Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-10-05 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 04/10/2016 00:56, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> >> On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote: >>> Hi! >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the ability to check syscall argument pointers or cr

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-10-03 Thread Kees Cook
On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote: >> Hi! >> >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as >>> the >>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security >>> policies. The g

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-09-24 Thread Pavel Machek
On Tue 2016-09-20 19:08:23, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote: > > Hi! > > > >> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as > >> the > >> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic > >> security > >> policies

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-09-20 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! > >> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the >> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security >> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called >> Landl

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-09-15 Thread Pavel Machek
Hi! > This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the > ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security > policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called > Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivilege

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-30 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as >>> the >>> ability to check syscall argumen

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-30 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> Hi, >> >> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the >> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security >> policies. The goal of

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-30 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Hi, > > This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the > ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security > policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) calle

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing (cgroup delegation)

2016-08-27 Thread Mickaël Salaün
Cc Tejun and the cgroups ML. On 27/08/2016 17:10, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > On 27/08/2016 09:40, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>> >>> # Sandbox example with conditional access control depending on cgroup >>> >>> $ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-27 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 27/08/2016 09:40, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> Hi, >> >> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the >> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security >> policies. The goal of

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-27 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Hi, > > This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the > ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security > policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) calle

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-25 Thread Mickaël Salaün
On 25/08/2016 13:05, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> Hi, >> >> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the >> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security >> policies. The goal of

Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-25 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Hi, > > This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the > ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security > policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) calle

[RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

2016-08-25 Thread Mickaël Salaün
Hi, This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones,