Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

2013-10-01 Thread Kees Cook
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 10:30 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 10/01/2013 10:25 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: >> >> I mean, for example in an oops message we print data in words: the RIP, >> other registers and stack contents. If any of these values lies within the >> randomization range then we could de-ra

Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

2013-10-01 Thread H. Peter Anvin
On 10/01/2013 10:25 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > I mean, for example in an oops message we print data in words: the RIP, > other registers and stack contents. If any of these values lies within the > randomization range then we could de-randomize it. > > So instead of exposing randomized values,

Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

2013-10-01 Thread Ingo Molnar
* H. Peter Anvin wrote: > I think that the randomization offset would be necessary in order to > identify pointers. I mean, for example in an oops message we print data in words: the RIP, other registers and stack contents. If any of these values lies within the randomization range then we c

Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

2013-10-01 Thread H. Peter Anvin
I think that the randomization offset would be necessary in order to identify pointers. Ingo Molnar wrote: > >* Kees Cook wrote: > >> Here is the latest version of the kASLR series. It has much improved >> e820 walking code, and expands the window available on 64-bit. >> >> This is rolled out

Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

2013-10-01 Thread Ingo Molnar
* Kees Cook wrote: > Here is the latest version of the kASLR series. It has much improved > e820 walking code, and expands the window available on 64-bit. > > This is rolled out on Chrome OS devices, and working well. There's one kernel debuggability detail that should be discussed I think: