Hi,
> In a lot of this dialogue, many say, "you should prefix filter".
> However, I'm not seeing how an ISP could easily adopt such filtering.
>
> Let's consider the options:
[..]
> a) only RIPE IRR uses a sensible security model [1], so if you use
> others, basically anyone can add rout
> Now if only everyone here on NANOG were to do what Matsuzaki has done,
> and take the time to educate those less clueless, the world would be a
> better place.
Its time that people responsible for BGP routing need to show that they
have the skills and knowledge for it. Every ISP requesting an
Alex Pilosov wrote:
> Oh yeah, d'oh! Thanks for correction. But that is also an important point
> against PHAS and IRRPT filtering - they are powerless against truly
> malicious hijacker (one that would register route in IRR, add the
> right origin-as to AS-SET, and use correct origin).
With a de
Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 26, 2008 at 11:43:10AM +0100,
> Arnd Vehling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote
> a message of 12 lines which said:
>
>> Every ISP requesting an ASN from one of the LIR's should be required
>> to make a test covering the ne
Randy Epstein wrote:
>>> This isn't the answer. If it were, there would be no car accidents, pilot
>>> error caused plane crashes, etc.
>
>> Probably the reason you dont need to have a pilot license...
>
> Sorry, what?
You _need_ a license to drive a car, fly a plane etc. but until now you
don
Leo Vegoda wrote:
> On 26/02/2008 12:06, "Arnd Vehling" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> [...]
>
>> With a decent LIR DB (like the RIPE DB) this is only possible if an
>> hijacker breaks the authentication of the according database objects
>> whi
Randy Epstein wrote:
> My point was that even with a license, accidents still occur.
My point is that without a license more accidents will occur.
> Vendors currently do train their customers and certify them.
A lot of companies dont send their personel to training lessons because
of the cost
