The problem isn't logging, billing, or crashing the network. The
problem is
that the Cells are designed to have a certain area of coverage based on
the
assumption that the remote station is a ground-based station. When you
elevate
a station, that station becomes capable of transmitting it's sig
--On Tuesday, July 5, 2005 12:02 -1000 Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The principle purpose of the secondary mx, in this case, is to accept
email for the primary mx during periods where the primary is down
and the sending smtp server has no spool. i.e. no useful
purpose.
today, th
Well... It will be most amusing if the 911 dispatchers start a deluge
of calls and letters asking the FCC "What the hell were you idiots
thinking?"
when they realize what the FCC has done here.
It's a bad rule on the FCC's part showing they don't understand the
technology and think that VOIP is
If you can put a locator into a cellphone, I see no reason why you cannot
do the same in a VoIP unit.
Just because you can does not mean it is a good idea. I like being
able to have a phone that cannot be accurately located. I won't be
buying any VOIP products that can.
Owen
--
If this mess
It doesn't need to work in basements, etc. It only needs to keep
a record of the last location it was at when the signal faded
away. The emergency service vehicles probably can't get any closer
than that anyway.
In the US, that might be true, but, I'm betting that could be very wrong
in places l
Perhaps the tube wasn't the best example, although, I remember making cell
calls from places in stations I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have gotten GPS
coverage.
In any case, the fundamental assumption that detailed location information
for
e911 on every phone or phone-like capability is desirable is,
Forget defeat, just look at the normal margin of error...
Forget fixed-line services, location is easy to solve for that. Let's look
at
things like a guy sitting on a mountain top with a BBQ grill antenna, and
amp,
and a WiFi card. I could make VOIP calls from Apple's public Wireless
network
fro
--On Saturday, July 30, 2005 14:43 -0400 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, 30 Jul 2005 10:28:38 EDT, "Geo." said:
available for free like the patches need to be. So I suggest they employ
a different patch method, you download an exe from their ftp site, it
takes your current build which is st
However, clearly, companies doing business in China under this set of
rules are placing profits ahead of human rights. I, for one, will avoid
patronizing any organization I know to be engaged in such practices.
Owen
pgpnvudC9baJQ.pgp
Description: PGP signature
--On October 7, 2005 2:56:10 PM +0100 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> Even those IXs with MPLA policy have to rely on law and courts for
>> enforcement -- that is, those with guns.
>
> In the United States, as in most countries, there is an
> explicit separation of the courts from the enforcemen
BTW, as I read it, SHIM6 requires not only modification to ALL nodes at the
site,
but, modification to ALL nodes to which the node needs reliable
connectivity.
In other words, SHIM6 is not fully useful until it is fully ubiquitous in
virtually
all IPv6 stacks.
Owen
--On October 14, 2005 11:48:2
> Well, not necessarily.
>
> Tier-2s should be given much more credit than they typically are in
> write-ups like this. When a customer is single homed to a tier-2 that has
> multiple tier-1 upstreams, and uses a delegated netblock from the tier-2's
> aggregations, that means one less ASN and one
>> That's the operators' view, but not the customer's.
>> The customer wants redundancy.
>
> That's why SLAs exist.
>
No... SLAs exist to extract some compensation when the level of service
doesn't meet the need. In a mission critical situation, SLAs are
pretty worthless. The primary benefit of
> Always remember: For every customer, their stuff _is_ mission
> critical. So everyone will take the multihoming road if they
> can afford it.
>
> We can make it more expensive, or we can offer other solutions.
>
Why should we do either? Why not fix the way we do routing so
that it's OK for eve
--On October 19, 2005 11:17:02 PM -0400 Jon Lewis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Wed, 19 Oct 2005, Owen DeLong wrote:
I've done simple ASN/BGP based multihoming for a number of businesses,
and, it can be done on a mostly set-and-forget basis. If you have your
upstreams supply 0.
> A customer with a prefix assigned from this chunk has to connect with an
> ISP who has
>
> * a Very Large Multihoming (to handle scaling concerns) router somewhere
> in its network that peers to other ISP Very Large Multihoming routers.
>
> ISP operating a VLMrouter to offer multihoming servi
> Rewriting would IMHO not work easily, but encapsulation would.
> Admittedly, this idea has occurred and lead to MPLS
> implementations (which are weak at interconnecting ISPs anyway).
>
Why wouldn't rewriting work? The "encapsulation" you show below
is little different from the rewrite I propos
> Mind you, it would help if some of the anti-abuse groups
> would band together under some umbrella organization that
> ISPs could join. Botnet researchers, SPAM fighters, etc.
> That way there could be some sort of good housekeeping
> seal of approval that ISPs can use to competitive advantage
>
--On October 20, 2005 2:31:39 PM -0400 "Howard, W. Lee"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> Imagine instead, a world where Routing Location Identifiers
>> are not coupled to End System Identifiers and Interdomain
>> routing (AS-AS routing) occurred based on Routing Location
>> Identifier, and only
--On October 20, 2005 9:32:44 PM +0100 Freminlins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Owen DeLong wrote:
If companies that made
vulnerable OSs were held liable for the damage caused
by those vulnerabilities, you would rapidly see $$
make a BIG difference in the security quality of
OS So
from multiple parties.
Owen
--On October 21, 2005 12:12:22 AM +0200 "Elmar K. Bins" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Owen DeLong) wrote:
Why wouldn't rewriting work? The "encapsulation" you show below
is little different from the rewrite I pro
> There is not only the multihoming issue but also the PI address issue.
> Even if any ISP would run his network very competently and there
> were no outages we would face the ISP switching issue. Again we
> would end up with either PI addresses announced by the ISP or BGP
> by the customer. With
--On October 24, 2005 10:01:21 AM +0100 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> the market wouldn't
> feel the need to have to dual home.
the internet model is to expect and route around failure.
Seems to me that there is some confusion over the meaning
of "multihoming". We seem to assume that it me
--On October 24, 2005 10:44:31 AM +0100 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One way to do this is for two ISPs to band together
in order that each ISP can sell half of a joint
multihoming service. Each ISP would set aside a
subset of their IP address space to be used by many
such multihomed customers. E
I believe RFC1122 was written in the days when there was a one-to-one
correlation
between IP addresses and interfaces, and, you couldn't have one machine with
multiple addresses on the same network. Obviously, also, we are talking
about
network multihoming, not host multihoming in a NANOG context.
> ... shim6 doesn't fit into the definition does it? Its seems to be a
> question of multihomed networks Vs. multihomed hosts (although the
> effect may be the same at the end of the day).
>
>
Yes... The network is still multihomed, but, instead of using routing to
handle the source/dest addr. s
OK... As entertaining as the debate on the definition of "multihomed host"
is so far, I'd like to point out that on NANOG, we are generally NOT
concerned with that term. The term that we are most interested in
is "multihomed network".
I would submit that host multihoming is irrelevant to the cha
> YOu may also remember that back in 1997, when the telcos were fighting
> this massive redesign of their systems, the FBI apparently tried to
> "decertify" the entire Telecommunications Industry Association.
>
>In their testimony, the TIA and carrier trade group leaders blamed
>the FBI an
Actually, having now read the entire proposed law, I think it is
remarkably reasonable compared to most of what Congress has done
lately.
It sets the regulatory threshold for ISPs and VOIP providers at
a very low level. It preempts most of the local regulations.
It provides for the possibility t
Something to consider about this proposed "regulation"... It is actually
in many ways proposed "deregulation". This bill removes more authority
from the FCC and state and local governments than it grants. It provides
a very minimal framework of regulation, then, except for taxation and
a couple
--On November 14, 2005 11:04:46 AM -0500 Sean Donelan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
On Mon, 14 Nov 2005, Blaine Christian wrote:
We are talking about an infrastructure that does not lend itself very
well to market forces. In many places FFTH and/or DSL from a single
carrier are becoming the
--On November 15, 2005 6:28:21 AM -0800 David Barak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
--- Owen DeLong <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
True
competition requires the ability
for multiple providers to enter into the market,
including the creation
of new providers to seize opportunities b
--On November 15, 2005 7:25:54 AM -0800 David Barak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
--- Matthew Crocker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
That is the exact problem with a [mon|du]opoly. The
incumbents drive
the price so low (because they own the network) that
it drives out an
potential competition
--On November 15, 2005 8:14:38 PM -0800 David Schwartz
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
--On November 15, 2005 6:28:21 AM -0800 David Barak
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
OK... Let me try this again... True competition requires
that it be PRACTICAL for multiple providers to enter the
market, inc
--On November 15, 2005 11:23:50 PM -0500 Sean Donelan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
On Tue, 15 Nov 2005, Owen DeLong wrote:
I think what is really represented there is that because
they own an existing network that was built with public
subsidy and future entrants have no such acc
I think what is really represented there is that
because
they own an existing network that was built with
public
subsidy and future entrants have no such access to
public
subsidy to build their own network, ...
Sean's post correctly identified the problem with this
assertion, so I won't
And I
--On November 16, 2005 1:48:39 AM -0500 Sean Donelan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
On Tue, 15 Nov 2005, Owen DeLong wrote:
areas, it's actually illegal. Usually, municipalities
have granted franchise rights of access to right of
way to particular comp
--On November 15, 2005 11:02:18 PM -0800 David Schwartz
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
--On November 15, 2005 8:14:38 PM -0800 David Schwartz
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> --On November 15, 2005 6:28:21 AM -0800 David Barak
>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> OK... Let me try this again...
--On November 16, 2005 4:23:20 AM -0800 David Schwartz
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>> In any case, the bottom line is that whether through subsidy, "deal",
>> or other mechanism, the "last-mile" infrastructure tends to end up being
>> a monopoly or duopoly for most terrestrial forms of infr
> Windows 98 price (in 1997) -> $209
> Office 97 Standard (in 1997) -> $689
> Windows XP price (now) -> $199.
> Office 2003 (now) -> $399.
>
> Want to try that again?
>
Yes... Here's some more accurate data:
Windows 3.1 price $49
Windows 3.1.1 price $99
Windows 95 (Personal) price $59
Windows
--On November 16, 2005 9:25:29 PM -0800 David Barak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
--- Owen DeLong <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Windows 98 price (in 1997) -> $209
> Office 97 Standard (in 1997) -> $689
> Windows XP price (now) -> $199.
> Office 2003 (n
VZ certainly shouldn't remove any copper that doesn't belong to VZ. So,
unless
they are the ILEC in Apple Valley, that may or may not be an issue.
Owen
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IP prefixes are NOT allocated to AS numbers, they are allocated to
Organizations
just like AS numbers.
Perhaps this is part of why you can't find such a list.
Owen
--On November 28, 2005 11:45:58 AM +0530 Glen Kent <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
to different Autonomous systems.
Is there a c
Actually, for actual implementation, there are subtle differences between
AS 0x0002 ans AS 0x0002. True, they are the same AS in 16 and 32 bit
representation, and, for allocation policy, they are the same, but, in
actual router guts, there are limited circumstances where you might actually
ca
It makes one wonder if an entity with as deep pockets and
adept legal staff might actually make an impact on spammers,
or if they are simply tilting at windmills.
Either way, it's a good thing. It takes resources away from Micr0$0ft's
other legal pursuits which can't possibly be a bad thing. It m
I think the original proposal was to still go with 32 bit ASNs, but, adapt
a range of 32 bit ASNs for the assignment to "NON-TRANSIT" ASNs leaving
the entire 16 bit range reserved for "TRANSIT" ASNs.
I think there's merit to the idea, but, I think that it could use some
refinement. I agree there w
I don't see non-transit ASN leakage as any greater issue than current
private ASN leakage.
However, I do see the ability to use non-transit ASNs to multihome end sites
with provider independent addresses and allow better aggregation as a good
thing. In this case, leakage would only have the same c
Owen
--On Saturday, December 4, 2004 0:30 + "Edward B. Dreger"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
OD> Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 14:45:17 -0800
OD> From: Owen DeLong <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
OD> I think the original proposal was to still go with 32 bit ASNs, but,
adapt OD> a
refinement,
but, I like the general idea.
Owen
--On Saturday, December 4, 2004 3:03 AM + "Edward B. Dreger"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
OD> Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 18:09:48 -0800
OD> From: Owen DeLong
OD> I think all the meaningful parties have already pretty much agreed on
O
--On Sunday, December 5, 2004 3:55 PM +0100 Iljitsch van Beijnum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 4-dec-04, at 21:04, Edward B. Dreger wrote:
I suppose there could be in excess of 65431 transit networks. I think
that's why Owen suggested reserving, say, 2^20 ASNs for transit in
32-bit space.
How d
works, allowing
transit networks to make more rational (possibly automated) decisions about
route aggregation.
Owen
--On Monday, December 6, 2004 12:54 PM -0500 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, 03 Dec 2004 15:23:55 PST, Owen DeLong said:
I don't see non-transit ASN leakage as any greater issue
onday, December 6, 2004 1:32 PM -0500 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, 06 Dec 2004 10:14:12 PST, Owen DeLong said:
The proposal wasn't for "parallel" ASN space. The proposal was to have
a range of ASNs for leaf-networks and a range for transit networks,
allowing transit networks to make mor
Assuming that this is in North America (this is NAnog, afterall), they
should probably apply to ARIN for both the /22 (if they can justify that
much space) and the ASN, or, get the ASN from ARIN and the space from you.
As of policy 2002-3, ARIN will assign /22s to end users that have need of
a uniq
I hadn't noticed it, but, I hope that ICANN will take appropriate action
on it.
It really is about time that Verisign got told "Either run the registry
as contracted for the public good, not as your own private revenue
producer, or, agree to terminate the contract and we'll find you a
successor on
Correct me if I'm wrong, but, nothing gives Netsol title to a domain that
someone happens to have registered through them after that registration
expires.
I apologize to Verisign for my earlier comment. I thought this was
something
being done by the registry at the top level. My mistake.
Does a
Michael,
Whether you like it or not, SPAM is the problem. There are legitimate
uses of anonymous email. I, for one, think that a web of mail peering
agreements would be detrimental to the situation, not helpful. Yes, people
should have the option of authenticating emails they send, and, end use
I realize that this is more of an IETF issue than a NANOG one, but, I'd
like to find a couple of people with some protocol background and a strong
operational background that would be interested in trying to see if we
can come up with a way to develop a version of IP which did not require
a flag da
I think that a secure email infrastructure is a good
thing to have, in and of itself. By secure, I mean
one in which messages get to their destination reliably,
i.e. not lost in some spam filter, and one in which
a recipient can reliably know where the message came
from if they feel the need to tra
--On Wednesday, January 12, 2005 4:11 PM + [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Right now I have freedom of communication. In your vision I would hand
all that over to my ISP for the benefit of giving complete control over
who can communicate with me to them.
Perhaps you could explain to me just how y
That's great if you want to trust one carrier to provide all your seperacy,
but, when you want to make sure carrier A isn't running your ring in common
with carrier B, you need GIS data.
Owen
--On Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:36 AM + [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
> My point was that competing, d
Requesting rDNS means "I don't want to receive email from Africa".
Having an rDNS entry for a host doesn't mean you know if it is/isn't in
Africa, to any higher degree of certainty than when you just had the IP
address.
What he was pointing out her is that a majority of African ISPs do not even
hav
That's bad sincd DNAME is deprecated and has been removed from BIND.
Owen
--On Friday, January 14, 2005 10:05 +1100 Mark Andrews
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
What is wrong with MTAMARK?
As currently described it doesn't fit well with RFC 2317
style delegations. They would need to be c
more
detail.
Anyway, thanks for your feedback. If I'm missing some glaring problem, I'd
like to know earlier rather than later. :-)
Owen
--On Wednesday, January 12, 2005 20:59 +0100 Iljitsch van Beijnum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 12-jan-05, at 19:26, Owen DeLong wrote:
[...]
I&#
--On Wednesday, February 16, 2005 2:16 + Thor Lancelot Simon
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tue, Feb 15, 2005 at 09:00:11PM -0500, Sean Donelan wrote:
Sendmail now includes Port 587, although some people disagree how
its done. But Exchange and other mail servers are still difficult
for syste
--On Tuesday, February 15, 2005 21:30 -0500 Sean Donelan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
On Wed, 16 Feb 2005, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
This is utterly silly. Running another full-access copy of the MTA
on a different port than 25 achieves precisely nothing -- and this
"support" has always been inc
Um, you actually have to work somewhat to get sendmail to support
unauthenticated submission on port 587. The default configuration
is that port 25 is unauthenticated (albeit with some restrictions
on relaying (only for local clients)) and port 587 is authenticated.
As such, I'm not sure why you s
Chances are that the Sendmail team doesn't share your worm problems as most
of them are not likely running unpatched windows boxes.
Owen
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Description: PGP signature
My favorite quote is:
"All countries want to counter spam -- unsolicited commercial messages that
can flood email accounts by the hundreds and burden the web with unwanted
traffic."
Especially in lite of the comment you posted and the fact that developing
countries seem to be the major sources o
What if the UN says ITU should run the TLDs, ICANN says yes, and, a
significant portion of the operational internet says no?
Owen
--On Tuesday, February 22, 2005 5:53 AM -0800 Ross
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
No government will ever have the internet's best interest in mind when
they talk about c
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Either by doing DNS delegation on the zone boundary or by SWIP'ing
> the space to the other company.
You can SWIP it yes, but that won't help DNS on small blocks like /24's.
SWIPping the large block won't help. SWIPping the /24s will.
OK, what am I missing?
*ASSUMPTION*
...snip...
Um, why?
Firstly he does NOT have authority for the /16 reverse. Lots
of latent problems there.
Nor is he claiming it. Nowhere on the internet is there anything saying
that the entire /16 should be looked up against his nameserver. No
reference
should exist pointing to hi
I'm afraid that above is not an accurate or workable sequence of events.
Not accurate in the sense that I left out some of the queries and left
it as a summary of the relevant ones, however...
[...bind 9.3.1...] snip
Note too that this is from a fresh (empty) cache. Some queries are not
needed whe
Were I running an ISP of which Utah subscribers were not a large portion
of my customer base, I would probably seriously consider simply
disconnecting
all of my Utah customers.
Owen
--On Tuesday, March 22, 2005 9:18 AM -0800 Bill Woodcock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>
> > The measure, SB 26
> I agree, I'd certainly like to see more people actively participate in
> the process. If nanog folks believe that the ARIN membership is not
> getting the right stuff done... How do we fix this problem? How do we
> get more operators involved and active in the RIRs?
>
I'd like to point out t
> One question does haunt me about how the operations community views ARIN.
> Most ARIN policies are concerned with address allocation, reporting, and
> such. There are not many policies regarding the functional role ARIN
> plays in the Internet, the only one that leaps to mind is a lame
> delegat
--On Thursday, March 24, 2005 3:20 PM -0500 Edward Lewis
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> At 17:01 + 3/24/05, Andrew Dul wrote:
>
>> I agree, I'd certainly like to see more people actively participate in
>> the process. If nanog folks believe that the ARIN membership is not
>> getting the r
--On Thursday, March 24, 2005 16:32 -0500 Edward Lewis
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
At 12:53 -0800 3/24/05, Owen DeLong wrote:
NO. Operational specifications and routing are the domain of the IETF
and _NOT_ ARIN. ARIN is responsible for the stewardship of assigned
numbers within the ARIN
Here's my dilemma. On the one hand I hear calls for greater operational
input to ARIN. On the other hand is empirical evidence that there isn't
much input being given.
Correct... Generally, you hear those calls coming from ARIN because ARIN
is trying to maximize the involvement of its constituen
--On Wednesday, March 30, 2005 21:36 -0600 Chris Adams <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Once upon a time, Eric A. Hall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
Do you also block NNTP so that customers have to use your servers?
Change that to SMTP and you'll get a bunch of "yes" answers. Why is one
right and the oth
No, but if your car doesn't have seat belts, we don't let you drive
it. Basic SMTP lacks safety features that are needed, ergo,
retrictions were placed on it.
Basic SMTP is fine. You all use it today. I will use it
to send this message. SMTP is not better or worse than
the po
Tiered service is fine, but, charge per octet transferred will not work for
me until I can have control over which octets are transferred. As long
as I can't block spammers and abusers from adding to my bill without
blocking services I want (email, web usage, the ability to host some
small website
> Heard of a little thing called a 'rhetorical question'?
>
> Who decides that it is okay for ISPs to block SMTP and not okay for them
> to block VoIP? If it is okay to block SMTP because "people do bad
[snip]
Well... Here's how I define things:
1. Blocking ports is bad.
2. Certain c
Is VoIP and VoIP blocking an operational issue?
Yes
Is VoIP and VoIP blocking an issue requiring coordination among providers?
Yes
Looks like they are, indeed, on topic.
Owen
--On Thursday, March 31, 2005 2:53 PM -0800 "J.D. Falk"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Are the
Actually, that's an interesting point...
What if SIP based phones could "know" do the following:
1. If they know where they are, include:
X-Lat: N/S dd:mm:ss.sss
X-Lon: E/W ddd:mm:ss.sss
In the SIP headers.
2. If they do
Also, as a former medical professional who has some actual experience
with these scenarios, I'd like to point out that the percentage of times
that people are _NOT_ screwed, even if the location pops up and EMS gets
there as absolutely fast as possible is less than 1%.
That's right... If you are h
> That may be the rule in Florida, but in DC, MD, and UT
> (the states in which I've lived in the past 2
> decades), you can be be ticketed if you are driving a
> car and not wearing a seatbelt.
>
This is true in CA, too. However, the law in CA specifically provides
that if you are driving a ca
USB is better because almost every computer today has USB ports. Not
all of them have headset/mic jacks.
My personal favorite is the Telex H551 implemented as a USB adapter
which provides standard headset/mic jacks.
Owen
--On Friday, April 1, 2005 2:00 PM -0800 Randy Bush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> w
Indeed, it does appear that eBay is attempting to use Eliza to perform
all of their customer service.
Owen
pgpoKiy1tfq5g.pgp
Description: PGP signature
That makes very little sense to me since the smaller providers can get
a /22 directly from ARIN.
I, personaly, would never purchase service from a provider that insisted
on sticking me behind NAT.
SPRINT PCS does not NAT my cellphone. I receive a dynamic address at
connection time, but, it is a
I think it's absurd. I expect my water delivery company not to add
polutants in transit. I expect my water production company to provide
clean water.
This is like asking the phone company to prevent minors from hearing
swear-words on telephone calls or prevent people from being able to make
prank
Why do ISPs owe this to their customers. I expect my ISP to deliver
packets sent to me, and, to pass along packets I send out. That is
the sum total of what I expect from my ISP, and, it's what my contract
says is supposed to happen. Where does this belief that when user A
at company Y sends a p
Sound about right?
No, not at all.
I'm not advocating a wild west every man for himself, but, I think that
solving end-node oriented problems at the transport layer is equally
absurd.
It's like expecting to be able to throw crude oil into a tanker at
one end and demanding that the trucker deliver g
yet another example of advertising disguised as news.
Owen
--On Wednesday, April 27, 2005 15:42 +0930 Mark Newton
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tue, Apr 26, 2005 at 10:38:00PM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote:
> So much for any sort of journalistic ethic, fact checking, or, unbiased
&g
--On Wednesday, April 27, 2005 6:36 + [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On Tue, Apr 26, 2005 at 10:38:00PM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote:
I think it's absurd. I expect my water delivery company not to add
polutants in transit. I expect my water production company to provide
clean water.
er.
--On Wednesday, April 27, 2005 7:39 + [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On Wed, Apr 27, 2005 at 12:13:16AM -0700, Dragos Ruiu wrote:
On April 26, 2005 11:36 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2005 at 10:38:00PM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote:
> > I think it's absurd. I e
Thing is, protecting them from themselves and their own stupidity is
also the thing that most everyone else needs, too.
Do you really want an internet where everything has to run over ports
80 and 443 because those are all that's left that ISPs don't filter?
They should be filtered, t
--On Wednesday, April 27, 2005 3:50 -0700 "william(at)elan.net"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Wed, 27 Apr 2005, Owen DeLong wrote:
Yes, most water transit companies are also the water supply company,
Water supply comes from rivers, lakes, etc. While water company take
water fr
EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> None -- when you disconnect [correct, block, whatever]
> abusive end-systems in your administrative domain. Act
> locally, think globally.
>
> In fact, an ISP in AUS just did this last week...
>
> - ferg
>
>
> Owen DeLong <[E
> We know that almost all users are too stupid to know what they really
> need or how to get it, and that they need to be protected from their own
> stupidity -- as well as protecting the rest of the world from their
> stupidity.
Not only do I not know this, I find it to be patently false.
--On Wednesday, April 27, 2005 11:08 AM -0700 Dan Hollis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Apr 2005, Owen DeLong wrote:
>> Strangely, for all the FUD in the above paragraph, I'm just not buying
>> it. The internet, as near as I can tell, is functioning today at l
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