On 8/9/19 4:46 AM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.c...@mediatek.com wrote:
>> Possible approaches are:
>> 1. stop printing kernel addresses
>> 2. print with %pK,
>> 3. print with %px.
>
> No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker
On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 07:26 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 10:11:58PM +0800, Miles Chen wrote:
> > On Thu, 2019-08-08 at 19:46 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > > On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.c...@mediatek.com wrote:
> > > > INFO: Slab 0x(ptrval) ob
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 10:11:58PM +0800, Miles Chen wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-08-08 at 19:46 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.c...@mediatek.com wrote:
> > > INFO: Slab 0x(ptrval) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(ptrval)
> >
> > ... you don't hav
On Thu, 2019-08-08 at 19:46 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.c...@mediatek.com wrote:
> > Possible approaches are:
> > 1. stop printing kernel addresses
> > 2. print with %pK,
> > 3. print with %px.
>
> No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is t
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.c...@mediatek.com wrote:
> Possible approaches are:
> 1. stop printing kernel addresses
> 2. print with %pK,
> 3. print with %px.
No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to
find a way to get the kernel to spit ou
From: Miles Chen
This RFC patch is sent to discuss the printing address with %p issue.
Since commit ad67b74d2469d9b8 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p"),
%p gives obfuscated addresses now. When CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y, it is still
useful to get real virtual addresses.
Possible approaches are
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