
> Some cell relays were temporarily shut to prevent a remote
> detonation of additional explosives. Cellular remotes seem
> to be a favorite of Al Qaeda and others
Chelmsford suspect on the hook in cable-cutting case
By Jessica Fargen
Tuesday, July 12, 2005
A Chelmsford man allegedly tried to get rich in a snip by cutting Verizon
and Comcast phone lines, then tried to get the companies to pay him to
stop, prosecutors say.
http://news.bostonherald.com/local
Both Steve Bellovin and Craig Labovitz show up in today's technology
section of the Wall Street Journal.
Information Security
Where the Dangers Are
By DAVID BANK and RIVA RICHMOND
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
July 18, 2005; Page R1
In the world of cybercrime, the bad guys are getti
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