Re: [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-10-26 Thread Tim Chen
On 10/26/2018 11:18 AM, Tim Chen wrote: > On 10/26/2018 10:00 AM, Waiman Long wrote: >> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote: >>> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not >>> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU. >>> There is no n

Re: [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-10-26 Thread Tim Chen
On 10/26/2018 10:00 AM, Waiman Long wrote: > On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote: >> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not >> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU. >> There is no need to use STIBP for this case. Disable the S

Re: [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-10-26 Thread Waiman Long
On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote: > With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not > be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU. > There is no need to use STIBP for this case. Disable the STIBP code > when enhanced IBRS is used. > > Sign

Re: [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-10-18 Thread Thomas Gleixner
On Wed, 17 Oct 2018, Tim Chen wrote: > With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not on a hyperthread sibling > be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU. That's technically wrong. It still can launch an attack, but the attack wont work