In article
you write:
>-=-=-=-=-=-
>
>We've also seen various banks and other large companies who seem to
>specifically only use SPF with DMARC, as a way of disallowing forwarding, I
>guess.
More likely their mail comes from a lot of places with hostile mail
admins, and while the overall admins
In article you write:
>Sometimes I'm thinking DMARC should have enforced DKIM, and not allowed
>to have only a match in {SPF, DKIM}, because it leads to issues like
>broken-DKIM working-SPF domains not noticing things are wrong even
>though they *are*…
That was ADSP. It was even worse than DMARC
We've also seen various banks and other large companies who seem to
specifically only
use SPF with DMARC, as a way of disallowing forwarding, I guess.
With ARC, you can actually "pass" the SPF pass through the forwarder.
Not that there's anywhere near wide enough acceptance of ARC to make that
yo
On 04/09/2018 08:45 PM, Jesse Thompson wrote:> Kinda, yes. Anyone
running a non-compliant list server should look to
> how other list servers are making themselves compliant. Could be...
> 1) rewrite headers
> 2) not break DKIM
> 3) ARC?
> I don't want to be overly prescriptive (no one in academi
