Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-28 Thread David Weinehall
On Thu, Jan 27, 2005 at 09:13:04PM +0100, Arjan van de Ven wrote: > On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 20:34 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote: > > > > > > Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful. > > > Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post. > > > > > > > Pleas

Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread Arjan van de Ven
On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 20:34 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote: > > > > Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful. > > Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post. > > > > Please, no hard feelings. > > Speaking about implementation of the non executable pa

Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread John Richard Moser
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Julien TINNES wrote: > >> >> Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful. >> Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post. >> > > Please, no hard feelings. > > Speaking about implementation of the non ex

Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread Julien TINNES
Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful. Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post. Please, no hard feelings. Speaking about implementation of the non executable pages semantics on IA32, PaX and Exec-Shield are very different (well not that much

Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread John Richard Moser
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Arjan van de Ven wrote: > On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 12:45 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote: > >>Arjan van de Ven wrote: >> >>>The randomisation patch series introduces infrastructure and functionality >>>that causes certain parts of a process' virtual address

Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread Arjan van de Ven
On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 12:45 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote: > Arjan van de Ven wrote: > > The randomisation patch series introduces infrastructure and functionality > > that causes certain parts of a process' virtual address space to be > > different for each invocation of the process. The purpose of t

Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread Julien TINNES
Arjan van de Ven wrote: The randomisation patch series introduces infrastructure and functionality that causes certain parts of a process' virtual address space to be different for each invocation of the process. The purpose of this is to raise the bar on buffer overflow exploits; full randomisatio

Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

2005-01-27 Thread Arjan van de Ven
The randomisation patch series introduces infrastructure and functionality that causes certain parts of a process' virtual address space to be different for each invocation of the process. The purpose of this is to raise the bar on buffer overflow exploits; full randomisation makes it not possible