Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-04 Thread Pavel Machek
Hi! > It is known that most remote exploits use the fact that stacks are > executable (in i386, at least). > > On Linux, they use INT 80 system calls to execute functions in the kernel > as root, when the stack is smashed as a result of a buffer overflow bug in > various server software. > > Th

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread David Huggins-Daines
Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 10:20:37PM -0500, David Huggins-Daines wrote: > > Dan Aloni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > > > This preliminary, small patch prevents execution of system calls which > > > were executed from a writable segment. > > > > How does

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread Andi Kleen
On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 10:20:37PM -0500, David Huggins-Daines wrote: > Dan Aloni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > This preliminary, small patch prevents execution of system calls which > > were executed from a writable segment. > > How does signal return work, then? Newer glibc sets a sa_rest

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread David Huggins-Daines
Dan Aloni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > This preliminary, small patch prevents execution of system calls which > were executed from a writable segment. How does signal return work, then? -- David Huggins-Daines- [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe from this list: send

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread Andi Kleen
On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 04:54:38PM -0500, Alexander Viro wrote: > > Win: 0 > Loss: cost of find_vma() (and down(&mm->mmap_sem), BTW) on every system It could actually be optimized a lot, e.g. by just read/writing to a byte in the caller's current code page and handling the exception. But I agr

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread Doug McNaught
Dan Hollis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Alexander Viro wrote: > > On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Dan Aloni wrote: > > > without breaking anything. It also reports of such calls by using printk. > > Get real. > > Why do you always have to be insulting alex? Sheesh. I was thinking it's

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread Jeff Dike
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > This preliminary, small patch prevents execution of system calls which > were executed from a writable segment. It was tested and seems to > work, without breaking anything. It also reports of such calls by > using printk. Have you tried running UML on this kernel?

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread Steven Walter
On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 04:54:38PM -0500, Alexander Viro wrote: > On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Dan Aloni wrote: > > > It is known that most remote exploits use the fact that stacks are > > executable (in i386, at least). > > > > On Linux, they use INT 80 system calls to execute functions in the kernel >

Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits

2001-01-03 Thread Erik Mouw
On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 11:13:31PM +0200, Dan Aloni wrote: > It is known that most remote exploits use the fact that stacks are > executable (in i386, at least). > > On Linux, they use INT 80 system calls to execute functions in the kernel > as root, when the stack is smashed as a result of a buf