Re: Satellite latency

st on BSD, the socket buffers aren't allocated buffers at all, simply numbers which fix maximium size that can be allocated when data comes in). -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Tauzin-Dingell (was ICANN)

ortunity to elect your favorite candidate is another. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Satellite latency

file, the web server will immediately dump 1MB into the kernel until either the socket buffer or the file runs out, and then the kernel will spend the 5 minutes transfering it to the dialup user. Have that happen a few times, and you get an instant mbuf exaustion (or whatever internal mechanism yo

Re: Equinix Exchange Point

206.223.115.79) appears to be up. Host (206.223.115.255) appears to be up. Nmap run completed -- 256 IP addresses (9 hosts up) scanned in 4 seconds -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Equinix Exchange Point

participant" for 6 months or more. Through time this will get better of course, but I still consider it something akin to deceptive advertising if you're going in there because of who you think you can peer with. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbi

Re: CEOlink

on't link it to EFNet noone will packet it. :) If thats too much trouble, try an AIM chat room. I don't think its worth making a whole mud over (no offense to MOO :P). -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: changes in classification of cable internet service

se does either. Worship your religion and/or politics all you want, but please don't tell me how to choose mine. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Metromedia Fiber warns of possible bankruptcy :-(

nd quarter, will be used to pay > down debt, it said. $50 mil down, $3.25 billion to go... -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Internet Exchange Questions

tched/multiplexed > service from a telco and directly connect with your intended peering ^ > partners over it, regardless of where everyone is located. (Hey, does this > sound like private interconnects?) You answered your own question. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <

Re: long distance gigabit ethernet

thers are as well, though it takes a while to overcome the well-engranded traditions and beliefs about "LAN vs WAN technology" and all that nonsense... Short of that, Cogent offers a layer 3 transport service with gige on both ends as an option... :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECT

Re: long distance gigabit ethernet

've seen the GigE long-haul transport subject come up a couple time there... -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Transatlantic response times.

n get a fairly good idea how drunk the people were when they laid your fiber. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise (fwd)

bedded SSH who still suffer from this problem (Vendor F comes to mind, but their SSH implementation also doesn't work with OpenSSH w/freebsd localisations, so something else is afoot there as well). -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID:

Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise (fwd)

, the speed) doubles every 2 > years. The pace has since slowed down a bit, but appears to be holding > steady at doubling every 18 months (1995-present). Not to be too picky, but how is going from "doubling every 2 years" to "doubling every 18 months" slowing down? :) --

Re: Exodus/C&W Depeering

of any given path sucking are far greater than the odds of that path going away. Therefore I would rather have one path which doesn't suck than two paths which may. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Let's talk about Distance Sniffing/Remote Visibility

expensive) cables, all in a box made out of what I swear was some kind of lead/neutron star material alloy. Of course that was a couple years ago, maybe they've upgraded to the current market's $50 processor. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Let's talk about Distance Sniffing/Remote Visibility

than I did writing the code to do this in the first place) but I don't see any reason it shouldn't work, with proper interrupt coalescing of course. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Let's talk about Distance Sniffing/Remote Visibility

where you want the RX data to be DMA'd. The kernel updates the producer index, discarding any data which the consumer can't read. Then you just have your userland program constantly scanning the ring for new data, put a usleep(1); in there and you'll stay below 0.01% cpu. Thin

Re: de-peering and peering

your nexthops. You can do something like RPF check your peers, but then you can run into asymetric routing issues. But just like anyone who is involved in selling "stolen" merchandise, they usually get busted when they piss off someone who knows about their activities and they get ratted o

Re: How to get better security people

uting IP lists that could be filtered by source address, let alone other more intelligent things like distributing firewall rulesets so you could pick off only the echo replies, BUT MAYBE THERE SHOULD BE. <-- HINT! -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Qwest Support

> > those peering points, you will not see any paths through Qwest on a > > single carrier route server like Nitrous. > > Not true. Nitrous shows all routes it knows about whether they are > preferred or not. Yes true. Once the path selection is made only the "best&qu

Re: MAE-Phoenix info request

term to refer to this nifty thing > that we now call an Internet Exchange. > > The MAE in Phoenix was originally constructed by Dave Siegel > and it ran from 1996 through 1998/9. Or companies like http://www.maedulles.net/ who aren't exchange points at all.

Re: Quick Question on Industry Standard

outer would route for 30 seconds and then not route for 30 seconds, that was a "bunch of 30 second outages" and not a 24 hour outage. Just remember, it's not an outage, it's an (quoting AboveNet here) "unscheduled network event". :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAI

Re: Load balancing in routers

4-7 load balancers). This is something that "routers" have typically avoided, and I'm not aware of any router vendors who attempt to do load balancing based on the load of a link. Did you have any more specific questions? -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Load balancing in routers

hat you can design your RIB so it is optimized for what it does most, insertions and deletions. Many RIB applications improve greatly when they no longer need a Patricia tree. To quote Avi Freedman, "Customer Enragement Feature". To quote Majdi Abbas, "John Chambers owes me a pony".

Re: NANOG on Trial

ines.. they most likely don't pay for transit.. I am about to call my lawyer about this and file lawsuits against 95% of the #nanog room to find out who has taken advantage of my system ...also with logs of everything said in #nanog I have over 50 cases of showing pornography to a m

Re: packet reordering at exchange points

bytes duped) 53862 out-of-order packets (75435307 bytes) 0.3% of non-ACK packets by packet were received out of order, or 2.8% by bytes. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: packet reordering at exchange points

T allow round > robin distribution; it uses hashes. Sure, hashed distribution > isn't perfect. But it's better than "perfect" distribution with > added latency and/or retransmits out the wazoo. You don't even need varying paths to create a desynch, all you n

Re: Qwest Transit

m other providers. Unfortunately for the cable companies, the people who they could get the best deals from (the "mostly hosters") tend to be highly based around the "major exchange points" cities (to most efficiently pump traffic into the rest of the internet), not the "res

Re: Qwest Transit

ndition that you will keep your traffic to a certain ratio? -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: packet reordering at exchange points

k they can't even build decent networks to deliver 10Mbit/s, @Home was the closest), and just a general lack of things for end users to do with that much bandwidth even if they got it. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: fixing TCP buffers (Re: packet reordering at exchange points)

our buffer, you might have the other side send you a few unnecessary bytes that you just have to drop, but the situation should correct itself very quickly. I don't think this would be "unfair" to any particular flow, since you've eliminated the concept of one flow "

Re: [Q] BGP filtering policies

ace. Such silly things are detrimental to the stability of one's > backbone. Permitting such silly things would be nightmarish. Once upon a time, AboveNet did not permit anyone to announce their IP space under any condition. I wonder if this is still the case. -- Richard A Steenb

Re: [Q] BGP filtering policies

Randy) care about, not because more routes is really harmful to the internet, but because it impacts the memory usage and convergence times of their networks. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: fixing TCP buffers (Re: packet reordering at exchange points)

it is free'd. The limits are just there to prevent you from running away with a socket buffer. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: fixing TCP buffers (Re: packet reordering at exchange points)

're serious about sucking down data. > > Once a socket proves its intentions (and periodically after > that), it gets to use a BIG buffer, so we find out just how fast > the connection can go. That doesn't prevent an intentional local DoS though. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[E

Re: packet reordering at exchange points

for anyone to explain to me the > issue of buffering. It appears to be completely unneccesary in a router. Note that the previous example was about end to end systems achieving line rate across a continent, nothing about routers was mentioned. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]&

Re: NANOG costs

peoples time for a few weeks, and the money is probably going to fund other Merit activities, I'm not certain that I'd want the prices dropped much lower. Unless of course, they'd like to give discounts for people who have attended many past NANOGs are who are now unemployeed. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: genuity - any good?

u can upgrade them or work around the other side's stupidities is one of the biggest indicators of the quality of your network. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: genuity - any good?

warm bodies or a perl monkey writing scripts to muck with router configs, just to keep a "dynamic" routing protocol from being "too dynamic". But I guess life isn't perfect. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: UUNET service

ot out that UU would take calls from anyone, every schmuck, crackpot, and prank call would be reporting something somewhere. It's just not an easily scalable solution. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Selective DNS replies

est way to do global server load balancing, as I see it. If you have a network, you can just use the same IP for your dns servers in multiple locations, and let your IGP route it to the closest one. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID

Re: UUNET instability?

On Thu, Apr 25, 2002 at 01:15:03PM -0500, Jeff Harper wrote: > > Anyone think this is related the Klez virus? Was UU running Outlook on their core routers? With Juniper I suppose it's possible... :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.n

Re: UUNET instability?

ldn't handle a couple hundred connections from NANOG readers. If that is the case, I would strongly suggest you reevaluate the language or method in which it was written. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

everyone needs to know (but usually doesn't) to handle DoS effectively, try reading: http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras/projects/dos/dos.txt -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

till what I would rank as a secondary effect. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

, how effective would be using a no export community with ones > peers (being non transitive, it would still distribute the force of the > attack). Many people do this already. If you're looking to purchase transit and you think this is something you'll care about, ask for it

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

a time. More would not take down the > session, but simply be ignored. > > I can carry 6 /32's for every peer I have, and if they only have > 6, they will probably use them for the most abusive target. I give it 2 months, then they'll start hitting random dst IPs in a ta

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

ring is only as good as your ability to DETERMINE WHAT TO FILTER. The only time you can get anything from this is when you admit defeat on keeping your services responding to new connection but want to keep existing connections and/or the end servers from failing completely. Depending on the

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

of > complaints. You have an interesting situation. I think rate limiting outbound RSTs would be the least offensive thing you could do, off the top of my head. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

On Wed, May 01, 2002 at 11:56:07PM -0600, Pete Kruckenberg wrote: > > On Thu, 2 May 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: > > > You have an interesting situation. I think rate limiting > > outbound RSTs would be the least offensive thing you > > could do, off the top

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

oviding layer 3 all the way to the student. So when you send in a DoS complaint about 1.2.3.182, the campus computer nerd looks it up, and goes to knock on that persons door. Little do they know that the actual compromised machine is 1.2.3.97 spoofing it. You ever tried explaining this to the camp

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

e on a DS3, or even if you have an OC48 from a provider who either doesn't want to or doesn't know how to protect their infrastructure from attacks, all of that means absolutily NOTHING. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

ning, I can tell you 4 things to add which will stop all existing packet kiddie tools in their tracks. But then again, I'd rather just have a language for bitmatching at any offset. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

e enabled in JUNOS software upgrades without having to swap hardware. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

On Thu, May 02, 2002 at 08:07:31PM +0200, Hank Nussbacher wrote: > > At 12:23 PM 02-05-02 -0400, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: > > >Thats what the IP2 does, match bytes in the headers and come back with a > >thumbs down or a thumbs up and a destination interface. It'

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

o your network via transits. The number you'd expect to filter is 50%, assuming the attacker in question is using an evenly distributing random() function. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: anybody else been spammed by "no-ip.com" yet?

On Fri, May 03, 2002 at 08:46:45AM -0700, Paul Vixie wrote: > > (time was, anyone who could use postfix and php would > also know better than to spam, or at least, to spam *me*. > .) If you feel like you don't have enough spam, I'd be happy to let you have some of m

eBay and the DoS thread

rbial poop chute to prevent the sharing of simple recommendations on DoS prevention with the networking community is that all useful, intelligent, and responsable people consider their policies carefully before working there. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

). Go forth and be filterful. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: anybody else been spammed by "no-ip.com" yet?

think they would stop. Spamming will stop when it stops being effective. That said, I'm pretty sure this thread has now excercised my D key more then a month's supply of spam. Isn't it about time we called it a day, or perhaps moved this to a list more appropriate for compla

Re: unicast RPF for peers viable?

I don't think much work is going to be done. Making RPF where reasonable a requirement for peering is a place to start, but I don't see that as being enforcable. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: uRPF Loose Check Mode vs. ACL

be interested in the data structure. Rather then walking a straight access-list rule set doing a comparison for every rule, you can make a "Filtering" Information Base mtrie for source address rules. This is the entire point of standard access-lists, and more recently compiled access-lis

Re: uRPF Loose Check Mode vs. ACL

could be. Of course then you'd need protocol extensions to carry around actual null0 routes instead of a nexthop just reserved for null routes... So this entire conversation is pretty pointless. :) What we all really need is a protocol which can distribute filtering information networ

Re: uRPF Loose Check Mode vs. ACL

On Mon, May 06, 2002 at 12:50:53AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > On Sun, 05 May 2002 22:11:12 EDT, Richard A Steenbergen said: > > What we all really need is a protocol which can distribute filtering > > information network-wide. Go make one. :) > > No, what we need i

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

> acls on E2 cards! If your vendor isn't providing you with working products, find a new vendor. I'm not going to touch that config with a 10ft cattle prod though, it better be automatically generated. That brings it down to the same level of distasteful tolerance for the good of the i

Re: Semi OT: Co-Location in Virginia/DC/Maryland

rea, your big 3 are: Equinix PAIX Switch and Data For price, quality, and if your goal is primarily to purchase transit, I would recommend Equinix, located in Ashburn VA. That said, this isn't the appropriate list for that kind of question. ISP-Bandwidth or ISP-Colo might be more appropr

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

as > most other DDoS defenses. Don't confuse the rantings of a nutcase and his T1 with useful information about DoS. I have to admit I like the direction the made up acronyms are going though, can we have MS-DOS next? :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://ww

Re: ratios

00Mb/s minimum traffic exchanged Must peer at OC12 or higher Must peer in 8 locations -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: ratios

en it is to get a metro OC12. Multiply that by the number of people they do peer with, and it adds up to a lot. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Asian exchange points

I know this isn't quote North American, but does anyone know what major exchange points exist in Asia? The largest one I've found so far is JPIX, which seems to move a fair amount of traffic (http://www.jpix.co.jp/en/techncal/traffic.html). Any other major ones? -- Richard A S

Re: Asian exchange points

tions and trying to find traffic stats. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: BGP and aggregation

lly cheap). If you're using the same transit provider in both cities, how about announcing the /20, and the 2 /21s tagged with no-export. The /20 would be heard by the world and get the traffic to your transit provider, then the /21s would route it to the right exit point. -- Richard A Steenberg

Re: BGP and aggregation

and maintained a reasonable throughput (say 30 or > SJW> 40Mbs) ? I'd be interested if anyone has a proven technique > > Anyone know more than myself about InterNAP who can disclose > details? Internap uses seperate, completely unconnected ASs for each city. -- Richard A Ste

Re: DirecPC Engineering Contact

t. More than a few people do (though I personally would not buy from them). -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: BGP and aggregation

put through the GRE tunnel. Handy for getting around MTUs you can't increase. Unfortunately, I do not believe Juniper has any such functionality (even when gre is done by the RE). -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (

Re: Arbor Networks DoS defense product

attacks. I'm still recommending rate limiting your outbound RSTs either on the webservers themselves (which a good OS should do), or on the routers. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Interconnects

eir own advantages and disadvantages, for example in Dallas both PAIX and Equinix sit right beside each other at the Infomart. In others, one or the other is out of space. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: The market must be coming back

moment to laugh uncontrollably. It has nothing to do with ISIS or MPLS, it has to do with making your existing functionality work correctly and behave in a sensible fashion. Nothing personal against Foundry, but the people in charge couldn't possibly "not get it" any more than they

Re: Cisco 7200 VXR with NPE-400 (was RE: The market must be coming back)

ate. And if^H^Hwhen you run into a really fun issue, don't even think about calling Foundry TAC after hours, all you'll get is someone's house with their screaming kids in the background. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Cisco 7200 VXR with NPE-400 (was RE: The market must be coming back)

ouse with their screaming kids in the background on a regular basis. I do know how to operate a telephone, thanks. :) And it's nothing personal, I have actually been one of Foundry's biggest supporters compared to almost every other engineer I know. Everyone else gave up using th

Re: Cisco quality

has better excuses to go along with them. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: list problems?

quickly, and if Merit is actually hiring people to censor NANOG 24/7 someone needs to reevaluate their funding), but I have seen censoring in the past which is almost comical in nature, for example the "Sexual Harassment" filter. Best be careful, the PC police are coming for you. -- Ri

Re: list problems?

e that held a university > degree. One I fired after 2 months, the other I fired after 3. "Sir, I think you have me confused with someone who cares". -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Certification or College degrees? Was: RE: list problems?

cs from reputable companies like GX, EXDS, and CSCO. http://www.bblabs.com/highspeed.htm http://www.bblabs.com/data_center_picture.html http://www.bblabs.com/dedicated_server.htm -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: list problems?

rojecting your personal prejustices about what learning style works best upon others is neither smart nor productive. Can we all just leave it at that, and try to get back to something operational? -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: operational: icmp echo out of control?

at can explain what your probe is doing, and a webpage for people to read more about what you are doing and why (such as how it benefits them). * Have an "opt out" option for networks who REALLY don't like probes. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Routers vs. PC's for routing - was list problems?

uys who could build a very beefy 2GHz box for computationally intensive tasks (like a route reflector). -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: operational: icmp echo out of control?

probably best off trying to get as much data as possible passively. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: operational: icmp echo out of control?

net equivilent of crying wolf. In my opinion, it is the responsability of these personal firewall makers to at least make an EFFORT to warn their users about this. So far, I havn't seen it. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Contact for UniNet S.A. de C.V. (NETBLK-UNINET-NETBLK-12)

hould contact them? -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: IP renumbering timeframe

27;ve tried preparing lists of the worst offenders and emailing them, and the vast majority don't answer and do nothing about it. If we could seperate the people with legitimate needs from the net polluters, we could then proceed to filter with a vengence. 5000 for 62000 sounds like a

Re: IP renumbering timeframe

On Thu, May 30, 2002 at 01:10:58PM -0400, Leo Bicknell wrote: > > In a message written on Thu, May 30, 2002 at 11:27:49AM -0400, Richard A Steenbergen >wrote: > > I'd be mildly concerned that people would see "free IP blocks" and start > > using them even wh

Re: Trying to find a connectivity provider that wont go under (was RE: CAIS/Ardent and now Network Access Solutions)

h silly bureaucracy. That said, this has very little place on NANOG. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: AS8070

On Sat, Jun 01, 2002 at 06:42:58PM -0400, Ralph Doncaster wrote: > > I've noticed a large chunk of my customer traffic coming from > Microsoft. Anyone know if they peer anywhere on the East coast? I think you have [EMAIL PROTECTED] confused with [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Richard

Re: route authentication

r-CPU'd, and I think most engineers would rather have routes converge 30% faster than protect against an attack noone has ever done. That and its just one more thing to negotiate with the other side. :) -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PG

Re: Bogon list

all of these from my routing table, but not with filtering RFC1918 space or exchange point routes (at least not on the border device connecting to it :P) from source addresses. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Bogon list

HOULDN'T be transited by anyone, therefore you should not hear them from your peers. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Meltdown somewhere?

nues to work. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Bogon list

I'm not terribly sure why you would want to make traceroutes lose all information about the circuits you're traveling through. It would make diagnostics an everloving nightmare, IMHO. -- Richard A Steenbergen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138E

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