Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing

2021-02-09 Thread Sai Prakash Ranjan
Hi Peter, On 2021-02-02 11:41, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: Hi Peter, On 2021-02-01 19:11, Peter Zijlstra wrote: On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 01:11:04PM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: Ok I suppose you mean CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM? But I don't see how this new config has to depend on that? Thi

Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing

2021-02-04 Thread Peter Zijlstra
On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 12:35:10AM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: > Here the idea is to protect such important information from all users > including root users since root privileges does not have to mean full > control over the kernel [1] and root compromise does not have to be > the end of the

Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing

2021-02-01 Thread Sai Prakash Ranjan
Hi Peter, On 2021-02-01 19:11, Peter Zijlstra wrote: On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 01:11:04PM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: Ok I suppose you mean CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM? But I don't see how this new config has to depend on that? This can work independently whether complete lockdown is enfor

Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing

2021-02-01 Thread Peter Zijlstra
On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 01:11:04PM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: > Ok I suppose you mean CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM? But I don't see > how this new config has to depend on that? This can work independently > whether complete lockdown is enforced or not since it applies to only > hardware inst

Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing

2021-01-31 Thread Sai Prakash Ranjan
Hi Peter, On 2021-01-30 01:00, Peter Zijlstra wrote: On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 12:35:10AM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: Here the idea is to protect such important information from all users including root users since root privileges does not have to mean full control over the kernel [1] and r

Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing

2021-01-29 Thread Peter Zijlstra
On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 12:35:10AM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: > Here the idea is to protect such important information from all users > including root users since root privileges does not have to mean full > control over the kernel [1] and root compromise does not have to be > the end of the