I think the most dangerous thing is the direct memory access , cuz u only need
some magic code and a computer with a psu or FireWire port
On October 17, 2017 1:46:43 PM GMT+02:00, Bryan Harris
wrote:
>Re: physical access, it seems not a technical problem. I.e. keep
>laptop
>with you, hire a gu
Re: physical access, it seems not a technical problem. I.e. keep laptop
with you, hire a guard, etc. I'm not very technical, but could the hash be
stored in usb stick or online?
Maybe construct yourself a "computer safe" to make it harder for people to
get access while you're away? I.e. increas
Hey I also run libreboot :)
I have read research about signing all the components and then verifying all
that while you both , anyhow I think this would be very problematic with the
new karl implementation that has taken place in openbsd 6.2
On October 14, 2017 4:26:21 PM GMT+02:00, "Bryan C.
I have a similar problem with remote systems on cloud farms. You cannot touch
the firmware. You can logon to admin panel via internet browser, boot your
instance from there, interact with its console, enter the fde password. All
this is visible to the cloud farmers.
Ideally, openbsd's boot sequ
> On 14. Oct 2017, at 16:26, Bryan C. Everly wrote:
>
> Hi misc@,
>
> In playing around with Libreboot and Coreboot, my belief that physical
> access to the hardware really ups an attacker’s ability to win against most
> security has been massively reinforced. For example, someone with enough
Hi misc@,
In playing around with Libreboot and Coreboot, my belief that physical
access to the hardware really ups an attacker’s ability to win against most
security has been massively reinforced. For example, someone with enough
practice could take my Thinkpad T500 apart, force flash the BIOS (a
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