On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:08:48PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> > On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: David Woodhouse
> > >
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > >
> > > From: David Woodhouse
> > >
> > > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with
> > >
On Thu, 4 Jan 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> #ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS
> #define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \
> "pushl %%ds\n\t" \
> @@ -28,6 +30,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
> u32 ecx_in,
> u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx,
>
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> index 28b0314..23b2804 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> @@ -113,5 +113,42 @@ static inline void
On 01/04/2018 12:51 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 09:56 -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
>> u32 ecx_in,
>> "=S" (*esi)
>> : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
>>
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 09:56 -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
> u32 ecx_in,
> "=S" (*esi)
> : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
> : "memory", "cc");
> + unprotected_formw
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:05:15PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > From: David Woodhouse
> >
> > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> > but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to pr
On 04/01/18 20:05, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> From: David Woodhouse
>>
>> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
>> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
>> firmware code execution when c
On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> >
> > From: David Woodhouse
> >
> > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with
> > retpoline
> > but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> >
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
Wait,
On Thu, 4 Jan 2018 09:56:46 -0800
Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
If you are
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