On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 04:33:13PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 10:16 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Cool, thanks Joe I'll keep this in mind for when we get to %pa.
>
> fyi: There are more of these misuses of 0x%pa now:
>
> $ git grep -E -n "0[xX]%pa[dp]?\b"
> drivers/d
On (11/02/17 21:14), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> I can put my email address if there is not a better option.
sounds good.
> > hm... just a huge pile of if's
> >
> > if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr))
> > do_hashing(addr);
> > else if (__module_address(addr))
> > do_ha
Micay ; Djalal
> Harouni ; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH V8 0/2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
>
> On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 05:23:44PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> > On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > [..]
> > > Yes. T
On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 05:23:44PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> [..]
> > Yes. The question has been raised will we be here again in 6 years time
> > trying to fix all the uses of %x. And there are already 29K uses of
> > %[xX] in tree, which of t
On (11/01/17 10:35), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> Yes. The question has been raised will we be here again in 6 years time
> trying to fix all the uses of %x. And there are already 29K uses of
> %[xX] in tree, which of these are leaking addresses? This is why Linus'
> has commented that really eff
On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 10:33:01PM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (10/26/17 13:53), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> > printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> > %pK allowing some control via
On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 10:16 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 07:08:48PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> > On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C.
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 07:08:48PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > > Here is the behaviour that this set implem
On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:33 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
> > >
> > > For kpt_restrict==0
> > >
> > > Randomness not re
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 03:03:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
> >
> > For kpt_restrict==0
> >
> > Randomness not ready:
> > printed with %p: (pointer) # NOTE: with pa
On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
>
> For kpt_restrict==0
>
> Randomness not ready:
> printed with %p: (pointer) # NOTE: with padding
> Valid pointer:
> printed with %pK: deadbeefdeadbeef
On (10/26/17 13:53), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> %pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing
> addresses gives attackers sensitive in
12 matches
Mail list logo
