On 11/27/2012 7:28 AM, Rafal Krypa wrote:
> Special file /smack/revoke-subject will silently accept labels that are not
> present on the subject label list. Nothing has to be done for such labels,
> as there are no rules for them to revoke.
>
> Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel
On 11/27/2012 7:29 AM, Rafal Krypa wrote:
> This fixes audit logs for granting or denial of permissions to show
> information about transmute bit.
>
> Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
I will queue this for 3.9 as I've just submitted the 3.8 Smack
changes.
>
> Signed-off-
On 11/27/2012 9:40 AM, Rafal Krypa wrote:
> The following three patches are intended to introduce in-place
> modification of Smack rules. Until now Smack supported only
> overwriting of existing rules. To change permitted access for a given
> subject and object, user had to read list of rules to ge
On 11/27/2012 3:16 PM, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> The security tree
> (git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git#next)
> looks a bit strange today ... It appears to have been created by Casey
> Schaufler (cc'd) and contains som
On 3/18/2013 10:05 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 02:12:59PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 3/15/2013 1:35 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>>> Create a new capability CAP_SIGNED which can be given to signed executables.
>> This would drive anyone who is tryin
On 3/18/2013 11:30 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 10:50:21AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 3/18/2013 10:05 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 02:12:59PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 3/15/2013 1:35 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
On 3/11/2013 4:50 AM, Igor Zhbanov wrote:
> This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type
> in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir().
>
> When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging
> is not zero) and you try to delete the file which
>
On 3/20/2013 6:09 AM, tal.tchwe...@gmail.com wrote:
> From: Tal Tchwella
>
> I want to suggest adding chroot capability to all users.
It is much too easy to create an environment for
tricking privileged programs using chroot to allow
unprivileged processes to use chroot. /etc/shadow
is your trivi
On 2/4/2013 6:14 PM, Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 2/2/13 11:30 PM, Al Viro wrote:
>> * JFS, since 2005: setxattr(name, "system.posix_acl_access", NULL,
>> 0, 0) succeeds, creating an empty EA with "system.posix_acl_access"
>> as name. Validity checks
As reported for linux-next: Tree for Apr 2 (smack)
Add the required include for smackfs.c
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
security/smack/smackfs.c |1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 2479a41..53a08b8 100644
--- a
On 3/15/2013 1:35 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> Create a new capability CAP_SIGNED which can be given to signed executables.
This would drive anyone who is trying to use
capabilities as the privilege mechanism it is
intended to be absolutely crazy.
Capabilities aren't just random attribute bits. They
turn -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> @@ -1362,7 +1364,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode,
> const char *name,
> static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> int type,
From: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets
by specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming
unlabeled packets. Because the other end of the connection
may dislike IP options, and ssh is one know application t
similar report was also
> sent here: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/27/85
>
> Could you please check below patch ? I think it should fix your problem.
>
> I've also added similar checks in inode_{get/set}security(). Cheating
> from SELinux post_create_socket(), it does the sam
#x27;ve also added similar checks in inode_{get/set}security(). Cheating from
> SELinux post_create_socket(), it does the same.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL P
body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
>
>
Casey Schaufler
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
/
> T: git kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/aegl/linux-2.6.git
> S: Maintained
>
> +SMACK (Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel)
> +P: Casey Schaufler
> +M: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> +L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> +W: http://schaufler-ca.com/
> +S:
--- Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Friday 15 February 2008 12:38:49 am Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > From: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> > Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets
> > by specifying an &quo
From: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets
by specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming
unlabeled packets. Because the other end of the connection
may dislike IP options, and ssh is one know application t
t; get that in?
>
> FYI, it looks like Linus just tagged -rc2 and it does have the fix you
> need.
Thank you. Verification in progress.
Casey Schaufler
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [EMAI
From: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets
by specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming
unlabeled packets. Because the other end of the connection
may dislike IP options, and ssh is one know application t
--- Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Friday 15 February 2008 6:24:25 pm Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > From: Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> > Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets
> > by specifying an &quo
On 8/6/2013 3:36 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 6, 2013 at 3:25 PM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> On 8/5/2013 11:30 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:52 PM, Casey Schaufler
>>> wrote:
>>>> The /proc/*/attr interfaces are given to
On 9/5/2013 11:48 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 7:29 PM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> On 8/6/2013 3:36 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Tue, Aug 6, 2013 at 3:25 PM, Casey Schaufler
>>> wrote:
>>>> On 8/5/2013 11:30 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>
Because NETLABEL depends on INET SECURITY_SMACK
has to explicitly call out the dependency.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
security/smack/Kconfig |1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
index 9fb14ef..1be1088 100644
--- a
On 11/30/2012 8:55 AM, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 11/30/2012 07:31 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>
>> On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:19:16 AM Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2012 04:05:26 PM Randy Dunlap wrote:
On 11/28/2012 10:40 PM, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi all,
> Changes
On 11/30/2012 10:43 AM, David Miller wrote:
> From: Randy Dunlap
> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 09:40:09 -0800
>
>> On 11/30/2012 09:28 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>
>>> Because NETLABEL depends on INET SECURITY_SMACK
>>> has to explicitly call out the dependency.
On 11/30/2012 2:01 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> Do other LSMs need this too Casey? I remember we mentioned how select
> was dangerous :-(
I don't see any missing dependencies, but then, I missed INET.
Yes, you mentioned that it was dangerous.
>
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 12:28 PM
On 12/6/2012 3:21 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 6 Dec 2012, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
>> Have people pulled that thing into anything else? Because quite
>> frankly, I think it's unsalvageable except with a rebase.
> AFAIK, only developers such as Casey will have pulled it for development
> purpo
On 12/5/2012 2:20 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@amacapital.net):
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 1:05 PM, Serge Hallyn
>> wrote:
>>> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@amacapital.net):
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 5:54 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@
On 12/7/2012 6:42 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Casey Schaufler (ca...@schaufler-ca.com):
>> On 12/5/2012 2:20 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@amacapital.net):
>>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 1:05 PM, Serge Hallyn
>>>&g
On 12/10/2012 6:59 AM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@amacapital.net):
>> It's especially bad because granting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to user "foo"
>> doesn't mean anything. Is he authorized to back things up to
>> encrypted storage?
> We're talking about privileges at the kernel
On 12/10/2012 10:12 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 7:47 AM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> Put an ACL on the program file.
>> If you want different users to run with different privilege
>> make two copies of the program and give them different
>>
On 12/10/2012 11:31 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 11:13 AM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> On 12/10/2012 10:12 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> I think that the Windows approach is worth looking at. See here:
>>>
>>> http://msdn.micr
On 11/6/2012 12:17 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> SMACK_MAGIC moved to a proper place for easy user space access
> (i.e. libsmack).
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/magic.h |1 +
> security/smack/smack.h |5 -
> 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletio
2012 at 5:43 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 11:59 PM, Casey Schaufler
>> wrote:
>>> On 11/6/2012 12:17 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>>>> SMACK_MAGIC moved to a proper place for easy user space access
>>>> (i.e. libsmack).
>
On 11/8/2012 10:08 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> SMACK_MAGIC moved to a proper place for easy user space access
> (i.e. libsmack).
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
I will apply once James updates the next branch of his security tree.
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/magic.h |1 +
> security/smac
On 1/2/2013 7:35 AM, Dave Jones wrote:
> Along the same lines as 779302e67835fe9a6b74327e54969ba59cb3478a, xattrs
> can cause big allocations, which are likely to fail under memory pressure..
Adding LSM and SELinux lists.
> [20539.081122] trinity-child3: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x1
ation it contains by LSM:
smack='Pop'selinux='system_u:object_r:etc_r:s0'
A security context without the LSM identifying lsm='' gets
passed through to all of the LSMs that use a security context. This
maintains compatability in the case where there is only one L
. Because the blob release mechanism
can't tell how the blob was allocated it's necessary
to tell it. This is accomplished by providing the
security operations pointer of the LSM that created
the context or NULL if it was created by the lsm
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
components will identify the security ops
vector of the LSM that will use it. There are various
wrapper functions provided to make this obvious and
painless.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
include/linux/security.h | 45 ++
include/net/netlabel.h
Subject: [PATCH v13 7/9] LSM: remove Yama special case stacking
Remove the special case stacking for Yama.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
security/security.c | 21 -
security/yama/Kconfig|8
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 19 ---
3
Subject: [PATCH v13 9/9] LSM: Documentation and cleanup
Add a description of the ways secuirty modules work now.
Remove security/capability.c as it is no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 39 +-
security/Makefile |3
provide that information to do so.
The networking interfaces that require a single secid
have been changed to hook into the mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
include/linux/audit.h |9 ++-
include/linux/cred.h |3
rather than the secid, eliminating the need to get
or pass the secid in cases where it is unused.
The two LSMs that use this hook, SELinux and Smack, are updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 10 ++
include/linux/sched.h |2 +-
include/linux
is. New interfaces
specific to the LSMs have been added. There is also a new entry
"context", which is the combined security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
fs/proc/base.c | 29 +++--
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git
On 6/12/2013 6:40 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> Hi Casey,
> Thank you for your review.
> Please refer to comments below.
>
> On 06/12/2013 07:11 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 6/11/2013 5:55 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
>>> This patch adds a hash table to quic
loc.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tomasz Stanislawski
Please see the explanation below.
Nacked-by: Casey Schaufler
> ---
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 15 ++-
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs
On 6/13/2013 8:29 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> Function smk_parse_long_rule() allocates a number of temporary strings on heap
> (kmalloc cache). Moreover, the sizes of those allocations might be large if
> user calls write() for a long chunk. A big kmalloc triggers a heavy reclaim
> havoc and i
On 6/13/2013 8:29 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> The smack_parsed_rule structure is allocated. If a rule is successfully
> installed then the last reference to the object is lost. This patch fixes
> this
> leak. Moreover smack_parsed_rule is allocated on stack because it no longer
> needed oft
On 6/13/2013 8:29 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> On ARM, sizeof(struct smack_rule)==20. Allocation by kmalloc() uses a
> 32-byte-long chunk to allocate 20 bytes. Just ask ksize(). It means that 40%
> of memory is simply wasted for padding bytes.
>
> The problem is fixed in this patch by using km
On 6/13/2013 8:29 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> On ARM, sizeof(struct smack_master_list) == 12. Allocation by kmalloc() uses a
> 32-byte-long chunk to allocate 12 bytes. Just ask ksize(). It means that 63%
> of memory is simply wasted for padding bytes.
>
> The problem is fixed in this patch by
On 6/17/2013 4:24 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> Hi Casey,
> Thank you for the review.
> Please refer to the comments below.
>
> On 06/15/2013 09:32 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 6/13/2013 8:29 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
>>> The maximal length for a rule line
On 6/3/2013 11:59 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> This patch adds a cache of selinux security checks into struct inode.
This violates the security blob architecture of the LSM.
Security module specific optimizations in the VFS layer are
probably going to be pointless if (when) we go to stackable
security
On 6/3/2013 1:26 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/3/2013 11:59 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
>> This patch adds a cache of selinux security checks into struct inode.
> This violates the security blob architecture of the LSM.
>
> Security module specific optimizations in the VFS layer ar
On 6/3/2013 4:18 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Tue, 2013-06-04 at 06:31 +0900, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, 3 Jun 2013, Eric Paris wrote:
>>>
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>>> + seqcount_t i_security_seqcount;
>>> + u32 i_last_task_sid;
>>> + u32
On 6/6/2013 10:55 PM, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> This patch adds the support of security labels for f2fs, which will be used
> by SElinux.
Please be inclusive. Security xattrs are used by LSMs other than SELinux.
> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim
> ---
> fs/f2fs/Kconfig | 9 +
> fs/f2fs/dir.c |
On 4/11/2013 1:46 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> This patch adds a hash table to quicken searching of a smack label by its
> name.
>
> For a typical idle for TIZEN the CPU wastes circa 5-10% of its cycles for
> processing the smk_find_entry function. This patch adds a hash map that should
> spee
On 6/11/2013 5:55 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> This patch adds a hash table to quicken searching of a smack label by its
> name.
>
> Basically, the patch improves performance of SMACK initialization. Parsing of
> rules involves translation from a string to a smack_known (aka label) entity
> w
gly, a single hlist is slightly faster than a double-linked list.
> The speed-up saturates near 64 slots. Therefore I chose value 128 to provide
> some margin if more labels were used.
> It looks that IO becomes a new bottleneck.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tomasz Stanislawski
I will ta
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Stanislawski
I will add this patch to the smack-next tree.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
> ---
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 30 ++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/se
On 8/19/2013 3:14 AM, Cong Wang wrote:
> From: Cong Wang
>
> selinux has some similar definition like union inet_addr,
> it can re-use the generic union inet_addr too.
I'm trying to understand what value this change adds.
All it appears to do is swap one set of inconvenient
structure members for
On 8/19/2013 12:50 PM, David Miller wrote:
> It's so that you can pass a generic ipv4/ipv6 address blob into
> things like printf formatting, and since there is an address family
> member present, it knows what's in there and therefore one printf
> format specifier can handle both ipv4 and ipv6 add
On 7/16/2013 3:39 PM, Sarah Sharp wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 17, 2013 at 12:18:21AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 02:12:35PM -0700, Sarah Sharp wrote:
>>> I *hate* both direct personal insults and indirect personal insults.
>>> Neither should be acceptable in our community.
>>>
>
On 7/26/2013 4:17 PM, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On 07/25/13 11:32, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 6/6] LSM: Multiple LSM Documentation and cleanup
>>
>> Add documentation and remove the obsolete capability LSM.
>> Clean up some comments in security.h
>>
On 7/29/2013 1:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:32 AM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations
>> [...]
>> Introduce feature specific security operation vectors
>> for NetLabel, XFRM, s
On 7/29/2013 2:15 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:32 AM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 1/6] LSM: Security blob abstraction
>>
>> Create an abstracted interface for security blobs.
>> Instead of directly accessing security bl
On 7/30/2013 2:47 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, July 25, 2013 11:32:23 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 5/6] LSM: SO_PEERSEC configuration options
>>
>> Refine the handling of SO_PEERSEC to enable legacy
>> user space runtimes, Fedora in parti
On 7/30/2013 3:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, July 25, 2013 11:32:11 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations
>>
>> Expand the /proc/.../attr interface set to help include
>> LSM specific entries as wel
On 7/31/2013 12:39 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, July 31, 2013 09:22:23 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 7/30/2013 3:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Thursday, July 25, 2013 11:32:11 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Subject: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explic
On 7/31/2013 7:48 PM, Balbir Singh wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:52 PM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 0/6] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs
>>
>> Version 14 of this patchset is based on v3.10.
>> It required significant change from version 13
On 8/1/2013 11:35 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, July 31, 2013 02:21:54 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 7/31/2013 12:39 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, July 31, 2013 09:22:23 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 7/30/2013 3:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>&
> Signed-off-by: Tomasz Stanislawski
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Applied to git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git#smack-for-3.12
Rebasing was required. The change has been tested.
> ---
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 30 ++
> 1 file changed, 10
On 8/1/2013 2:30 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, August 01, 2013 11:52:14 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 8/1/2013 11:35 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> Okay, so if I understand everything correctly, there are no new entries in
>>> /proc relating specifically to NetLabel,
On 6/27/2013 2:11 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/11/2013 5:55 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
>> This patch adds a hash table to quicken searching of a smack label by its
>> name.
>>
>> Basically, the patch improves performance of SMACK initialization. Parsi
On 8/20/2013 6:01 AM, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-08-19 at 14:42 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Well, they certainly don't appear to add any value on their own.
>> I also generally oppose doing clever things with data structures.
> If you want to implement same thing
sockaddr isn't as large as a struct sockaddr_in6.
There would need to be casting one way or the other. This
patch gets it the right way.
This problem required some effort to make occur in development
with 3.10, but hits every time in 3.11. This patch should go
into 3.11.
Signed-off-by: Casey Scha
On 8/5/2013 11:30 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:52 PM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> The /proc/*/attr interfaces are given to one LSM. This can be
>> done by setting CONFIG_SECURITY_PRESENT. Additional interfaces
>> have been created in /proc/*/attr so t
On 7/10/2013 4:51 AM, Phil Carmody wrote:
> 5d is ']', 'M' is 4d.
And spelling was never my strong suit. I don't know of anyone
who depends on this value, but in case someone does the correct
fix is to change the comment, not the constant.
>
> Signed-off-by: Phil Carmody
> ---
> include/uapi/li
x27;t as large as a struct sockaddr_in6.
There would need to be casting one way or the other. This
patch gets it the right way.
This problem required some effort to make occur in development
with 3.10, but hits every time in 3.11. This patch should go
into 3.11.
Signed-off-by: Casey Scha
all of the LSMs that use a security context. This
maintains compatability in the case where there is only one LSM
using the security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 56 +-
drivers/usb/core/devio.c
Subject: [PATCH v14 6/6] LSM: Multiple LSM Documentation and cleanup
Add documentation and remove the obsolete capability LSM.
Clean up some comments in security.h
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 56 +-
include/linux/security.h | 48 +-
security
t it has that ownership. These interfaces
are intended to allow a future in which NetLabel can
support multiple LSMs at the same time, although they
do not do so now.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
drivers/usb/core/devio.c |2 +-
fs/proc/b
option, and requires that the default be the legacy behavior.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
include/linux/lsm.h| 15 +
include/linux/lsm_audit.h |9 +--
include/linux/security.h |7 +-
include/net
x27;s
free code needs to be called. The context generation has to
note which LSM created a context, or if it was done for a
set.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
---
fs/sysfs/dir.c |3 +-
fs/sysfs/inode.c | 12 ++-
fs/sys
ndary.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Applied to git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git smack-for-3.12
> ---
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 167
> +++---
> 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 85 de
On 3/1/2013 2:12 AM, Steven Whitehouse wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I'm wondering whether there is a list somewhere of fields which
> security_inode_init_security() requires are set in an inode when it is
> called? In particular, does it matter if the inode number itself is
> unset when security_inode_init_sec
On 4/24/2013 5:10 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> (Reposting with expanded 'cc' list.)
>
> Included in the EVM hmac calculation is the i_mode. Any changes to
> the i_mode need to be reflected in the hmac. shmem_mknod() currently
> calls posix_acl_init(), which modifies the i_mode, after calling
> securit
On 4/24/2013 11:51 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 09:04:31 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v13 5/9] LSM: Networking component isolation
>>
>> The NetLabel, XFRM and secmark networking mechanisms are
>> limited to providing security inform
On 4/24/2013 11:57 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 09:04:06 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v13 0/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs
>>
>> Change the infrastructure for Linux Security Modules (LSM)s from a
>> single vector of hook handlers
On 4/24/2013 4:00 PM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 04/24/2013 02:15 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 01:22:20 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 4/24/2013 11:57 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> I know we had a good discussion about this a while back and I
On 4/25/2013 8:01 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 05:43:08 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/24/2013 4:00 PM, John Johansen wrote:
>>> On 04/24/2013 02:15 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 01:22:20 PM Casey Schaufler wrote
On 4/25/2013 12:14 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, April 25, 2013 11:09:23 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/25/2013 8:01 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 05:43:08 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/2013 4:00 PM, John Johansen wrote
On 4/11/2013 1:46 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> I am a developer working on optimization of the TIZEN system.
> Recently, I've discovered a performance issue in SMACK subsystem.
> I used the PERF tool to find performance bottlenecks.
>
> The test scenario was simple. Run multiple
On 4/12/2013 8:12 AM, Łukasz Stelmach wrote:
> It was <2013-04-11 czw 19:59>, when Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/11/2013 1:46 AM, Tomasz Stanislawski wrote:
>>> Hi everyone,
>>> I am a developer working on optimization of the TIZEN system.
>>> Recent
On 5/25/2013 9:57 AM, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, May 24, 2013 at 08:21:08PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> On Tue, May 21, 2013 at 3:22 PM, Linus Torvalds
>> wrote:
>>> Untested patch attached. It compiles cleanly, looks sane, and most of
>>> it is just making the function prototypes look much nice
On 5/25/2013 10:19 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sat, May 25, 2013 at 10:04 PM, James Morris wrote:
>> On Sat, 25 May 2013, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>
>>> But I haven't even looked at what non-selinux setups do to
>>> performance. Last time I tried Ubuntu (they still use apparmor, no?),
>>> "make m
On 5/26/2013 5:02 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sat, May 25, 2013 at 11:33:46AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Now I'll put on my Smack maintainer hat. Performance improvement is
>> always welcome, but I would rather see attention to performance of
>> the LSM arc
On 5/26/2013 11:17 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 10:59 AM, Casey Schaufler
> wrote:
>> The whole secid philosophy comes out of the need to keep security out
>> of other people's way. It has performance impact. Sure, SELinux
>> hashes lookups
On 5/26/2013 12:32 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>> And if we can't rip out that fundamental assumption, it's not obvious
>> to me it will be possible to simplify the core LSM architecture.
> One thing that may be sufficient is to maintain a com
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