Hi Thomas,
On Tue, 2025-04-29 at 15:04 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> The current signature-based module integrity checking has some drawbacks
> in combination with reproducible builds:
> Either the module signing key is generated at build time, which makes
> the build unreproducible, or a stati
On May 7, 2025 6:41 pm, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Wed, 2025-05-07 at 09:47 +0200, Arnout Engelen wrote:
>> On Tue, May 6, 2025, at 15:24, James Bottomley wrote:
>> > I'll repeat the key point again: all modern hermetic build systems
>> > come with provenance which is usually a signature.
>>
>> I
On Wed, 2025-05-07 at 09:47 +0200, Arnout Engelen wrote:
> On Tue, May 6, 2025, at 15:24, James Bottomley wrote:
> > I'll repeat the key point again: all modern hermetic build systems
> > come with provenance which is usually a signature.
>
> I'm not sure the 'hermetic build' parallel is so applic
On Tue, May 6, 2025, at 15:24, James Bottomley wrote:
> I'll repeat the key point again: all modern hermetic build systems come
> with provenance which is usually a signature.
I'm not sure the 'hermetic build' parallel is so applicable here: typically a
hermetic build will produce an artifact and
On Sat, 2025-05-03 at 10:19 +0200, Arnout Engelen wrote:
> On Fri, May 2, 2025, at 15:30, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2025-05-02 at 08:53 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> > > Specifically the output of any party can recreate bit-by-bit
> > > identical copies of all specified artifacta previo
On Sat, 2025-05-03 at 01:43 +0200, kpcyrd wrote:
> On 5/2/25 3:30 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
> > Or you simply ship tools to remove the signature;
> >
> > sbattach --remove
> >
> > already does this for you ...
>
> It reads like you assume somebody sits down and explicitly looks at
> the
On Fri, May 2, 2025, at 15:30, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2025-05-02 at 08:53 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> > Specifically the output of any party can recreate bit-by-bit
> > identical copies of all specified artifacta previous build (the
> > public key, module signatures) is not available
On 5/2/25 3:30 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
Under a your interpretation of the above, any signed binary isn't
"reproducible" even if the underlying build was, which means any secure
boot kernel would never be reproducible because it also has to be a
signed binary. The solution is simple: can you s
On Fri, 2025-05-02 at 08:53 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> On 2025-04-29 10:05:04-0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2025-04-29 at 15:04 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> > > The current signature-based module integrity checking has some
> > > drawbacks in combination with rep
Hi James,
On 2025-04-29 10:05:04-0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2025-04-29 at 15:04 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> > The current signature-based module integrity checking has some
> > drawbacks in combination with reproducible builds:
> > Either the module signing key is generated at bui
On Tue, 2025-04-29 at 15:04 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> The current signature-based module integrity checking has some
> drawbacks in combination with reproducible builds:
> Either the module signing key is generated at build time, which makes
> the build unreproducible,
I don't believe it do
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