On Wed, 2005-07-06 at 15:23 -0400, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
> [late followup, sorry]
>
> On Thu, Jun 23, 2005 at 05:42:17AM -0700, Dave Crocker wrote:
> > The real fight is to find ANY techniques that have long-term, global
> > benefit in reducing spam.
>
> We've already got them -- we've always ha
On Jul 13, 2005, at 6:57 PM, Fergie (Paul Ferguson) wrote:
Just curious: Did any readers of the list participate in
this summit?
While the event was focused upon advocating the use of Sender-ID now,
and DKIM later, there was some information made available regarding
Sender-ID not normal
On Sun, 2005-08-07 at 11:09 -1000, Randy Bush wrote:
> > will the ilec's start offering competitive services (not bw,
> > but non-dynamic ips or small blocks to end-users?)
>
> if their competition has been eliminated by fcc ruling, what
> does 'competitive' pricing mean?
The choice for broadba
On Sun, 2005-08-07 at 22:20 -0400, Richard A Steenbergen wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 07, 2005 at 02:21:59PM -0700, Douglas Otis wrote:
> > The choice for broadband will be either the cable company or the phone
> > company, in those areas with both. In other areas, it will be just the
&g
On Dec 4, 2005, at 8:04 PM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
"Church, Chuck" writes:
The ideal solution would be for the scanning software to send a
warning only if the virus detected is known to use real addresses,
otherwise it won't warn.
A-V companies are in the business of analyzing viru
On Dec 6, 2005, at 8:19 AM, Todd Vierling wrote:
On Mon, 5 Dec 2005, Douglas Otis wrote:
A less than elegant solution as an alternative to deleting the
message, is
to hold the data phase pending the scan.
Contrary to your vision of this option, it is not only elegant; it
happens
to
On Dec 6, 2005, at 2:15 PM, Todd Vierling wrote:
On Tue, 6 Dec 2005, Douglas Otis wrote:
Holding at the data phase does usually avoid the need for a DSN,
but this
technique may require some added (less than elegant) operations
depending upon
where the scan engine exists within the
On Dec 7, 2005, at 1:35 PM, Edward B. Dreger wrote:
DO> Not all email is rejected within the SMTP session. You are
changing
DO> requirements for recipients that scan incoming messages for
malware. Fault
DO> them for returning content or not including a null bounce-
address. No one
DO>
On Dec 7, 2005, at 4:06 PM, Edward B. Dreger wrote:
H. BATV-triggered bounces. Virus triggers forged bounce which in
turn triggers "your DSN was misguided" bounce. Perhaps the bandwidth
growth of the '90s will continue. ;-)
BATV should not trigger any bounce as this only changes the l
On Dec 8, 2005, at 2:18 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It seems reasonable to design a mail system so that notifications
are sent back to the originator of the message when there is a
problem somewhere along the delivery chain.
Agreed. The alternative would be more like instant messaging.
On Fri, 2005-12-09 at 09:25 +, Simon Waters wrote:
> But the point of this discussion is that SMTP will have to evolve to be a
> point to point system (or functional equivalent). The days of store and
> forward in intermediate MTAs should die as quickly as possible (which as our
> forwardi
On Fri, 2005-12-09 at 11:16 -0500, Todd Vierling wrote:
> On Fri, 9 Dec 2005, Geo. wrote:
>
> > If everyone would just standardize on at least the first part of every virus
> > notification being the same thing, say:
> >
> > XXX VIRUS NOTIFICATION: blah blah blah
> >
> > where XXX is some error
On Dec 9, 2005, at 9:22 AM, Todd Vierling wrote:
Actually, I get about ten to twenty times as much virus blowback as
I get spam from trojan-zombie boxes.
That's because the virus blowback comes from otherwise "reputable"
MTAs, whereas the spam comes form zombies that are often already
b
On Dec 9, 2005, at 9:59 AM, Steven J. Sobol wrote:
On Fri, 9 Dec 2005, Todd Vierling wrote:
I'd like someone UNBIASED to take up his side of the discussion,
please. I'm really not inclined to listen to an AV employee explain
why they should be spamming us.
I am not aware of any of our
On Dec 9, 2005, at 10:15 AM, Todd Vierling wrote:
1. Virus "warnings" to forged addresses are UBE, by definition.
This definition would be making at least two of the following
assumptions:
1) Malware detection has a 0% false positive.
2) Lack of DSN for email falsely detected containi
On Dec 9, 2005, at 1:12 PM, Todd Vierling wrote:
None of these are my problem. I am a non-involved third party to
the malware detection software, so I should not be a party to its
outgoing spew.
I have not requested the virus "warnings" (unsolicited), they are
being sent via an automa
On Dec 9, 2005, at 4:09 PM, Robert Bonomi wrote:
1) Malware detection has a 0% false positive.
If there is a 'false positive' detecting malware, it is a near
certainty that the "legitimate" message so classified does *NOT*
have a FORGED ADDRESS.
When there is some percentage of false
On Sat, 2005-12-10 at 15:40 +0100, JP Velders wrote:
> *any* anti-virus vendor has not only signatures of a specific virus
> but also a good understanding of what the virus does and how it
> spreads. If the vendor doesn't, well, they'd better retire from the AV
> business, because as a vendor
On Sat, 2005-12-10 at 17:37 +, Andrew - Supernews wrote:
> BATV doesn't help you if the problem is SMTP transaction volume, any
> more than a firewall will help you cope with a saturated network link.
I agree with most of your statements. AV filters should be done within
the session when po
On Sat, 2005-12-10 at 17:51 -0600, Robert Bonomi wrote:
> BATV has the risk of false-positive detection of an 'invalid' DSN.
> All it takes is a remote mail system that keeps 'trying' to deliver to
> a tempfailing address for _longer_ than the lifetime of that 'private
> tag'.
>
> Congratulation
On Thu, 2005-02-03 at 14:55 -0800, J.D. Falk wrote:
> On 02/03/05, "Hannigan, Martin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > ..or a cost issue. Most of these users are people who have
> > decided not to spend the $40 to defend their machine at home.
>
> So you educate them as to why it would be a go
On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 09:53 -0500, Todd Vierling wrote:
> On Thu, 3 Feb 2005, Edward B. Dreger wrote:
>
> > JJ> auth is sufficient to make email traceable to your own customers.
> >
> > End users also would appreciate the ability to _know_ a message is not
> > forged.
>
> The only way to be sure
On Sat, 2005-02-05 at 19:18 +, JÃrgen Hovland wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Edward B. Dreger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > TV> From: Todd Vierling
> >
> > TV> The only way to be sure is via cryptographic signature. Barring
> > TV> that level
> >
> > False. You imply that a crypt
On Sat, 2005-02-05 at 09:39 -0800, J.D. Falk wrote:
> On 02/04/05, Douglas Otis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > SPF does nothing, and could actually damage the reputation of those
> > domains that authorize the provider for their mailbox domain using
> > SPF. Th
On Sat, 2005-02-05 at 19:10, J.D. Falk wrote:
> On 02/05/05, Douglas Otis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > DK or IIM makes it clear who is administering the server and this
> > authentication permits reputation assessment. Add an account
> > identifier, and the
On Sun, 2005-02-06 at 09:41, J.D. Falk wrote:
> On 02/05/05, Douglas Otis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Without authenticating an identity, it must not be used in a reputation
> > assessment. Currently this is commonly done by using the remote IP
> > address au
On Mon, 2005-02-28 at 11:44 -0600, Kee Hinckley wrote:
> At 4:51 PM + 2/25/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > Because that would require providers to act like professionals,
> > join an Internet Mail Services Association, agree on policies
> > for mail exchange, and require mail peering agreem
On Mon, 2005-03-14 at 14:50, Dan Hollis wrote:
> I asked an EE friend, he says it sounds like a convenient excuse for
> APC to reject claims.
Surge protection using military style passive line filters will reduce
an already attenuated trapezoidal wave by absorbing higher frequency
components. M
On Mon, 2005-03-28 at 09:55 -0500, Jay R. Ashworth wrote:
>
> As for "didn't authorize you to block", two thoughts come to mind:
> first, the person with the last clear chance in a mail blacklisting
> situation is the mail admin in question, is it not?
Many administrators avoid complaints by plac
On Tue, 2005-04-19 at 15:44 -0400, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
> I think that these conpanies (lexis nexis, ameritrade, whoever) should be
> held *criminally* liable for things like this.
>
> How long until something like the social security administration has an
> announcement like this? Or, Exper
On Wed, 2005-04-20 at 12:38 +0530, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
> seen on a local linux mailing list -
>
> > It looks like some one broke into VSNL's name server and done some
> > harm to open source websites I'm now using Airtel's (mantraonline)
> > name server and able to browser the sites men
On Wed, 2005-04-27 at 13:39 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> At a recent forum at Fordham Law School, Susan Crawford -- an attorney,
> not a network operator -- expressed it very well: "if we make ISPs into
> police, we're all in the ghetto".
>
> Bruce is a smart guy, and a good friend of min
On Wed, 2005-05-11 at 11:08 -0700, Matt Bazan wrote:
> why in the world would anyone want to purchase dsl from a private
> reseller when i can get 4mb down 384 up from comcast for $25?
Broadband access may become limited to the cable provider and the phone
company, once access to the CO becomes i
On Thu, 2005-06-09 at 13:54 -0700, william(at)elan.net wrote:
>
> On Thu, 9 Jun 2005, Barry Shein wrote:
> When somebody else looks at your activity and makes "subjective" judgment
> (mostly based on multiple reports from users) and then lets this judgment
> about your activities be available
On Tue, 2004-07-27 at 13:38, James Couzens wrote:
> On Sat, 2004-07-24 at 18:49, John Bittenbender wrote:
> > http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/07/22/HNmicrosoftid_1.html
> >
> > As a side note, I notice that the article mentions a submission to the
> > IETF but I haven't seen any RFC's related
On Tue, 2004-07-27 at 19:38, Mike Leber wrote:
> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 11:51:26 EDT, Gerald said:
> >
> > > I think this will be the next best thing in E-mail. I'd love for that date
> > > to be August 1 though.
> >
> > OK... Aug 1 is a weekish away
> DAU> Date: Wed, 4 Aug 2004 14:46:02 -0700
> DAU> From: David A. Ulevitch
>
> DAU> I don't think SPF is worthless [1] but it isn't a drop-in
> DAU> solution and the impact on infrastructure will be
> DAU> significant if it becomes widely adopted.
>
> When an architecture is "maxed out", it's diff
>
> David A.Ulevitch wrote:
>
>>
>> 1: SRS may just be a boondoggle, we'll see.
>>
>
> Considering MARID seems to be sender id first and the rest nowhere ..
> http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3390221
This article has the state of these drafts stated incorrectly.
See:
http://www.imc.or
On Thu, 2004-08-12 at 14:43, Scott Francis wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 12, 2004 at 12:17:47AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
> >
> > Folks,
> >
> > EBD> ... SPF isn't
> > EBD> perfect, but it's something now, and IMHO probably better than
> >
> > This is a very popular view these days.
> >
> > Howev
On Thu, 2004-08-12 at 16:59, Ted Hardie wrote:
> At 3:32 PM -0700 8/12/04, Douglas Otis wrote:
> >
> >There is a proposal that should interest you. It is called Bounce Tag
> >Address Validation By Dave Crocker.
> >
> >http://www.brandenburg.com/specifica
"J.D. Falk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 09/07/04, Paul Jakma <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> Then there's Sender-ID. Bulky XML in DNS, sigh.
>
> No, that was CallerID. SenderID uses a format that looks and
> smells almost exactly like SPF.
>
> I only mention this to reduce the FUD.
Sender-ID
On Wed, 2004-09-08 at 09:59, Paul Vixie wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (vijay gill) writes:
>
> > ... That means that if I do get a mail purporting to be from citi from
> > randomgibberish, I can junk it without hesitation.
>
> agreed, that is what it means.
>
> however, and this is the important
On Tue, 2004-09-21 at 13:01, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
> On Tue, 21 Sep 2004, Dan Mahoney, System Admin wrote:
>
> > Unless your connection is permenent, with a permanent static ip, you
> > should not be *directly* sending out mail. The very nature of dynamic ips
> > implies that even if a sin
On Tue, 2004-09-21 at 14:22, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
> On Tue, 21 Sep 2004, Douglas Otis wrote:
>
> > As a prophylactic measure, Port 25 is blocked or transparently
> > intercepted to monitor the network via error logs. For external mail
> > submissions, Port
On Thu, 2004-12-02 at 16:03, Mark Andrews wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you write:
> >
> >You would put in a global wildcard that says no smtp sender here. Only
> >for those boxes being legitimate SMTP to outside senders you'd put in a
> >more specific record as shown above. You probab
On Dec 27, 2005, at 5:03 AM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]
om>, "Hannigan, Martin" writes:
In the general sense, possibly, but where there are lawyers there
is =
always discoragement.
Suing people with no money is easy, but it does stop them from =
contribu
On Jul 29, 2007, at 5:02 AM, Peter Dambier wrote:
I am pessimistic. The malware will find its way.
It is port 25 smtp that goes away and takes part of the spam away too.
IPv6:25 will not work, or will not be accepted? There are IPv6
translators that dynamically share IPv4 address space.
On Aug 1, 2007, at 7:10 AM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Does anyone have any thoughts on this? Sorry if this is the wrong
place to ask.
It would be better for you to join an organization like MAAWG
http://www.maawg.org/home which is attempting to define best
curren
On Aug 8, 2007, at 12:11 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Douglas Otis) writes:
Ensuring an authoritative domain name server responds via UDP is a
critical security requirement. TCP will not create the same risk
of a resolver being poisoned, but a TCP connection will consume a
On Aug 8, 2007, at 5:35 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
... but a TCP connection will consume a
significant amount of a name server's resources.
...wrong.
Wanting to understand this comment, ...
the resources given a nameserver to TCP connections are tightly
controlled, as described in RFC 103
On Aug 9, 2007, at 2:05 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
Your comments have helped.
i think you're advising folks to monitor their authority servers to
find out how many truncated responses are going out and how many
TCP sessions result from these truncations and how many of these
TCP sessions are
On Aug 13, 2007, at 11:03 AM, Chris L. Morrow wrote:
So, to be clear folks want to make it much more difficult for
grandma-jones to return the typo'd: mygramdkids.com for
mygrandkids.com right?
Grandma will still need to make a payment for the domain. Grandma is
also unlikely to find a
On Aug 13, 2007, at 2:01 PM, Carl Karsten wrote:
I am not sure tasting is criminal or fraud.
Tracking domain related crime is hindered by the millions of domains
registered daily for "domain tasting." Unregistered domains likely
to attract errant lookups will not vary greatly from unreg
On Aug 14, 2007, at 9:29 AM, Al Iverson wrote:
On 8/14/07, Tim Franklin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tue, August 14, 2007 1:48 am, Douglas Otis wrote:
For domains to play any role in securing email, a published MX
record should become a necessary acceptance requirement. Usin
On Wed, 2007-08-15 at 11:58 +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
> > Accepting messages from a domain lacking MX records might be risky
> > due to the high rate of domain turnovers. Within a few weeks,
> > more than the number of existing domains will have been added and
> > deleted by then. Spammers ta
On Aug 14, 2007, at 10:22 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
On Wed, 2007-08-15 at 11:58 +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
Since all valid email domains are required to have a working
postmaster you can safely drop any email from such domains.
Use of root "." as a name for a target may create undesired
On Aug 14, 2007, at 11:00 PM, Chris L. Morrow wrote:
On Wed, 15 Aug 2007, Paul Ferguson wrote:
More than ~85% of all spam is being generated by spambots.
yes, that relates to my question how though? I asked: "Do spammers
monitor the domain system in order to spam from the domains in flux
On Aug 15, 2007, at 12:38 PM, Al Iverson wrote:
Dumb question, not necessarily looking to call you or anyone out,
but I'm curious: What valid, legitimate, or likely to be used non-
criminal reasons are there for domain tasting?
This article describes the motivation leading to domain tastin
On Aug 15, 2007, at 2:55 PM, Barry Shein wrote:
Then my next question is, what reasons are there where it'd be
wise/useful/non-criminal to do it on a large scale?
It's a relatively passive activity when used for ad pages, no one
forces anyone to look at them. I'm not sure what the problem
On Aug 15, 2007, at 5:34 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
Yes, and this convention still generates nuisance root traffic
whenever the application fails to comprehend "." is a special
target. This is true even when _defined_ as a special target for
the specific resource record, as with SRV. In th
On Oct 11, 2006, at 9:07 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 10 Oct 2006 22:54:03 BST, Per Gregers Bilse said:
The problem is that from and including A we can't talk about the
damned things any more -- we resort to spelling out each number,
with no inherent and natural feel for what we'r
On Thu, 2006-10-26 at 13:03 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 17:07:32 +0200, Florian Weimer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
> > * Steven M. Bellovin:
> >
> > > As you note, the 20-25% figure (of addresses) has been pretty
> > > constant for quite a while. Assuming that subv
On Fri, 2006-10-27 at 14:11 +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Douglas Otis:
>
> > Spam being sent through Bot farms has already set the stage for
> > untraceable DNS attacks based upon SPF. In addition to taking out major
> > interconnects, these attacks can:
> >
On Oct 27, 2006, at 10:03 AM, Chris L. Morrow wrote:
On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Or you could look at it as a weakness of SPF that should be used
as a justification for discouraging its use. After all if we
discourage botnets because they are DDoS enablers, shouldn't we
On Sat, 2006-10-28 at 00:52 -0500, Gadi Evron wrote:
> If you believe SPF prevents you from doing it, can you elaborate how?
Spam referencing malicious SPF scripts can result in PASS or NEUTRAL,
where the message and message rates may be normal. Recipients will not
notice the role they are pla
On Sun, 2006-10-29 at 09:40 -0600, Gadi Evron wrote:
> On Sun, 29 Oct 2006, Douglas Otis wrote:
> >
> > How would you identify and quell an SPF attack in progress?
>
> Okay, now I understand.
>
> You speak of an attack specifically utilizing SPF, not of how SPF
>
On Dec 8, 2006, at 6:40 AM, Luke wrote:
Hi,
as a consequence of a virus diffused in my customer-base, I often
receive big bursts of traffic on my DNS servers. Unluckly, a lot of
clients start to bomb my DNSs at a certain hour, so I have a
distributed tentative of denial of service. I ca
On Jan 9, 2007, at 7:17 PM, Fergie wrote:
Gian Constantine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If demand for variety in service provider selection grows with the
proliferation of IPTV, we may see the required motivation for
inter-AS multicast, which places us in a position moving to the
large mu
On Feb 7, 2007, at 6:27 AM, Jeff Kell wrote:
Alexander Harrowell wrote:
It was clear from the highly reliable index I call the "Nanogdex"
that nothing was seriously amiss.
Yes, but it got so much bloody press that ambitious copycats can't
be too far behind.
When 2 of 13 root systems
On Wed, 2007-03-28 at 13:34 +0100, Tony Finch wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Mar 2007, Chris L. Morrow wrote:
> >
> > didn't paul vixie post a problem domain a bit back that would suffice?
>
> IIRC he was complaining about junk DNS lookups to the RBL's original
> domain.
Correct.
The conclusion of that th
On Mar 28, 2007, at 11:08 AM, william(at)elan.net wrote:
On Wed, 28 Mar 2007, Tony Finch wrote:
On Wed, 28 Mar 2007, Ken Simpson wrote:
What is particularly missing IMHO is a spoofed-BGP-route blacklist.
Anyone making any progress on that sort of thing?
completewhois has lists in variou
On Mar 30, 2007, at 7:33 AM, Wil Schultz wrote:
So at my workplace we have a fairly fast moving newsletter machine
that people sign up for.
Rules are followed as in: Mail isn't sent unless people request it,
an address is removed upon subscription cancel, and addresses are
removed after t
On Sat, 2007-03-31 at 06:16 -0500, Gadi Evron wrote:
> Or we can look at it from a different perspective:
> Should bad guys be able to register thousands of domains with "amazon" and
> "paypal" in them every day? Should there be black hat malicious registrars
> around? Shouldn't there be an abuse
On Sat, 2007-03-31 at 11:09 -0500, Frank Bulk wrote:
> On
Sat, 31 Mar 2007 07:46:47 -0700,
Douglas Otis wrote:
> >
> > Even when bad actors can be identified, a reporting lag of 12 to 24
> > hours in the case of global registries en
On Sat, 2007-03-31 at 15:02 -0800, william(at)elan.net wrote:
>
> On Sat, 31 Mar 2007, Fergie wrote:
>
> > It is my understanding that the various domain registries answer
> > to ICANN policy -- if ICANN policy allows them to operate in a manner
> > which is conducive to allowing criminals to man
On Sat, 2007-03-31 at 16:47 -0500, Frank Bulk wrote:
> For some operations or situations 24 hours would be too long a time to wait.
> There would need to be some mechanism where the delay could be bypassed.
What operation requires a new domain be published within 24 hours? Even
banks require sev
On Sun, 2007-04-01 at 08:41 -0700, David Conrad wrote:
> > It is my understanding that the various domain registries answer
> > to ICANN policy
>
> _Some_ registries answer to ICANN policy, those that have entered
> into contracts with ICANN. Others, e.g., all the country code TLD
> registri
On Sun, 2007-04-01 at 12:29 -0700, Roland Dobbins wrote:
>
> On Apr 1, 2007, at 11:51 AM, Douglas Otis wrote:
>
> > Instituting notification of domain name additions before publishing
> > would enable several preemptive defenses not otherwise possible.
>
> How d
On Sun, 2007-04-01 at 16:42 -0700, Roland Dobbins wrote:
>
> On Apr 1, 2007, at 3:36 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
>
> > By ensuring data published by registry's can be previewed, all
> > registrars would be affected equally.
>
> But what is the probative value of
On Mon, 2007-04-02 at 12:03 +1200, Simon Lyall wrote:
> So assuming you get rid of tasting and reduce the flow of new names to
> say 50,000 per day [1] exactly how are you going to preview these in any
> meaningful sort of way?
A preview would not directly reduce a churn rate, although it might
On Apr 1, 2007, at 8:15 PM, Roland Dobbins wrote:
On Apr 1, 2007, at 6:16 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
Reacting to new domains after the fact is often too late.
What happens when they're wrong?
Most assessments are fairly straight forward. As with any form of
protection, there m
On Apr 2, 2007, at 11:07 AM, Roland Dobbins wrote:
On Apr 1, 2007, at 6:16 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
Until Internet commerce requires some physical proof of identity,
fraud will continue.
As has already been stated, this is hardly a guarantee.
It seems to me that we're in dang
On Apr 2, 2007, at 6:29 PM, David Conrad wrote:
On Apr 1, 2007, at 8:45 AM, Gadi Evron wrote:
On Sun, 1 Apr 2007, David Conrad wrote:
On Mar 31, 2007, at 8:44 PM, Gadi Evron wrote:
I'm not clear what "this realm" actually is.
Abuse and Security (non infrastructure).
Well, ICANN is suppos
On Apr 2, 2007, at 7:02 PM, Gadi Evron wrote:
On Mon, 2 Apr 2007, David Conrad wrote:
On Apr 1, 2007, at 8:45 AM, Gadi Evron wrote:
The one concrete suggestion I've seen is to induce a delay in zone
creation and publish a list of newly created names within the zone.
The problem with this
On Apr 3, 2007, at 3:29 PM, Sam Stickland wrote:
Maybe it would make sense for someone to reiterate what types of
abuse DNS is facilitating? I believe what Gadi was getting at was
mainly the ability to use fake details to register a domain, and
then very rapidly cycling the A records thr
On Apr 8, 2007, at 9:03 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Douglas Otis) writes:
Good advise. For various reasons, a majority of IP addresses
within a CIDR of any size being abusive is likely to cause the
CIDR to be blocked. While a majority could be considered as being
half
On Apr 11, 2007, at 10:32 AM, Warren Kumari wrote:
Perhaps you could write a nice, simple, friendly guide explaining
how you ensure that your network is never the source of malicious
traffic?
Identify your ownership, and ensure contact information is accurate
and well attended. Inconsi
On Apr 13, 2007, at 4:55 PM, Fred Baker wrote:
The biggest value in real practice is IMHO that the end systems
deal with a lower interrupt rate when moving the same amount of
data. That said, some who are asking about larger MTUs are asking
for values so large that CRC schemes lose their
On Apr 14, 2007, at 1:10 PM, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
On 14-apr-2007, at 19:22, Douglas Otis wrote:
1500 byte MTUs in fact work. I'm all for 9K MTUs, and would
recommend them. I don't see the point of 65K MTUs.
Keep in mind that a 9KB MTU still reduces the Ethernet CRC
eff
On Apr 19, 2007, at 10:03 AM, Robert E. Seastrom wrote:
"David Temkin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Warren Kumari
Yup, Sandia National Labs made a radiation hardened Pentium and,
as far as I remember, was working on a hardened
On May 22, 2007, at 2:16 PM, Gadi Evron wrote:
On Tue, 22 May 2007, David Ulevitch wrote:
These questions, and more (but I'm biased to DNS), can be solved
at the edge for those who want them. It's decentralized there.
It's done the right way there. It's also doable in a safe and
fail-
On Jun 19, 2007, at 8:35 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 6/19/07, Leigh Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Agreed, SMTP is not really a special vector, other than it's
obvious commercial spam use. So just block all the usual virus
vector ports, block 25 and force people to use your own
On Jun 28, 2007, at 10:06 AM, chuck goolsbee wrote:
6. Economists call this a collective action problem. Traditional
solutions include legislation, market leadership, and agreements
among small actors to achieve such leadership.
You left out: The "killer-app."
Compelling content *only
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