This reverts commit 7f3c5d099b6f8452dc4dcfe4179ea48e6a13d0eb.
Turns out that this is reproducible still under specific compiler
versions (mea culpa: I did not test every supported version of clang),
and even a few randconfigs bots found.
We'll have to revisit this again in the future, for now bac
This reverts commit 9c87156cce5a63735d1218f0096a65c50a7a32aa.
I have not been able to reproduce the reported -Wframe-larger-than=
warning (or disassembly) with clang-11 or clang-18.
I don't know precisely when this was fixed in llvm, but it may be time
to revert this.
Closes: https://github.com/
Clang didn't recognize the instruction tlbilxlpid. This was fixed in
clang-18 [0] then backported to clang-17 [1]. To support clang-16 and
older, rather than using that instruction bare in inline asm, add it to
ppc-opcode.h and use that macro as is done elsewhere for other
instructions.
Link: htt
prevent_tail_call_optimization was added in
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
to work around stack canaries getting inserted into functions that would
initialize the stack canary in the first place.
Now that we have no_stack_protector function attribute (gcc-11
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fix
A security research paper was recently published detailing Catch Handler
Oriented Programming (CHOP) attacks.
https://download.vusec.net/papers/chop_ndss23.pdf
The TL;DR being that C++ structured exception handling runtimes are
attractive gadgets for Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) attacks.
In res
prevent_tail_call_optimization was added in
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
to work around stack canaries getting inserted into functions that would
initialize the stack canary in the first place.
Now that we have no_stack_protector function attribute (gcc-11
A security research paper was recently published detailing Catch Handler
Oriented Programming (CHOP) attacks.
https://download.vusec.net/papers/chop_ndss23.pdf
The TL;DR being that C++ structured exception handling runtimes are
attractive gadgets for Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) attacks.
In res
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fix
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fix
A security research paper was recently published detailing Catch Handler
Oriented Programming (CHOP) attacks.
https://download.vusec.net/papers/chop_ndss23.pdf
The TL;DR being that C++ structured exception handling runtimes are
attractive gadgets for Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) attacks.
In res
prevent_tail_call_optimization was added in
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
to work around stack canaries getting inserted into functions that would
initialize the stack canary in the first place.
Now that we have no_stack_protector function attribute (gcc-11
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 15:38:38 -0700
From: Nick Desaulniers
To: Michael Ellerman ,
christophe.le...@c-s.fr, seg...@kernel.crashing.org
Cc: Christophe Leroy ,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt ,
Paul Mackerras , npig...@gmail.com,
seg...@kernel.crashing.org, linuxppc-dev@list
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