> > This proposal attempts to reduce that cost by letting the system
> > developer choose whether to issue the IBPB on entry or exit of an IB
> > speculation disabled process (default is both, which is current
> > behaviour). Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst documents two
> > mitigatio
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry
> > Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry
>
> Two SoBs by you, why?
Tooling issues probably. Not intentional.
>
> > ---
> > Background:
> > IBPB is slow on some CPUs.
> >
> > More detailed background:
> > On some CPUs, issuing an IBPB can cause the address space sw
On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 07:47:19PM +1100, Anand K Mistry wrote:
> When IB speculation is conditionally disabled for a process (via prctl()
> or seccomp), IBPB is issued whenever that process is switched to/from.
> However, this results more IBPBs than necessary. The goal is to protect
> a victim pr
On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 07:47:19PM +1100, Anand K Mistry wrote:
> When IB speculation is conditionally disabled for a process (via prctl()
> or seccomp), IBPB is issued whenever that process is switched to/from.
> However, this results more IBPBs than necessary. The goal is to protect
> a victim pr
When IB speculation is conditionally disabled for a process (via prctl()
or seccomp), IBPB is issued whenever that process is switched to/from.
However, this results more IBPBs than necessary. The goal is to protect
a victim process from an attacker poisoning the BTB by issuing IBPB in
the attacker
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