Sorry, I was not clear.
A lot of phishing that passes the antispam checks comes from *hacked*
accounts from universities and government agencies. So SPF, DKIM, DMARC,
all these pass and give negative score.
Only RBL (ip, url or hash), bayes from past phishing or some handmade rules
can detect the
On 3/25/23 3:10 PM, Heiko Schlittermann via mailop wrote:
We used MX sandwiching/NoListing on our own MXs and had issues sending
messages to remote sites which did sender verification via a poorly
implemented callback.
So, is it fair to say, that you had problems sending to site that used a
q
hg user via mailop (Sa 25 Mär 2023 18:39:06 CET):
> A. extortion messages like "I recorded you doing bad things, pay me". Tons
> deleted, but some in the inboxes.
>
> B. phishing, some generic, some specific for our web mail interface. The
> latter, sometimes, carry our logo in the fake page...
Grant Taylor via mailop (Sa 25 Mär 2023 17:07:23 CET):
> Are you indicating that you had problems sending to others who were using
> NoListing / MX sandwiching? Or are you saying that your equipment had
> problems going through NoListing / MX sandwiching in your outbound
> infrastructure?
We use
Dňa 25. marca 2023 17:11:48 UTC používateľ Andrew C Aitchison via mailop
napísal:
>
>On Sat, 25 Mar 2023, Grant Taylor via mailop wrote:
>> I never understood different envelope senders for each attempt of a given
>> message. -- I can see different envelope senders per message, a la. VERP.
>>
Really interesting thread. But like most other threads it seems to me that
the result is always the same: *it depends*.
In the last months my main pains were:
A. extortion messages like "I recorded you doing bad things, pay me". Tons
deleted, but some in the inboxes.
B. phishing, some generic, s
On Sat, 25 Mar 2023, Grant Taylor via mailop wrote:
I never understood different envelope senders for each attempt of a given
message. -- I can see different envelope senders per message, a la. VERP.
But I would naively expect each message to have a fixed envelope sender and
recipient from s
On 3/25/23 2:25 AM, Heiko Schlittermann via mailop wrote:
Ah, ok, that's what I know as MX sandwiching.
Interesting. I'll have to research that phrasing to see if I can learn
more about it.
Ok, that was your point. Sure. We tried this (NoListing, MX
sandwiching) for a while and had problem
What? I never said they were, I said do what we did with our issue. Please
reread my response again.
From: f...@dnsbed.com
Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2023 6:02 AM
To: Salvatore Jr Walter P
Cc: mailop@mailop.org
Subject: [EXT] - Re: [mailop] [EXT] - Dear sympatic
On 2023-03-25 13:54, Salvatore Jr Walter P via mailop wrote:
You could always do what we do with AT&T. We have been blocked for
months with no response and no reason given from AT&T. We are a
government agency, so we simply told our vendors and other entity's we
deal with that if they use AT&T
Bill Cole via mailop (Sa 25 Mär 2023 03:55:26 CET):
> > What does this change? From senders PoV it is a temporary error. The
> > sender will retry.
>
> The point of greylisting and "NoListing" is to eliminate the spammers who do
> not retry. They are harmless (aside from delay) for mail being haq
Grant Taylor via mailop (Sa 25 Mär 2023 00:33:32 CET):
> On 3/24/23 4:01 PM, Heiko Schlittermann via mailop wrote:
>
> NoListing works by causing the sending server to cascade through multiple
> MXs.
> First MX either doesn't respond /or/ sends a TCP reset. Thereby causing the
> sending MTA to
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