On July 6, 2022 5:23:31 AM PDT, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 04:11:45PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>> What I'm wondering is if we shouldn't be simply instrument *every*
>> invocation, and set the trust to zero if we ever trip it.
>
>I guess you can add some logic to rdrand_lon
On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 09:01:21PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND
> values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious.
I personally think it's totally fine to remove nordrand. However, the
reason why it w
On July 5, 2022 3:00:04 PM PDT, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 02:50:34PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>> It's just math. The only variable is your confidence level, i.e. at
>> what level do you decide that the likelihood of pure chance is way
>> smaller than the likelihood of har
On July 5, 2022 12:57:04 PM PDT, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 09:44:17PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> Oh, huh. Maybe in that case I should adjust the message to say "consider
>> using `random.trust_cpu=0`," which is the thing that would actually make
>> a security differe
On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 02:50:34PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> It's just math. The only variable is your confidence level, i.e. at
> what level do you decide that the likelihood of pure chance is way
> smaller than the likelihood of hardware failure.
That might be but the likelyhood of certain
On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 09:44:17PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Oh, huh. Maybe in that case I should adjust the message to say "consider
> using `random.trust_cpu=0`," which is the thing that would actually make
> a security difference.
Why isn't that option documented in
Documentation/admin
