Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] powerpc/mm: Remove custom stack expansion checking

2020-07-23 Thread Daniel Axtens
Hi Michael, > We have powerpc specific logic in our page fault handling to decide if > an access to an unmapped address below the stack pointer should expand > the stack VMA. > > The logic aims to prevent userspace from doing bad accesses below the > stack pointer. However as long as the stack is

Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] powerpc/mm: Remove custom stack expansion checking

2020-07-06 Thread Michael Ellerman
Christophe Leroy writes: > Le 03/07/2020 à 16:13, Michael Ellerman a écrit : >> We have powerpc specific logic in our page fault handling to decide if >> an access to an unmapped address below the stack pointer should expand >> the stack VMA. >> >> The logic aims to prevent userspace from doing b

Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] powerpc/mm: Remove custom stack expansion checking

2020-07-05 Thread Nicholas Piggin
Excerpts from Christophe Leroy's message of July 6, 2020 3:49 am: > > > Le 03/07/2020 à 16:13, Michael Ellerman a écrit : >> We have powerpc specific logic in our page fault handling to decide if >> an access to an unmapped address below the stack pointer should expand >> the stack VMA. >> >> Th

Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] powerpc/mm: Remove custom stack expansion checking

2020-07-05 Thread Christophe Leroy
Le 03/07/2020 à 16:13, Michael Ellerman a écrit : We have powerpc specific logic in our page fault handling to decide if an access to an unmapped address below the stack pointer should expand the stack VMA. The logic aims to prevent userspace from doing bad accesses below the stack pointer. H

[RFC PATCH 4/5] powerpc/mm: Remove custom stack expansion checking

2020-07-03 Thread Michael Ellerman
We have powerpc specific logic in our page fault handling to decide if an access to an unmapped address below the stack pointer should expand the stack VMA. The logic aims to prevent userspace from doing bad accesses below the stack pointer. However as long as the stack is < 1MB in size, we allow