On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 07:55 -0400, Josh Boyer wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 02:40:28PM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> > On 2 June 2014 14:33, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 13:48 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> > >> On 1 June 2014 05:14, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > Currently only
On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 02:40:28PM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 2 June 2014 14:33, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 13:48 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> >> On 1 June 2014 05:14, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >> > On Sat, 2014-05-31 at 01:37 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> >> >> On 28 May
On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 14:40 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 2 June 2014 14:33, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 13:48 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> > Currently only the builtin keys are on the system keyring, but once
> > David and Josh's UEFI patches are upstreamed, the UEFI key
On 2 June 2014 14:33, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 13:48 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> On 1 June 2014 05:14, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> > On Sat, 2014-05-31 at 01:37 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> >> On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> >> > (UEFI) secure boot provides a signat
On Mon, 2014-06-02 at 13:48 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 1 June 2014 05:14, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Sat, 2014-05-31 at 01:37 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> >> On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >> > (UEFI) secure boot provides a signature chain of trust rooted in
> >> > hardware.
On 1 June 2014 05:14, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Sat, 2014-05-31 at 01:37 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> > (UEFI) secure boot provides a signature chain of trust rooted in
>> > hardware. The signature chain of trust includes the Machine Owner
>> > Keys(MOK
On Sat, 2014-05-31 at 01:37 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > (UEFI) secure boot provides a signature chain of trust rooted in
> > hardware. The signature chain of trust includes the Machine Owner
> > Keys(MOKs), which cannot be modified without physical
On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> (UEFI) secure boot provides a signature chain of trust rooted in
> hardware. The signature chain of trust includes the Machine Owner
> Keys(MOKs), which cannot be modified without physical presence.
>
> Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates si
(UEFI) secure boot provides a signature chain of trust rooted in
hardware. The signature chain of trust includes the Machine Owner
Keys(MOKs), which cannot be modified without physical presence.
Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to
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