On Mon, Mar 21, 2016 at 7:44 PM, Juerg Haefliger
wrote:
> Hi Balbir,
>
> Apologies for the slow reply.
>
No problem, I lost this in my inbox as well due to the reply latency.
>
> On 03/01/2016 03:10 AM, Balbir Singh wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27/02/16 01:21, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
>>> This patch adds supp
On 03/21/2016 01:37 AM, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
...
+void xpfo_free_page(struct page *page, int order)
+{
+int i;
+unsigned long kaddr;
+
+for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) {
+
+/* The page frame was previously allocated to user space */
+if (TEST_AND_CLEAR_XPFO_FLAG(u
Hi Balbir,
Apologies for the slow reply.
On 03/01/2016 03:10 AM, Balbir Singh wrote:
>
>
> On 27/02/16 01:21, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
>> This patch adds support for XPFO which protects against 'ret2dir' kernel
>> attacks. The basic idea is to enforce exclusive ownership of page frames
>> by eit
Hi Laura,
Sorry for the late reply. I was on FTO and then traveling for the past couple of
days.
On 03/01/2016 02:31 AM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 02/26/2016 06:21 AM, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
>> This patch adds support for XPFO which protects against 'ret2dir' kernel
>> attacks. The basic idea is
On 27/02/16 01:21, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
> This patch adds support for XPFO which protects against 'ret2dir' kernel
> attacks. The basic idea is to enforce exclusive ownership of page frames
> by either the kernel or userland, unless explicitly requested by the
> kernel. Whenever a page destined
On 02/26/2016 06:21 AM, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
This patch adds support for XPFO which protects against 'ret2dir' kernel
attacks. The basic idea is to enforce exclusive ownership of page frames
by either the kernel or userland, unless explicitly requested by the
kernel. Whenever a page destined fo
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