On Tue, Apr 20, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 08:09:13PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > The critical question is whether we ever need to translate hva->pfn after
> > > the page is added to the guest private mem
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 08:09:13PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 06:09:29PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +, Sea
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 06:09:29PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > But fundamentally the private pages, are well
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 06:09:29PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > But fundamentally the private pages, are well, private. They can't be
> > > shared
> > > across pro
On 19.04.21 20:09, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
But fundamentally the private pages, are well, private. They can't be shared
across processes, so I think we could (should?) requir
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > But fundamentally the private pages, are well, private. They can't be
> > shared
> > across processes, so I think we could (should?) require the VMA to always be
> > MAP_PRIV
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 04:01:46PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 05:30:30PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > I like the idea of using "special" PTE value to denote guest private
> > > memory,
> > > e.g. in thi
On Mon, Apr 19, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 05:30:30PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > I like the idea of using "special" PTE value to denote guest private memory,
> > e.g. in this RFC, HWPOISON. But I strongly dislike having KVM involved in
> > the
> > manipul
On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 05:30:30PM +, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 16, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index 1b404e4d7dd8..f8183386abe7 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -8170,6 +8170,
On 4/17/2021 1:30 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Fri, Apr 16, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
[...]
index fadaccb95a4c..cd2374802702 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -436,6 +436,8 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu
*vcpu)
On Fri, Apr 16, 2021, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 1b404e4d7dd8..f8183386abe7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -8170,6 +8170,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> kvm_sched_
TDX architecture aims to provide resiliency against confidentiality and
integrity attacks. Towards this goal, the TDX architecture helps enforce
the enabling of memory integrity for all TD-private memory.
The CPU memory controller computes the integrity check value (MAC) for
the data (cache line)
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